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THE
TARGET:
OR, A
TREATISE
Upon a BRANCH of
ART MILITARY.

By a GENTLEMAN,
Who has reſided ſome time in ENGLAND.

Nunquam ita quiſquam ſubducta ratione ad vitam fuit,
Quin res, ætas, uſus, ſemper aliquid apportet novi,
Aliquid moneat; ut illa quæ te ſcire credas, neſcias;
Et quæ tibi putaris prima, in experiundo repudies.
P. TERENTII Adelphi, Act. 5. Sc. 4.

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TO HIS

ROYAL HIGHNESS

WILLIAM AUGUSTUS,

DUKE OF CUMBERLAND,

CAPTAIN GENERAL

OF HIS

BRITANNICK MAJESTY's ARMIES,

&c. &c. &c. &c.

MAY IT PLEASE YOUR ROYAL HIGHNESS,

I CRAVE LEAVE,

WITH THE GREATEST SUBMISSION,

TO LAY BEFORE YOU

THE TARGET,

AND AM, WITH THE UTMOST RESPECT,

YOUR ROYAL HIGHNESS's

MOST DEVOTED,

MOST OBEDIENT, AND

MOST HUMBLE SERVANT,

PREFACE.

WE muſt beg to inform our readers, that the rough lines of this treatiſe were drawn at different times, at and after the concluſion of the laſt war, with other poſitions calculated for larger numbers; in which, at another time, we hope to ſhew) if nothing prevents us) the ſtrength of infantry for particular ſituations, ſuperior to any yet found out by either the ancients or moderns; and calculated for the uſe and ſervices of the troops of theſe kingdoms, more than any other. Nor indeed was this intended to have ſeen the light for ſome conſiderable time, according to a judicious writer, who tells us, nine years are not too long to keep any performance by us, before it takes it's fate in the world †.

At the expiration of that time was our intention to do with the whole, what we do now only with the firſt part. And though this part is to make it's appearance rather before it's time, having not paſſed over nine years in the cabinet; we hope our readers (when the reaſon is known) will treat it as an indulgent parent does the offſpring of an immature birth, with double tenderneſs.

The reaſon of this rather early production requires no illuſtration: it is the war hanging over our heads; the ſword already drawn againſt us. When then can there be a more ſeaſonable time to brandiſh the Target?

It

† Nonumque prematur in annum. Hor. Ar. Poet.

It has been permitted us to ſee the concluſion of one war; it may not be our fortune to ſee the concluſion of another. Once begun, who can tell, when, where, and how it will end? The beginning and ending are not in the ſame hands †.

† Salluſt.

As war is a trade ſo uncertain; like a ſhip once out of the harbour, which no body can foretell, what ſtorms ſhe may meet with, when, and how ſhattered ſhe may come home. Should her ſails now be ſpread; all our thoughts may long have periſhed before ſhe rides ſecure in port again. Wherefore, the few we threw together in a rude undigeſted manner, relating to art military, at the concluſion of the laſt war; a part of thoſe few, with ſome additions, we have ventured to make publick at the beginning of this---if it is to be war. For which purpoſe we have newly regulated, digeſted, and given them a little better dreſs, that they may make a better appearance. This is all we ſhall ſay of this treatiſe, containing defenſive poſitions, which are left to defend themſelves. But as it tends chiefly to one point; it is not put forth, as of equal ſervice, with ſeveral other authors that have treated more largely of military matters; ſuch as Bland's Military diſcipline, Moleſworth's Standing rules for the government of an army, for, or in the field; Puyſegur's Art of War; Folard's Comment upon Polybius; Turpin's Eſſay; Feuquieres and Monticuculi's Memoirs; Ray's Practical art of war, and many others. Theſe books contain too many uſeful inſtructions to be wholly neglected by officers, whoſe rank

rank and ſituation in the army don't qualify them to gain that knowledge by experience thoſe books contain. The treatiſe before us is of a different nature; being more confined, tending to one little object, which is called neither Military Diſcipline, diſcipline of war, nor Art of war: but a branch of Art military. And when our brother ſoldiers have read all uſeful military learning, ſuch as is abſolutely neceſſary to be read (if any thing is eſteemed neceſſary) they will do this treatiſe honour enough, in a vacant hour to let it bring up the rear.

INTRO-

EXPLANATION of the PLANS.

THESE plans are not all drawn by the ſame ſcale.

The firings are deſcribed in ſome of them, to ſhew clearer the meaning of their poſitions.

The figures in plan 1 and 2 with croſs bars, repreſent ſquadrons: inſtead of bars, dotts; ſquadrons diſmounted: the other thicker ſtrokes, infantry. The dotted lines and wheelings, the ground they ſtood upon or marched over. This is to be obſerved through all the plans, except in ſome few places where the dotts point out the ground that is to be paſſed over, and the poſition the troops may, or are to be in.

Figure 3, in plan 4, is variouſly ſhaded, which is continued all through the plates of the target, to ſhew in every different plate the different parts.

The wings are divided in three platoons each, and then ſubdivided; which ſubdiviſion is deſcribed by dotts. The flanks the ſame. The enemy's infantry againſt the target, is manifeſted by an horizontal ſhade: the cavalry by an oblique, with a large light between; when dotted, diſmounted.

The enemy againſt the orb is repreſented by an oblique ſhade.

Errors of the PRESS.

Page	Line		
4	26	*read,*	at court
11	17		or cunning
13	29		ſtrengthen
30	29		it is
49	14		ſquares
72	19		army
89	19		ſo in effect by being in it, did
98	27		are adequate
131	22		in the center
154	25		in their ſame

INTRODUCTION.

WHEN we conſider the weakneſs of man's judgement, and contemplate upon the ſhallowneſs of human underſtanding; when we conſider further, how ſoon and how eaſy we may be deprived even of this; and at the ſame time ſee ourſelves vaunting, and endeavouring to aſſume the merit and glory of every action we are concerned in, (if it bears but the leaſt gloſs upon it) catching at every occaſion to mount on the wings of fame, and ſoar above our neighbours; it ſeems a matter worthy of aſtoniſhment, that ſuch oſtentation, and vanity, ſhould be the inheritance of the only rational creature: and nothing can account for it, but the weakneſs of that reaſon, and the ſhallowneſs of man's judgement and underſtanding.

Actions illuſtrious, that are brought to paſs by ſtratagem and contrivance, prudence and wiſdom, and may be called the works and productions of the brain; to whom is the glory of theſe to be attributed? Is it to him who gave us this wiſdom, and nicely formed and wove the texture of this brain, or to our all-ſufficient ſelves? O folly, blindneſs, and preſumption! not knowing how ſoon a moon-ſtruck madneſs, or moping melancholy, may ſeize and diſorder this nice-wove texture; not knowing how ſoon ſome little unforeſeen accident may bring back the driveling childhood, that ſets us ſcarce equal to the irrational animal; which having no reaſon, thinks not thus highly of itſelf, and may be ſaid to be the moſt rational, and worthy of praiſe for it.

Actions heroick, that are the efforts of ſtrength and courage; to whom ſhall we ſay the honor of ſuch that are praiſe-worthy are due? Shall it be to him who gave us this ſtrength, and endued us with this courage, or muſt we have recourſe again to our valiant ſelves, to find out objects proper to inveſt with honors; not feeling how near the melancholy conſumption, or pining atrophy may be treading upon our heels, that will waſte this boaſted ſtrength, and dwindle this heroiſm to imbecillity? The ſteed ſhares equal danger in the engagement with his rider, contributes more ſtrength and ſwiftneſs, perhaps as much to the ſucceſs and glory of the action; then generouſly reſigns all the merit and honor to him, who too often as arrogantly aſſumes it. He ſubmits (as it has been ordained) to the all-ruling reaſon of man; which is often made uſe of, not as if it was thought to come from him, who denied it to the beaſt: he who denied it to the one, could as eaſily have denied it to the other; and can, with as much eaſe, darken the underſtanding of the one, and enlighten the other.

This ſhall ſuffice to teach us, all honor, glory, and praiſe, that redound from ſhining actions, conducted and brought to perfection through reaſon's light, or the pregnant wit of man, or bodily ſtrength, or courage more than human, may be attributed to man, as man attributes the ſucceſs of an action to a horſe, that is governed by his rider, who is governed by his reaſon; which reaſon is given him by him who denied it to every other animal.

Turpin, tom. ii. li. 2. ch. 5. eſſai ſur l'art de la guerre.

This ſhall ſuffice to teach us, all military virtues are without merit, if they don't flow from, and are not ſuſtained by virtues more ſolid. And that he has but little of the great general, who has not made religion his firſt and principal concern. The Perſians implored the help of

of the Gods before the battle. The Greeks ſought to render themſelves acceptable by ſacrifices and prayers. The Romans devoted before the battle the ſpoils of the enemy. The ſongs of victory among all nations, were hymns to the honor of the Deity.

And it is by the grace of the divine omnipotence, that we are endued with the little reaſon and ſlender abilities which are here employed in the ſtudy of arms, in the ſearch of the truth of their ſtrength and force: this being the profeſſion to which we are called. [1]

The

[1] We have mentioned this, for every one to reflect upon, as the foundation of true heroiſm, and the ſolid baſis of victory: their reflections muſt incline them to think, as it has been thought before by the greateſt men in the world; that then, is the moſt hopes of ſucceſs, when an army puts their truſt in Providence, as well as the arm of man; becauſe no people can have preſumption to do this, but from a ſelf-conviction of ſomething in themſelves to merit it; which gives courage, confidence and ſtrength.

When Cyrus marched againſt the Aſſyrians, and was yet out of reach of their arrows-ſhot, he gave the ſignal, Jupiter our protector and leader; and when it had gone through the army, he began a ſolemn hymn to Caſtor and Pollux: for they who at ſuch a time are ſuperſtitiouſly given, (that is, who fear God moſt) ſtand ſo much the leſs in the fear of men. And the whole army of Cyrus was full of alacrity, emulation, vigor, reſolution, exhortation, temperance, and obedience; than which, nothing can be a more terrible ſight to an enemy. And after the great victory he gained over the Aſſyrians, Cyrus made them all ſenſible that it became them, to the utmoſt of their abilities, to pay their acknowledgements to the Gods for it. Xenophon's Cyropedia, book 3. Book 4.

Alexander the great upon his Perſian expedition, as ſoon as he came within ſight of Aſia, was inflamed with an incredible ardor of mind: and when he arrived, he erected twelve altars to the Gods upon the bank of the river Pyramus, devoted to the ſucceſs of the war; nor did he ſuffer a ſhip to diſembark, before they had offered ſacrifices. Juſtin. lib. xi. Quint. Curtius.

When Fabius Maximus had occaſion to ſpeak of the great victories he had been honored with; he ſaid, But theſe you muſt aſcribe to the goodneſs of God. Plutarch li. Fa. Max.

Titus Veſpaſian, the ornament of the Roman empire in the ſtate of heatheniſm, was called the delight of mankind: he had ſuch an humble ſenſe of God's government of the world, that he refuſed to wear the crowns that were ſent him upon his conqueſt of Jeruſalem: ſaying, It was not I that did it, but God, to puniſh a wicked people. Pezel. p. 35.

The branches of art military we are going to treat of, perhaps will be thought minute, and ſcarce worth the pains beſtowed upon them: thoſe who think in this manner, we would have to know, our labor is our own; things of an higher nature, we leave to them, or any other ſuperior ſkill and knowledge; contenting ourſelves with the induſtrious bee's humble flight; whilſt they like aſpiring eagles ſoar far above and look down with contempt upon us: at the ſame time we will remind them, that the bee is ſmall among ſuch as fly, but her fruit is the chief of ſweet things.

However,

Joſephus's wars of the Jews, chap. 20.

When Joſephus was made general by the people of Jeruſalem, he continually inſtructed the Galileans who had led bad lives, in what concerned the courage of the ſoul: and told them, that wars are then managed the beſt, when the warriors preſerve a good conſcience; but ſuch as are ill men in private life, will not only have thoſe for their enemies who attack them, but God himſelf will be againſt them.

D. F. Prudencio de Sandoval's hiſt. Char. v. emp. and king of Spain.

Theſe noble ſentiments of the ancients, have been imbibed in much later times: when the news of the victory of Pavia was brought to Madrid, the emperor Charles the fifth, (ſuch was the greatneſs of his ſoul) never altered his countenance, nor gave the leaſt token of joy; but withdrew into a private oratory, where he continued an hour giving thanks to God. The court was ſoon filled with foreign miniſters, coming to congratulate this ſucceſs; yet at his coming out to them, he continued the ſame calmneſs, and attributed all to God; nor did ever ſuffer any publick rejoicings to be made at coutt, or in any part of the kingdoms; but only thankſgivings in the churches, and his letters to the grandees to acquaint them of this great news: where the French were quite expelled Italy, and Francis the firſt their king taken priſoner.

Ramſay's hiſt. Turenne Father Maſcaron.

The famous Marſhal Turenne purified all his virtues by that noble ſolid piety, which refers them to God as their ſource and end; in the midſt of the noiſe and tumults of arms, the ſentiments of a chriſtian accompanied, animated, and perfected in him thoſe of a hero.

Turpin, tom. ii. li. 5. ch. 5.

Je ne m'étendrai point ſur les effets que la religion produit dans un général; le ſeul nom de Turenne renferme en lui ſeul tout ce qu'on pourroit dire a ſon ſujet.

Swediſh intelligencer, 1631.

The people of Naumberg were not only glad, but thought themſelves ſecure, ſo ſoon as they had Guſtavus Adolphus the great king of Sweden among them: even as confident as if they had ſeen their tutelar deity, or that their guardian angel had been come to their protection. This carnal confidence

However, during the ſearch of the truth of what we have advanced, we have learnt this, through the courſe of ancient and modern reading as well as our own reflections: that the art of war is an art of ſuch a great extent, ſuch a field for imagination, and ſuch a field for error; that notwithſtanding it has been the ſtudy and employ of many warlike ages, the inſtrument that has wrought many and great revolutions in every quarter of the world; notwithſtanding there has been improvements, new methods and inventions produced to light almoſt in every age; no body can pretend to ſet a bound to her perfections, and ſay it is now at the higheſt: and what is compleat, needs no amendment. Wherefore we may draw this inference; that it is as great a vanity in that perſon who treats of this art in general, as terminated and limited by any rules he can lay down, as it is an

confidence of an overjoyed people, the good king having by reflection applied to himſelf, became the more humbled by it; and ſaid to his chaplain, that he feared, becauſe every man ſo adored and honored him even as a God, that God Almighty would thoroughly puniſh him for it. But, ſays he, my God knoweth that I take no delight in it, nor am I deſirous of it. Guſtavus before his victories of Leipſick and Lutzen, prepared his whole army in the manner that Cyrus the great did before his victory over the Aſſyrians.

Charles the twelfth, a deſcendent of this great king, during his march to Ruſſia in 1707, had infinite crowds of people both young and old from all parts, to ſee this monarch, their protector and reſtorer of their liberties: who obſerved, that this great prince cauſed prayers to be ſolemnized twice a day as of cuſtom in the open field, where he incamped; forming a circle round the miniſter, being all on their knees together with their king. This admirable example of piety made ſuch an impreſſion on the children, that they afterwards imitated them in many places with ſuch extraordinary circumſtances, that numbers of people came from far to ſee theſe aſſemblies, till they were forbid for fear of miſchief. Adlerfield, hiſt. ch. 12.

We will finiſh theſe obſervations with holy writ.

10 Joſhua did as Moſes had ſaid to him, and fought with Amalek: and Moſes, Aaron, and Hur, went up to the top of the hill. Exodus, ch. xvii.

11 And it came to paſs when Moſes held up his hands, that Iſrael prevailed, and when he let his hands down, Amalek prevailed.

12 But

an abſurdity in him, who imagines he has attained the whole art, by having learnt what has already been practiſed and laid down.

Mar. Turenne's memoirs.

Marſhal Turenne ſays, in war accidents frequently happen to the moſt experienced general, againſt whom much might be ſaid, if experience did not ſhew, that the moſt able are thoſe only, who commit the feweſt miſtakes. Turenne ſeems to have thought as Epaminondas the famous Theban general did many ages before him: for being aſked, whether he thought Chabrias, Iphicrates, or himſelf, the better general? anſwered, 'Tis hard to judge while we live. What Epaminondas meant, was, that no body could tell the many errors either of them might commit before they died: art of war being ſuch a field for error.

Stan. hiſt. of Greece.

In

12 But Moſes hands were heavy, and they took a ſtone and put it under him, and he ſat thereon: and Aaron and Hur ſtayed up his hands, the one on the one ſide and the other on the other ſide; and his hands were ſteady till the going down of the ſun.

13 And Joſhua diſcomfited Amalek and his people with the edge of the ſword.

Deuteron. ch.xxxiv.v.9.

Joſhua was the greateſt captain of his age; was full of the ſpirit of wiſdom, for Moſes had laid his hands upon him, and the children of Iſrael hearkened unto him.

Joſhua, ch. xxiii. v. 2, 3.

And in his exhortation before his death, 2. Joſhua called for all Iſrael, and for their elders, and for their heads, and for their judges, and for their officers, and ſaid unto them; I am old and ſtricken in age:

3 And ye have ſeen all that the Lord your God hath done unto all theſe nations becauſe of you; for the Lord your God is he, that hath fought for you.

Joſhua wiſhed to make them ſenſible to whom they owed their great victories; and that he aſſumed no merit to himſelf. He thought as Solomon did after him, when he ſays:

Eccleſiaſtes, ch. ix.

11 I returned and ſaw under the ſun, that the race is not to the ſwift, nor the battle to the ſtrong.

And this wiſe king obſerved:

Proverbs, ch. xxviii.

1 The wicked flee when no man purſueth: but the righteous are bold as a Lion.

In the inſtructions Cambyſes gives to his ſon Cyrus, he tells him, It is in war as in muſick; you muſt not content yourſelf on remembering the ſtratagems and fineſſes you have learnt; but you muſt invent new yourſelf; like muſicians, who are not ſatisfied in chanting the airs they have been taught by their maſters; but are all their days compoſing new ones themſelves. As in muſick, ſongs that are made laſt are generally in the higheſt eſteem; ſo in war, methods and ſtratagems that are laſt found out, are regarded moſt, becauſe they operate with more effect; no one foreſeeing them, and conſequently not ſo well able to guard againſt them. Hiſt. of Cyrus upon military ſtratagems.

Who then can pretend to ſay, they have learnt the art of war; when it is of ſuch an extent, or rather of ſuch a nature, as to have no boundary: no one being able to find out the many hidden myſteries that lie ſtill behind, more than a muſician can pretend to tell us, the ſongs and airs that are to be compoſed by all the future children of Apollo.

There is no one ſcience has a greater variety of parts than this, where a ſmall diſregarded circumſtance may alter entirely the nature of the whole; ſo much the end is often the reverſe of what was expected from the beginning. Whoever give themſelves the trouble to ſearch, will find ſcarce two military actions either in ancient or modern hiſtory, that bear a reſemblance to each other in every particular: this manifeſts the unlimited extenſiveneſs of this art, being liable to ſo many changes; and has induc'd us to think it ſufficient, for one perſon to treat of one or two branches only; as there are few in this ſcience, but what will bear much to be ſaid upon; like that of a tree, the one being productive of another. Wherefore, whoever treats at large of this art in general, ſhould conſider within himſelf, what reaſon he has to

flatter

flatter himſelf, there ever will happen a war, or even an action, more conformable to his military ſyſtem, (tho' he ſhould waſte all his days in the execution) than to the theory and military ſyſtem of thoſe who are gone before him. We have mention'd this to ſhew, it is beyond the ſtrength of any human perſon to treat abſolutely and concluſively of war in general; tho' it may be laudable to make known the little we do know, relative to thoſe branches we are moſt acquainted with. The art of war in general may be compared to a large ſpreading tree, which in different ſoils, and in different ſeaſons, and according to it's own temperature, will be productive of more or fewer branches: and the perſon who by judging of the nature of the plant, as well as the ſoil and ſeaſon it is planted in, can tell how many branches it will be productive of; how many twigs upon every branch; where the ſtrongeſt ſhoots will be made; and why they ſhoot in one place more than in another; the wiſdom of that perſon muſt be great: he may be beſt able to ſay; why in different countries, and at different times, different methods are to be purſued in the military ſcience or art of war; and alſo to foretell the numberleſs unexpected circumſtances that will ariſe during the courſe not only of an action, or a campaign, but even a whole war; that will occaſion various turns, and require a variety of expedients and alterations; the execution of which may employ as many different branches of this ſcience: he alſo may be beſt able to ſay; where the chief puſhes are to be made, at what time, and what manner; and why in one place, one time, and one manner, more than another: the difficulties to do all this are ſo obvious, they need no enlarging upon. However, to thoſe who don't ſo readily agree in this, we would have to know, military operations depend not wholly upon human actions:

actions: ſometimes there are changes occaſioned by the interpoſition of divine providence; and God, to convince Job of his ignorance in the ſecrets of nature and providence, poſeth him with many hard queſtions, and with this among the reſt: Haſt thou entered among the treaſures of the ſnow? Haſt thou ſeen the treaſures of the hail? which I have reſerved againſt the time of trouble, againſt the day of battle and war. The meaning of which is, that the providence of God doth ſometimes interpoſe to determine the events of war, by governing the ſeas and weather, by making the ſnows and froſts, the rains and winds to fulfil his word, and to execute his pleaſure. Of this a remarkable inſtance happened in 1672. The duke of Luxembourg ſat down with the French army in the conquered parts of Holland; neglecting nothing that might facilitate his deſigns of penetrating farther into the heart of the country. However, he had no hopes of ſucceeding, but by the help of the ice, becauſe the Hollanders had laid their whole country under water, and were in poſſeſſion of the head of the dikes, with poſts well fortified, but expoſed behind; this it was that engaged the duke of Luxembourg to ſeize the opportunity of a hard froſt to fall upon the back of Bodegrave, Nieutbruck, Swammerdam, and ſome others of their principal poſts; he had certainly ſucceeded, had not a ſudden thaw forced him to retire, juſt as he was preparing to put things in execution, and obliged him to abandon in his turn the ſide of Holland.

Job xxxviii. 22, 23.

Reign of Lewis XIV.

Philip the ſecond, (king of Spain) not a great many years before, left us a noble example of his ſubmiſſion to the power of the Almighty; being told of the deſtruction of his invincible Armada by a ſtorm, which he had prepared for the conqueſt of England, coolly anſwered, I did not ſend them to fight the winds.

Eng. hiſt.

Queen Elizabeth did not ſhew herſelf leſs ſenſible upon that occaſion of the hand of providence; upon the medal that was ſtruck to perpetuate the memory of that extraordinary event, ſhe had a fleet repreſented, beaten by the tempeſt, and falling foul upon one another, with that religious inſcription, He blew with his wind, and they were ſcattered.

Wherefore, unleſs we had eyes that could pierce into the womb of events, and foreſee the battles, with their various forms and circumſtances, that are to be fought by our ſons hereafter, we ſhall content ourſelves in treating of one or two branches of this art. The experience and practice, that can poſſibly happen in the ſhort duration of man's life, not being ſufficient to give us the knowledge of the manifold accidents which ariſe from the variety of human actions, ſo as to be prepared againſt every turn or change that can happen; no, not if we add to this experience, all we can cull from the regiſters of antiquity and hiſtory, recording the motions of former ages; though meditating upon the effects of other mens adventures; their misfortunes may in ſome degree be our warnings, their happy proceedings our fortunate directions.

Our view in dwelling ſo long here, is rather to make the following ſheets of more conſequence, though they contain but a ſmall ſhare of this art in general, than to leſſen the merits of thoſe, who by greater pains and labor have handled this ſcience more largely.

Wherefore, though we have been endeavouring to prove it impoſſible to treat ſo fully, as that no action can happen, howſoever circumſtanced, but an exact parallel ſhall have been ſhewn us before, by which we may guide ourſelves; yet it muſt be allowed, that they who have employed moſt time in the theory and practice, ought to

to be moſt ſkilful in the knowledge of their employments. We agree with Franciſcus Patricius, who ſays, He that follows a war, ſees either the whole or a part; ſhould his knowledge extend no farther than a part, he has learnt leſs than him who ſaw the whole; but if he has ſeen and learned the inſtructions of one war; he has not learned ſo much as that perſon who has ſeen the proceedings of two ſuch wars; and the perſon who has ſerved in three ſeveral wars, ought ſtill to know more than him who has had the experience of only two; and ſo on.

Franciſcus Patricius's parallels.

But the art of war in general is of a great latitude; and appears to be chiefly as Cambyſes told his ſon Cyrus, a continual invention of ſomething new; this ſeems the principal art: it is not to travel in beaten roads where every one knows his way, and to be immediately bewildered if one wanders out of them; there is little art or ennning ſhewn here; the meaneſt capacity can't do much leſs. Wherefore, if it is a continual invention of ſomething new, whoever teaches the art of war, muſt teach the art of inventing; every thing elſe can be no more than rules and inſtructions tending to this art; and all military diſcipline is but the firſt ſtep towards it; and his own inventions during the courſe of ſeveral wars may not be required to be put in practice, more recent ſtill being ſubſtituted in their room.

Should then the art of war appear more difficult to be taught than we firſt imagined, the art of learning it perhaps may not ſeem much eaſier: the teacher, unleſs he is fertile in inventions, and advances ſomething of his own, teaches no more than what has been taught before; ſhould he be ſucceſsful in finding out novelties and improvements, they are the labor of one man's cunning, and the production of one brain only. The learner, 'tis

true, reaps the fruits of the theory and practice of all who went before him; ſelects what he thinks the purer part, and leaves the droſs behind; and it is eaſier to imitate than invent: but the difficulty is to find out, when he has learned enough; and to diſtinguiſh the purer part, or the right from the wrong of what he has learned: for they are ſeldom found like ſtep-mothers to their own productions, who have introduced improvements, as they call them, and inventions of their own; ſo far from it, that they more frequently appear infatuated by ſtrenuouſly ſupporting what they have advanced: yet theſe people ſhall be wiſe and famous in their generation. Who then are we to believe among the many that maintain their own notions, though perhaps all different? or ſhall we prefer ſchemes of our own, and become fools by fancying ourſelves more wiſe than any before us? here then lies the difficulty of the learner.

Almoſt all nations adore one deity, though they make their approaches to him through different paths: all nations have ſome wiſe and learned men. Would it not be arrogance and preſumption for one people to ſay to another, they ſhall ſurely trip or loſe their way, becauſe they ſeek a different path from themſelves? yet one path may be ſtraighter or more ſafe than another. It is the ſame in the military profeſſion: here victory is the idol every thing tends to, though ſought by different ways, and gained by various methods. Was there but one path that led to her altar, and one perſon only fortunate enough to find it, he might ſay, She is attached to my ſword only, and if you expect laurels, you muſt gather them from my brow: but experience teaches the contrary, and diſcovers many paths; ſome indeed long and intricate, others more ſhort and eaſy; and to find out

out the latter, depends on the wiſdom and judgement of the perſon employed in the ſearch. Nor is it a ſmall difficulty, when many, as we have ſaid before, and perhaps equally famous in their generations, have advanced methods and inventions of their own, which they ſtrenuouſly ſupport and maintain to be the moſt perfect, though differing one from another. This it is that has occaſioned changes and variations in the military ſcience and art of war, even from it's infancy to theſe times: for as ſoon as men were inflamed with the love of power and dominion, which was almoſt from the beginning of the world, every one was ſeeking to enlarge his territory, and encroach upon his neighbour; that from neceſſity war became from the earlieſt times the prevailing paſſion; and conſequently the ſtudy of it, the faſhion and chief employment. From this ſpirit there ſprung, like ſo many phenixes from the combuſtions occaſioned thereby, ſeveral famous empires ſucceſſively, the one being built on the ruins of the other; [a] the Aſſyrian, Medan, Perſian, Macedonian, and Roman; theſe great empires began their riſe, and to ſupplant one another, in thoſe parts of the world where the art of war was beſt underſtood, and flouriſhed moſt. Nothing proves the Roman method and ſkill in this art to have been the moſt perfect, more than the vaſt empire that was eſtabliſhed by it; and the chief cauſe of it's ruin being it's own greatneſs. They all may be ſaid to owe their foundations to military ſkill; their ſtatutes and policy, which ſerved afterwards to ſtrengtheu them, were firſt wrote in blood, and the ſword was the inſtrument that did it; their ſtrength was the law of juſtice, and that which was feeble was found to be nothing worth.

[a] Medus ademit
Aſſyrio, Medoque tulit moderamina Perſes. Claud. de laude Stilic.

That

That to whatever height of perfection the preſent art of war may be arrived, to whatever degree of wiſdom the profeſſors of it may flatter themſelves they are endued with, they can't but allow, the art of war of thoſe ancient days, that could bring ſuch mighty things to paſs, as to conquer almoſt the whole habitable earth, and found ſuch great empires, (eſpecially as the two laſt) which were ſo famous, that either before or ſince they have not had their equal; they can't but allow, the art of war that could do theſe things to be no ways contemptible, and the inventors of it to be no leſs wiſe than themſelves; unleſs their own conſummate wiſdom could find out ways to exceed all this.

Wherefore, as by the Macedonian and Roman (which were the two laſt and moſt famous empires) are ſeen, as well as by ſeveral ages after, the different opinions the moſt renowned for military ſkill have been of by their different practice, concerning the diſpoſition of troops for ſtrength and courage, and every thing that was eſteemed neceſſary and moſt conducive to ſucceſs; it will be obvious, what is incumbent on that perſon, who imagines he has a capacity ſufficient to give a compleat ſyſtem of the art of war: he muſt either advance ſomething new of his own, or take from ſeveral what he thinks the beſt and moſt uſeful, and blend them together, or prefer one before the others. When he has done this, he may find a greater labor ſtill behind; which is, to know how to prove what he is pleaſed to pronounce infallible, to be ſo, notwithſtanding the want of experience to convince; and alſo to prove every thing elſe inferior and more imperfect, notwithſtanding the famous people that were the inventors and practicers,

and

and the wondrous deeds that have been performed by them.

For this purpoſe, we have here given him a curſory view of the variety of practice, as well as opinions, of one part only, by which he may judge a little of the whole; which to the whole, is as a little field to a great country: when he enters it, let him conſider with himſelf, before he offers to leave it, whether he is able to beat this little field thoroughly; and, like a well-trained dog, make his points in proper places.

The Macedonian empire owed it's greatneſs chiefly to Philip king of Macedon; for it owed it's greatneſs to the Macedonian phalanx, of which Philip was the inventor, or rather improver; as it was an improvement upon the ancient manner of fighting among the Grecians, who generally drew up their foot ſo cloſe, as to ſtand the ſhock of the enemy without being broken. The compleat phalanx was thought to contain above ſixteen thouſand men; though it was alſo taken in general for any company or party of ſoldiers, and frequently the whole body of foot. Plutarch ſays, for it's ſtrength it was like ſome maſterleſs beaſt; whilſt it was embodied into one, as it were, and locked together target to target all as in a piece: but, if once broken, every ſingle ſoldier loſt of his own ſtrength, the nature of their armour was ſuch; for each of them was ſtrong, rather as he among the reſt made of the whole, than in his ſingle ſelf. In the evolutions or exerciſe of the phalanx, ſome of the motions were called Lacedæmonian, ſome Chorean or Perſian, and Cretan; and authors write, that they took theſe names from thoſe countries, being found out and practiſed there firſt. Philip, to make his phalanx perfect, like the wiſe man that he was, took from the neigh-

A.M. 3645. Olymp. 1051. Stanyan's hiſtory of Greece.

Plutarch's life of Titus Q. Flaminius.

Elian's tactics.

neighbouring ſtates their beſt methods, and inſerted them into his Macedonian; and it is ſaid, that Philip and his ſon Alexander neglected the Macedonian evolution, and uſed chiefly the Lacedæmonian, which difference will be ſhewn, and that they owed their victories to it.

As the Macedonian empire owed it's greatneſs to Philip, who may be called the author of the Macedonian phalanx; ſo the Roman empire owed it's greatneſs to Romulus, who was, as well as of Rome itſelf, the founder of the Roman legion. It was the phalanx and legion that enlarged theſe two empires; that is, in ſhort, their military diſcipline, together with their art of war. As Plutarch compares the Macedonian phalanx to ſome maſterleſs beaſt; ſo Vegetius ſays, without doubt, it was ſome god that inſpired the Roman legion: for they were ſo formidable, that one only dared undertake the greateſt enterprizes. Thus Romulus and Philip may be ſaid to have formed, tempered, and proved thoſe bloody inſtruments their ſucceſſors fought and conquered with.

Plutarch's life of Romulus.

In Romulus's time every legion contained three thouſand ſoldiers; ſhortly four thouſand, whence a legion was called quadrata; then four thouſand two hundred, which was the common number of a legion till Hannibal came into Italy; then it was augmented to five thouſand; and when Scipio went into Africk, ſix thouſand two hundred foot and three hundred horſe: in Cæſar's commentaries it exceeded not the number of five thouſand, but oftentimes much leſs; that at different times it was compriſed of different numbers, as were moſt convenient for the ſervice of the commonwealth.

Livy, book 22.

Echard's Rom. hiſt. chap. 1. lib. 1.

The Romans were as wiſe a people as the Greeks, Philip and Alexander; they were not more wedded to abſurdities that had nothing to recommend them than cuſtom

Hiſt. Polybius, Liv. 6. chap. 4.

cuſtom and their antiquity: [3] methods and cuſtoms they found in other nations preferable to their own; they, without any heſitation, made uſe of, aboliſhing their own; as did Pyrrhus the famous king of Epirus, and Hannibal the Carthaginian general.

It is not a little ſurprizing as theſe great empires ſucceeded one another, and owed their greatneſs to art military, to find it ſo very different: for the phalanx was compoſed of one great body; the legion, of many little diſtinct and ſeparate bodies; which, as it will be ſhewn, gave it the advantage over the phalanx.

However, notwithſtanding the phalanx was the common method of drawing up their forces among the Greeks, the different ſtates varied in many particulars concerning their art military. The Argives and their confederates marched to the charge with great violence and fury; but the Lacedæmonians ſlowly and with many flutes, according to their military diſcipline; not as a point of religion, but that marching even and by meaſure, their ranks might not be diſordered; as the greateſt armies, when they marched in the face of the enemy, uſed to be. Thucydides lib. 5.

It was otherways with the Roman legion: as every legion, though diſperſed in very different parts of the world, belonged to the ſame great government, ſo their diſcipline was the ſame; and, in all probability, would have continued ſo many ages longer, had not a path been opened to barbarous people, to Goths, who were accompanied with barbarous laws and manners, as well in their military as civil affairs. A. D. 376. Echard's Rom. hiſt.

We have mentioned this, to ſhew the Roman empire

[3] Quod ubique apud ſocios aut hoſtes idoneum videbatur, cum ſummo ſtudio domi exequebantur. Imitari quam invidere bonis malebant. Cæſ. apud Salluſt.

did not owe her downfal to the ſuperior military ſkill of thoſe people who formed kingdoms and principalities on her ruins, as may be ſaid, in ſome meaſure, of the Macedonian; the phalanx apparently acknowledging a ſuperiority in the legion. But it was very different with the Romans; their ruin might rather be ſaid to be the unhappy conſequence of that ſuperiority in military ſkill and art of war: for by this art they got the better of all their enemies, and monopolized to themſelves the beſt part of this habitable earth, as well as the power and riches of it, which gave birth to all ſorts of enormities and vice; as luxury, prodigality, monſtroſities of nature, pride, contempt of their neighbours, diſcord, and civil diſſenſion; any one of which would have been enough to have humbled a moderate ſtate; and all together at laſt, after much ſtruggling, did tear and rend their mighty empire to pieces.

But as to their diſcipline relative to war, whilſt Rome flouriſhed; Joſephus, who was ſkilled in it, having fought againſt the Romans and for them, ſays at the concluſion of his deſcription of the Roman armies and their diſcipline: There are no examples to be found, where they have been conquered in battle when they came to a cloſe fight; either by the multitude of their enemies, or ſtratagems, or the difficulties of the places they were in; no, nor by fortune neither: their victories have been ſurer to them, than fortune could have granted them: therefore, where counſel goes before action, and where the wiſeſt advice is followed by ſo active an army, what wonder is it, that Euphrates on the eaſt, the ocean on the weſt, the moſt fertile regions of Libya on the ſouth, and the Danube and the Rhine on the north, are the limits of this empire? one might well ſay the Roman poſſeſſions are inferior to the Romans themſelves.

Joſephus's wars of the Jews, book 3. chap. 5.

To

To ſhew farther, that this great empire owed her downfal to her own greatneſs; Demades ſpeaking of this, and the Macedonian, compared the Macedonian army, after the death of Alexander, to the cyclops Polyphemus after his eye was out; ſeeing their many diſorderly and giddy motions. But the Roman government he likened to the giants that aſſailed heaven, whoſe force returned upon itſelf, and, with a great deal of buſtle, only wrought it's own ruin. Plutarch, Galba.

Thus we may be well aſſured, it was no contemptible diſcipline and art of war that founded the above great empires: nor can we find any other after their diſſolution for many ages any ways to be compared to them.

In the time of Clovis, who was the fifth king of France, and reigned in the fifth century, the French were wholly freed from the Roman empire, having till that time been ſtipendaries or tributary to them; and that part of Gaul which reaches from the Rhine to the Loire was called France: the inhabitants were bred to the exerciſe of war from their greeneſt years; and were ſo nimble, they were upon the enemy almoſt as ſoon as the dart they had thrown againſt them: they had left off the uſe of arrows, and employed in their ſtead for offenſive weapons the ſword, the angon, which was a dart of a moderate length, having an iron bearded head and cheeks, and the two edged axe, which they called Franciſque; this might be darted as well as the angon, but nearer at hand: for defenſive arms (unleſs it were their commanders) they had only bucklers, which they managed very dextrouſly to ſhelter, and tortoiſe like to cover themſelves, when they went to make a charge or an aſſault: their whole armies were infantry, or if there were ſome few horſe, they ſerved only to attend the general or carry his orders. Mezeray's hiſtory of France.

Mezeray. In the eighth century, in the reign of Charlemain, who was elected emperor of the Romans; the method of making war and arming themſelves was much changed ſince the reign of Clovis: they had now as much cavalry almoſt as infantry; and they uſed great lances, which they darted or retained in their hands after they had ſtruck the blow: they were armed cap-a-pie, their very horſes were bearded, that a ſquadron ſeemed to be all of iron: the infantry had no cuiraſſes or armour, but covered themſelves well with their bucklers: they alſo began to learn the uſe of engines in ſome ſieges.

Mezeray. In the eleventh century, Philip the ſecond, ſurnamed the conqueror, introduced croſs bows in France; before that time they would not owe their victories but to their lances and ſwords: in this reign king Richard the firſt of England was killed by a croſs bow at the ſiege of Chalus.

Mezeray. In the forty-ſixth year of the thirteenth century, at the famous battle of Creſſy, we firſt find the uſe of cannon; here the Engliſh had four or five pieces; and we believe this was the firſt time gunpowder was turned to any uſe for war: for even here the French attributed the loſs of the battle in a good meaſure to the Genoeſe, who were a part of Philip de Valois's infantry; for by a great quantity of rain that fell at the beginning of their ſervice, their bow ſtrings were rendered uſeleſs: that gunpowder ſeemed only uſed in thoſe few cannon; the Engliſh infantry making uſe of bows and arrows both here and in the battle of Poictiers ten years after, where the Engliſh bearded arrows made the enemy's cavalry mad, and contributed not a little to the victory. Nor is it probable there was any great progreſs made in gunpowder ſo early; it being but ſixteen years before the battle of Creſſy that it was firſt invented, according to ſome, by Conſtantine Anchtzen of Fribourg; but according to

to others, and moſt likely, by Bertold Schwartz, cordelier, and chymiſt. We do not find any improvements made in military operations by the uſe of gunpowder, till the beginning of the fifteenth century; but in this century, when Naples revolted from the French to the emperor Maximilian, Capua and Avorſa followed the example; and it is mentioned, that the Chateau Neuf ſurrendered, a breach being made by the ſpringing of a mine by Peter de Navarre; the garriſon was ſo aſtoniſhed at this unknown new thunder which burſt out of the earth, that they ſurrendered; the caſtle De l'ovo was taken three weeks afterwards by the ſame invention. Peter de Navarre was a ſoldier of fortune, bearing the name of his own country; who taught them the way of filling a mine with gunpowder to blow up their walls; whether of his own invention, or rather he bringing it to greater perfection; for it was ſaid, he had ſeen it practiſed by the Genoeſe at Serazenella, when they beſieged upon the Florentines in the year fourteen hundred and eighty-ſeven; where the mine having only cracked the wall, not being deep enough, nor enough charged, they laid aſide this invention, as of little uſe or effect: but he having obſerved their miſtake, and why it miſcarried, corrected them, and found the way to make them very uſeful. A few years after this, in the twenty-firſt year of the fifteenth century, the count de Naſſau paſſed the Meuſe with the emperor's army, and beſieged Mouzon; in this ſiege bombs were firſt made uſe of, and by the Germans. However, according to ſome, the mortar and bomb were firſt uſed at the ſiege of Vachtendonk, in fifteen hundred and eighty-eight; according to others, in fourteen hundred and thirty-five, at Naples, under Charles the eighth.

Mezeray's hiſt. France.

Mezeray.

Lewis

L'art de la guerre pratique, par M. Ray de Saint Genies.

Lewis the thirteenth made one Maltus, an Engliſh engineer, come to him from Holland to throw bombs, which he had done with great ſucceſs at Collioure in ſixteen hundred and forty-two. Maltus was killed at the ſiege of Gravelines. He had obſerved a place where he intended to puſh the trench in the night; and to make the general ſee it, he leaped into the trench to reconnoiter the ſituation; the general leaped after him; but not having thoroughly examined it, he deſired Maltus to make a ſecond leap, that he might ſcrutinize it more narrowly, which he did, and received as he was in the air a ſhot in the head; which gave an opportunity to thoſe who were wittily inclined, to ſay, Maltus was killed flying.

Ray.

The biſhop of Munſter was the firſt prince who had any number of mortars and bombs, at the ſiege of Groll, in ſixteen hundred and ſeventy-two, where the duke of Luxembourg commanded. The biſhop of Munſter alſo introduced the carcaſs, which is a ſort of bomb.

Ray.

Three years after this ſiege of Groll, red hot balls were firſt made uſe of with ſucceſs, by the elector of Brandenbourg at the ſiege of Stralſund in Pomerania.

Eng. hiſt.

In the fortieth year of the fifteenth century, muſkets were invented, which ſucceeded the arquebuſe, the moſt ancient of ſmall fire arms; about this time alſo granado's and pot granado's had their beginning. The invention of the muſket is generally attributed to the Muſcovite, as the carabine is to the Arab, the piſtol to the Italian, and the fuſee to the French, in ſixteen hundred and ninety-nine and ſeventeen hundred, which is the laſt effort in ſmall gunnery.

Ray, ch. 1. art. 3. part 1.

Eng. hiſt.

In the ſixty-firſt year of the fifteenth century, gunpowder was firſt procured to be made in England, by the

the order of queen Elizabeth. In fifteen hundred and eighty, the king of Navarre, afterwards Henry the fourth of France, in an aſſault upon Cahors made uſe of a petard, a new invention which then began to be employed; and by it he made a gate fly open. In the year ninety-ſeven of this ſame century, they were grown ſo expert in the art of mining, which had been but little practiſed during the civil wars in France, that at the regaining of Amiens by the French, they and the Spaniards did inſtantly attack each other by theſe ſubterraneous fires. Mezeray.

In this century alſo ſmall fire arms, as arquebuſes and muſkets, were mixed with the infantry; particularly in the civil wars in France, and the Low Countries; nor do we find there were any uſed before; for in the eighty-fifth year of the fourteenth century, which may be called the latter end, the army of Richard the third of England, at the famous battle of Boſworth, where he loſt both his crown and life, had for it's van guard twelve hundred bowmen, flanked with two hundred cuiraſſiers; and for the main battle a thouſand billmen, empaled with two thouſand pikes; and the rear conſiſted of two thouſand mingled weapons, with two wings of horſe, in number fifteen hundred, in ſquare ſquadrons, expecting lord Stanley's coming in with two thouſand horſe more. Eng. hiſt.

However, in the fifteenth century it may be ſaid, that ſmall fire arms were made uſe of among the infantry, though perhaps not brought to that perfection as in the following century; when the common method was to have the right and left of every battalion or regiment muſketry, both in the civil wars of England and France, and in the war with the emperor and Guſtavus Adolphus king of Sweden, and in other parts of Europe: after the invention of muſketry there is no mention of bows and arrows, the infantry that did not carry muſkets having

ing long pikes in their ſtead; that every battalion was divided in three diviſions, the center conſiſting of pikes, the right and left of muſkets: this was the common method in England and France, and in moſt parts of Europe, before the intire abolition of pikes.

Tom. 1. chap. 2. de Puyſegur ſur les memoires de Montecuculi.

In 1675, the year marſhal Turenne was killed upon the Rhine; Montecuculi's army which he commanded againſt him, had only a third of the infantry pikes; the reſt were muſkets, but of a lighter ſort.

It is to be obſerved the Imperialiſts were the firſt nation that quitted pikes in their war in Hungary againſt the Turks; and had in their ſtead little chevaux de frize, which they placed before their battalions, and the ſoldiers carried the ſticks, bayonets being as yet unknown: however not long after this, the bayonet was made uſe of in Europe, but invented by the people of Malacca; though not brought to the perfection it is now in, being for a good while ſcrewed into the muzzle of the barrel, and conſequently not to be uſed during the fire.

Sir Han's Sloan's collection.

At the firſt introduction of fire arms they had but very few, the reſt preſerving the ancient arms, which were chiefly pikes; but as they grew more perfect in the making them, the ancient arms inſenſibly decreaſed: and at the end of ſeventeen hundred and three, the battalions in France had not more than a fifth part which carried pikes, the reſt muſkets and fuſils; ſome regiments at the beginning of this war had entirely laid aſide pikes: there is no mention of any at the famous battle of Blenheim, which was in 1704: though the two armies conſiſted of Imperialiſts, Engliſh, Danes, Dutch, Pruſſians, Hanoverians, Heſſians, French and Bavarians.

Puyſegur, tom. 1. ch. 5. art. 1.

We have mentioned chiefly France, as being the center nation of Europe, by which we may judge in a good meaſure

meaſure of the diſcipline and manner of fighting of Europe in general.

Thus we find art military, like other arts, in length of time ſubject to change and alterations: but we are not to ſuppoſe the few mentioned here to be all, though it is of no great ſignification, if we knew them, to be tedious in deſcribing them: it is not very probable there would be much to be learnt from the military diſcipline of the many dark and barbarous ages we have paſſed over; ſome of which have ſcarce afforded a pen to hand it down to poſterity. But according to our judgement, we have already paſſed from a worſe to a better, from a better to a worſe, and from a worſe to a better again.

However, as ſome of the abovementioned inventions for military operations owe their riſe to the invention of gunpowder; and it may be alledged that ſuch an invention can't happen again; though it can't be ſaid, but there may be ſtill more improvements for the uſe of it found out: however, as the invention of gunpowder occaſioned ſeveral of the above innovations in military operations, we will proceed to ſhew the variety of opinions the moſt famous for military atchievements have been of in different ages, by the variety of methods they have purſued in other branches of this art, particularly in their diſpoſitions of troops for action. It is not to be underſtood here, of whole corps, as regiments or ſquadrons; but the different methods of forming theſe regiments or ſquadrons; that is, the diſpoſition of the individuals the corps are compoſed of; which is chiefly the different depths they drew up their infantry and cavalry.

Should we go very far back, the Lacedæmonians uſually drew up their troops eight in depth; the Bœotians ſixteen; the Macedonian phalanx was ſixteen; the Roman Xenophon hiſt. Græc. l. 4.

man legion twelve. Both Greeks and Romans drew up their cavalry in ſquadrons; the former had about fourſcore in a ſquadron, and eight in depth; the Romans had but half ſo many, and only four in depth: nor does it appear they changed theſe methods of forming their cavalry. The difference of opinions concerning different methods of drawing up troops, hath prevailed in modern ages as well as among the ancients. Folard ſays, in the time of Francis the firſt was one method; in Henry the third another; another in Henry the fourth: all different from thoſe practiſed in his time. Henry the fourth, prince Maurice, and Guſtavus Adolphus, as well as other great captains, drew up their infantry ten or twelve in file; in the time of Lewis the thirteenth, eight in file: and Puyſegur tells us, that eight in file was the uſual method in the minority of Lewis the fourteenth, though the armies were then ſmall. The prince of Condè, and marſhal Turenne did the ſame at that time. However, this number was ſoon changed; for the firſt of the three laſt wars, he ſays, they formed the battalions only ſix in depth; the ſecond, five; and the laſt only four and three: the reaſon was, upon the ſuppreſſion of pikes to be able to command more fire. There were as many different opinions concerning the cavalry.

Folard, tom. 4. obſ. 2. ſuite du paragraph precedente.

Tom. 1. Traite de la Colonne, de Folard.

Preface, tom. 3. de Folard.

Puyſegur, ch. 5. art. 1. obſ.

The cavalry did not begin to be formed in ſquadrons in France, till the reign of Henry the ſecond; when they uſed lances, they charged in a ſingle line: it was with much difficulty they changed this cuſtom: the prince of Condè ranged his cavalry in a ſingle hay at the battle of St. Denis under Charles the ninth. This was the method the gens-d'arms practiſed when they were in their flower: and M. de Guiſe and the conſtable, who were great captains, made no innovation or alteration.

Dan. hiſt. de la miliſe Franc. tom. 1. liv. 5. p. 314.

tion[4]. Howſoever bad this method may ſeem, there were many ſtrenuous for it, aſſerting it to be the beſt. Not long after this, they were very far from thinking this the beſt method; they then formed their ſquadrons of three or four hundred horſe each, and ten in depth: and the battle of Coutras in 1587, in the reign of Henry the third, Charles the ninth's brother, was loſt in a great meaſure by Joyeuſe's great ſquadron of lances: [5] the princes running in upon them rendered them uſeleſs. In 1590, Henry the fourth gained the victory of Ivry [6] chiefly by the ſame means; the great ſquadrons of lances that were ſent to the duke de Mayene, who was the head of the leaguers, by the duke of Parma from the Low Countries, being heavy and unſkilful, were broken to pieces by the others ſwords and piſtol ſhot. However, by degrees they diminiſhed both the number and the depth. Henry the fourth of France, prince Maurice who commanded the Dutch, Alexander Farneſe and the duke of Alva who were at the head of the Spaniſh armies in the Low Countries, formed their ſquadrons eight in depth, then ſix: and afterwards Wallenſtein, the emperor's general, made his very large and deep; and he found the inconveniency of them at Lutzen, as did count Tilly at Leipſick. Guſtavus Adolphus the great king of Sweden was of a different opinion from Wallenſtein and Tilly his antagoniſts; he formed his cavalry in ſmall ſquadrons, and five in depth

Mezeray.

Mezeray.

Tom. 4. l. 3. ch. 13. de Folard.

Swediſh intelligencer.

[4] See, Noue ſes diſcourſes Politiques, Un ecrivain militaire, and Folard, tom. 5. li. ch. 15. note.

[5] King of Navarre, afterwards Henry the fourth, prince of Condè and Conti, proteſtant princes. Coutras is between the little rivers L'iſl and D'rougne which empty themſelves into the Garonne.

[6] In a plain lying in the midſt of a peninſula between the rivers Aure and Iton, oppoſite Ivry.

with platoons, nor had he reaſon to repent. Marſhal Turenne ranged his four in depth, oftentimes five. In the war 1701, the French cavalry at the beginning of the campaign were not all formed in three ranks, not being compleat; towards the middle of the campaign many ſquadrons had only two ranks; and towards the end ſcarce any had three. However, in the war 1701, and in the laſt, the cavalry of moſt powers in Europe (if not all) formed three in depth, and about 150 in a ſquadron, except there has been particular reaſons as above for the contrary: it is at preſent the general method and notion, that it is the beſt in point of number and depth for the ſervice in general. The Engliſh have varied in their cavalry and infantry in theſe reſpects, as much as other nations.

Tom. 1 ch. 5. de Puyſegur.

See Elton's body of art military.

Thus what one age does, another undoes; what one approves, another condemns. It is the practice among us at preſent to form for the defence our infantry in ſquares in an open country, with the center empty; for which it has the name of the hollow ſquare: Folard ſays, though it is now an age ſince the ſquare with the center full has been laid aſide, it was the better of the two: however a little afterwards, he condemns both full and empty as equally bad. Wallenſtein at Lutzen had ſome of his infantry in ſquare bodies with their centers full. Puyſegur is as ſtrenuous an advocate for his orb, as ſome have been for the ſquare; and quotes Cæſar as the ſtrongeſt argument to convince; but takes no notice of Sabinus and Cotta, though in the ſame commentaries: 'tis true, ſucceſs attended Cæſars orb, and Sabinus's and Cotta's met a contrary fate.

Traite de la Colonne, chap. 2.

De la Colonne, chap. 3.

Cæſar's, commentaries.

Guſtavus Adolphus at the battle of Leipſick in 1631, added a column to the center of each brigade; the column

column was in three or four diviſions, the firſt of pikes, with a view of opening a paſſage wherever it came, whilſt the long ſides of the column were defended by the muſqueteers of the brigade upon the right and left of it. Guſtavus approved of this method ſo much, that with ſome alterations he practiſed the ſame at Lutzen. This method did not die with him: the Swedes gained the battle of Oldendorp in 1633 by the ſame: five campaigns after the ſame Swedes got a great victory at Witte-weyr; in 1642 mareſchal de Guebriand gained that of Hulſt; in theſe laſt were ranged upon a line plain columns; that is, the pikes which formed the columns, and projected from the line, had their ſides flanked by the muſqueteers which formed the line.

Merian, theat. Europ. tom. 2. page 433.

Ibid. tom. 3. page 84.

Tom. 3. p. 963.

Ibid. tom. 4. page 800.

We all know how much Folard has ſaid in vindication of his column; how to it's ſupport he has raked up the aſhes of Epaminondas the Theban, and brought upon the ſtage the fight of Leuctra and Mantinea; expoſing to publick view again his two fair daughters, as he called them, upon his death bed, that he had left behind him to perpetuate his memory.

Plutarch.

Marſhal Saxe has ſince left us his treatiſe and commendations of the legion; ſhewing how glad he would have been to have proceeded on the ſame plan. A later author too talks much, and tells us the wonders of his phalanx, his divided and doubled phalanx. Thus with the phalanx and legion did we ſet out: as there were no general poſitions more ancient than thoſe; and as none have been ſtarted later, we are obliged to reſt with the legion and phalanx; having been like ſome traveller, loſt in a great wilderneſs, and puzzled with a multitude of paths, which leave us doubtful of the right, and ſhew us no end, 'till we light again on the path we made our entry.

Traité des legions, par Mr. le Mareſchal comte de Saxe, ouvrage poſthume, 1753.

Projet d'un ordre François en tactique, ou le phalange coupée et doublée, 1755.

Thus

Thus we have run through a few of the changes and alterations, as well as different opinions, concerning a very ſmall branch with regard to the art of war in general; concerning, as we have already ſaid, a little field to a very great country: and by it we are taught two things; the firſt is, it ſhews us how every one leans to his own opinion; and where there is a new conception, though ever ſo trivial, how very far the author of it is from treating it like a ſtepmother. For our own parts, knowing ourſelves to be made of the ſame materials as thoſe who are gone before us, and conſequently liable to the ſame frailties, we are glad to connive at this blindneſs of others; not in the leaſt doubting but we ſhall ſoon be found as blind ourſelves, and hurried away with the ſame fondneſs for our own productions. It is a kind of indulgence incident to the weakneſs of human nature, to admire and be a well wiſher to what we give birth ourſelves, fancying it more excellent and meritorious than any thing before, or than in reality it is: as parents view their own children with more pleaſurable eyes than others, and ſpy out virtues in their infancy which no one elſe can diſcover. [7]

The ſecond thing this part of the introduction ſhews us, is, how many different ſentiments there have been, and how much may be ſaid concerning a ſmall part only of the art of war; and what an extenſive as well as unerring judgement that perſon muſt have, who is capable of treating of the art of war in general; when to a common diſcernment is is no eaſy taſk to point out the infallible, even in this little field we have been beating;

[7] Seldom or never we find a mother,
That will change her booby for another.
Gay.

what

what will it then be ſhould we break out of it, and launch into the great country? We call what we have been here treating very ſmall, being of the ſame opinion with Cambyſes and his ſon Cyrus: for when he went to his father Cambyſes to aſk him for money to reward the perſon who had been teaching him the conduct of an army and the office of a general; Cambyſes aſked Cyrus what the perſon had taught him, to whom he was to give this reward? whether he had mentioned any thing to him with regard to the oeconomy of an army, or healthful ſtate and ſtrength of body? whether he told him any methods and rules by which his men might become excellent and compleat in the duties of a military life? whether he had taught him how to raiſe the ſpirit of his ſoldiers, and incite them with courage, or how to inſtill obedience into them? with many other things: to all which Cyrus anſwered, he had not mentioned a word. Cambyſes then aſked him, what he had told him, when he taught him the office of a general? Cyrus replied, he had inſtructed him how to marſhal and imbattle an army. Cambyſes then ſmiled, and told Cyrus, that diſcipline and order was but a ſmall advantage to an army deſtitute and unfurniſhed of every thing elſe. Cyrus was ſenſible of the truth of what Cambyſes ſaid, and acknowledged, that he had learned little or nothing: for he agreed with him, the drawing an army in battle array was the leaſt part of the office of a general [8].

Xenophon's Cyropedia, book 1.

[8] Imperatore quatuor hæ virtutes ineſſe debent: Scientiæ rei militaris, virtus, authoritas, felicitas. Cicero, pro lege Man.

And recommending Pompey for a publick employ, Cicero reckons theſe to be the imperatoriæ virtutes.

Labor in negotio, fortitudo in periculis, induſtria in agendo, conſilium in providendo. Pro. le. Man.

Wherefore

Wherefore if the drawing out an army is ſo ſmall a part of the art of war, or office of a general, and there has been ſuch a number of different methods, ſuch a variety of opinions of different ages, as well as of different men of the ſame age, as we have already mentioned, concerning a branch only of a branch, which is the diſpoſition of troops for action; for here it is the diſpoſal of every individual man, not the diſpoſition of every body or corps conſiſting of many individuals, as every battalion, regiment, or brigade, which is moſt material, being of greater latitude, depending on many accidents, as time, place, ſituation, temper, number, diſpoſition, and quality of our own troops, as well as the enemy, and ſuch like: wherefore, if ſo minute a branch of the art of war has employ'd the attention of ſuch a variety of commanders, who have put in practice ſuch a variety of methods as are above mentioned; how much greater muſt the variety of opinions be concerning any branch of greater conſequence? how much ſtill greater muſt the variety of opinions be concerning all the branches of this art, or of art of war in general? Theſe reflections determined us at once to confine ourſelves to ſo ſmall a part; leſt by pretending to know every thing, we ſhould prove we know nothing. Theſe reflections determined us alſo to treat of that branch which might be ſpoken of with greater freedom and certainty, and conceived with greater eaſe. The theory of the motions of troops which have nothing to obſtruct and impede them in the practice of thoſe motions, which is the ſituation of the troops we are going to treat of, being defenſive movements in a ſmooth champain country; this theory will bear a nearer reſemblance to this practice, by as much as plain paper is like to a ſmooth country, more than a country diverſified. There

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is a wide difference in forming projects, diſpoſitions, and plans of operation for a diverſified country, between the paper which is the theory, and field which is the practice: in the former in one view, even at a glance, we take in the whole, ſhift it and change it about, and uſe it as our fancies lead us; in the latter the eye comprehends it only as we travel, ſparingly, and little by little; ſees but a ſmall part at a time, a ſeries of freſh objects, and one claſhing with another; nor are we aware of the many impediments, rubs, difficulties and dangers we muſt meet with, which, on the ſmooth paper, are apt imperceptibly to be look'd over: deſerts, rocks, mountains, woods, defiles, bogs, rivers, incloſures, and plains, ſeem all alike, eaſily march'd and clamber'd over; or eaſily ſcrambled, waded, or ſwam through. As all ſmooth champain countries are near alike, ſo every diverſified country is very different; each of which in many particulars require a different theory and a different practice, from thoſe who treat of them, and thoſe who are perſonally engaged in them [9].

Where-

[9] The viſcount de Turenne could not diſſemble his uneaſineſs on the bad ſucceſs of the campaign in 1673; and there appeared in his countenance an air of thoughtfulneſs and melancholy. When he returned to court, Lewis the fourteenth received him with great demonſtrations of eſteem and affection; and talked with him frequently in private, of the means of re-eſtabliſhing affairs next campaign; and ſpoke to him one day of the fatal conſequences of Louvois's counſels; and gave him a fine opportunity to revenge himſelf of the miniſter. The viſcount contented himſelf with anſwering the king; that the marquis de Louvois was very capable of doing his majeſty great ſervice in the cabinet; but that he had not experience enough in war, to take upon him the direction of it. This moderation and generoſity extremely pleaſed the young king; and he ſaid to him, Though all my miniſters ſhould hate you, my heart ſhall be always for you. However, two years after this, the prince of Condè being diſſatisfied with the miniſter, ſpoke of his diſcontent to Turenne, and they both reſolved to complain of him to Ramſay's life of Turenne, li. 6.

Wherefore we will aſk once more that perſon who imagines has a capacity ſufficient to teach the art of war, or office of a general, as Cambyſes did Cyrus, What it is we are to learn from him? whether it is what has been already taught and practiſed? and if it is, perhaps it might be known by others as well as himſelf; or whether it is any thing new of his own? Should it be an entire new ſyſtem, new methods and inventions of his own, it is likely they will be either better or worſe than what has been practiſed before him: ſhould they be worſe, he gains by it nothing more than infinite labor to be laugh'd at, and immediately forgot; if they are better, he then is the fortunate perſon that has at laſt found out rules and inſtructions, methods and inventions, proving all before him erroneous; that all preſent and (unleſs the infallible lie ſtill behind) future heroes are to guide themſelves by. Before he can hope to arrive to this perfection, both reaſon and prudence adviſe him to examine himſelf well, to find out where his many hidden ſuperior virtues lie: to examine himſelf, not by an artificial glaſs,

the king; not ſo much to gratify their reſentments, as to hinder his diſconcerting the projects of the enſuing campaign. Condè was ſoftened by the ſubmiſſion of the chancellor Le Tellier the miniſter's father; but Turenne now thinking he ſhould fail in his duty, if he kept ſilence, ſpoke reſolutely to the king; and made him ſenſible, that though Louvois was an able miniſter, yet he was not always qualified to judge of the operations of a war in a remote country, ſo well as the generals who were upon the ſpot.

Dans le ſpeculation on atteint au but par une ſeule combinaiſon; dans la pratique cette même combinaiſon devient inutile par un ſeul mouvement de l'ennemi.

Turpin, tom. 1. li. 2. ch. 9.

Quelqu'exactes que ſoient les cartes, un général y trouvera peu de ſûreté pour les opérations d'une campagne, & le conſeil ne ſçauroit gueres fonder un projet d'attaque ou de defenſe ſur du papier; c'eſt autre choſe ſur les lieux: les campemens, les bons ou mauvais poſtes, les hauteurs, les endroits couverts, & les défilés, ne ſçauroient s'y connoître tels qu'ils ſont ſur le terrein.

Par Mr. Ray, guerre, pratique, ch. 2. ar. 3. part 1.

which

which ſhows only the outſide; leſt an after-experience ſhould teach him, when it is too late, that,

Errors like ſtraws on the ſurface flow,
He who ſeeks for pearls muſt dive below.

PART II.

WE have endeavoured to give a little idea of the extenſiveneſs of the art of war, and of the knowledge of that perſon who is ſkill'd enough in it to be able to treat of it, and teach it others. But it muſt not be underſtood, that every one who writes of military affairs is treating of the art of war: there are ſeveral degrees and diſtinctions; as military diſcipline, art military, the diſcipline of war, and the art of war; and tho' they are all included in the art of war, yet either of the three firſt does nor comprehend any thing equal to the extenſive appellation of the art of war. Military diſcipline is no more than every ſoldier's duty, the common practice and exerciſe of the army; but no body can ſay, every ſoldier who is inſtructed in military diſcipline, ſo as to know his duty, underſtands the art of war. Art military indeed is of a larger extent, containing in it all military diſcipline, and all other inventions for military operations, that are, or are to be found out. The diſcipline of war is the duty of every ſoldier, the common practice and exerciſe of an army employed, either in the field or elſewhere, in the time of war, with an enemy to oppoſe it; and is, as well as art military, of a larger extent than military diſcipline; depending in a great meaſure upon the deſigns and motions of the enemy; and comprehends occaſionally all military diſcipline, together with art military.

As we have now ſaid the diſcipline of war comprehends art military, ſhould art military comprehend the diſcipline of war, they would be the ſame; but there is a difference, though they may be near relations: for a perſon may be ſkill'd in art military, without ever knowing it otherways than by theory; and conſequently may at the ſame time be ſuch a ſtranger to the diſcipline of war, as to be unable to put his theory in practice: but he who underſtands the diſcipline of war, muſt know not a little of art military alſo, as it conſiſts both of practice and theory: the knowledge of art military being a neceſſary ingredient to the practice of the diſcipline of war.

As many are learned in that branch of the mathematicks requiſite in the art of building, though they cannot build themſelves more than thoſe who are ignorant of both: but no body can be called a builder, who is ignorant of the branch of mathematicks requiſite in the art of his trade; for if he is, he muſt err in his rules of order and architecture, as well as ſymmetry and proportion, which are the principles and fundamental baſis of his profeſſion.

The knowledge of the art of war (as we have endeavoured to ſhew) comes within the reach of few, being of ſo great an extent; comprehending all military diſcipline, art military, and diſcipline of war; as well as every thing that ever was, is, or ever will be inſtrumental towards crowning an army with ſucceſs; all that ever was practiſed, or even exiſted in imagination, or remains to be practiſed or conceived; that is, or may be conducive, and tends moſt to the facilitating and bringing all military operations to the happieſt and wiſh'd-for iſſues: ſuch is the art of war.

We have mentioned this to ſhew the following ſheets

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are not to be conſidered under the denomination of military diſcipline, the diſcipline of war, or art of war; no, nor art military; being of no greater conſequence to deſerve any appellation more than a part or branch of art military.

However, art military contains no branch more uſeful, neceſſary, difficult, and honourable, than that of the defence: it is uſeful, being for the preſervation of our own troops; and the ſaving of one friend has been eſteemed more praiſe-worthy than the deſtruction of two enemies: it is neceſſary, as no troops can be of any great ſervice, or capable of acting well offenſively, 'till they have learnt to defend themſelves; otherways it would be ſeeking miſchief in an enemy's country, and leaving our own frontiers unguarded at home: it is difficult and dangerous, having generally a ſuperior force to deal with; which ſuperiority oftentimes is the chief motive that puts the one upon the attack, the other upon the defence: it is honourable, as where the greateſt danger is, there the moſt honor is to be acquired. But to ground the aſſertion upon better authority; the greateſt captains that ever exiſted, and who owed their greatneſs as much to their own perſonal valour as to any other virtue, and from whoſe hardy deeds of arms it is ſcarce to be conceived the thought of danger could ever come acroſs them, yet theſe very men did not think it any ways derogatory from the characters of brave and valiant ſoldiers, to defend themſelves and friends, as well as offend their enemies. The Greek lawgivers puniſhed the man who threw away his ſhield, but not him who loſt his ſword and ſpear. At the battle of Mantinea, Epaminondas the Theban, perceiving the ſtreſs of the action lay between the Spartans and Thebans, and that the engagement was never more in

Plutarch, life of Pelopidas.

Stanyan's hiſt. of Greece. A. M. 3642. Olymp. 104, 2.

in earneſt, formed a troop of the moſt determin'd about him, and putting himſelf at the head of them, made a very vigorous charge upon the Lacedæmonian phalanx, and wounded their general with the firſt javelin he threw; and his troops puſhing on, broke the enemy to pieces, and covered the ground with the bodies of the ſlain; but advancing ſtill, the Spartans rallied, and pointed their whole fury at him, and at laſt mortally wounded him with a javelin. Epaminondas was carried alive into his tent, where, as ſoon as he recovered his ſpeech, he aſked his friends about him, whether the enemy had taken his ſhield from him? They told him it was ſafe; and being brought to him, he kiſſed it; then aſked which ſide had the victory, and being told the Thebans, All then, ſaid he, is well; and ſoon after drawing the head of the javelin out of his body, he fell as it were in the arms of victory, congratulating the good fortune of his country. This great man feared nothing but the loſs of reputation by the neglect of his own defence, though it was through the zeal of ſerving his country, and obtaining victory.

Alexander, the ſon of Philip, when he drew near to Darius's army at the river Pinarus, called a council of all his captains of cohorts and troops, and prefects of his auxiliaries, and adviſed them to be of good courage; and having made a ſpeech to exhort his army, gave his ſoldiers a ſtrict charge to take care of their bodies; that though he had the greateſt diſregard to danger himſelf, like a wiſe and prudent captain, he thought it neceſſary to give ſuch ſalutary inſtructions to preſerve, as much as he could, the lives of valiant men, who were to fight his battles, and reap freſh laurels for him.

Arrian. hiſt. of Alexander, lib. 2. ch. 8.

Nor did the ſentiments of the Romans differ much from thoſe of the Greeks; they granted a reward to every man

man that ſaved the life of a Roman citizen in battle [1]. Rom. hiſt.
Julius Cæſar, their firſt and greateſt emperor, thought no art or cunning was to be neglected that tended to the preſervation of his own men, eſpecially when he could bring his purpoſes to bear with it [2]. It was a doubt whether he was moſt wary and careful, or moſt bold and daring. When he ſhut up Afranius and Petreius, Pompey's lieutenants in Spain; as Afranius himſelf ſays, like women not having it in their power even to get water, and without hopes of eſcaping; oppreſs'd with grief of body and diſhonor in their reputations; and though he could have eaſily cut them off, perceiving the victory hanging over him without blow or wound, thus anſwered his captains who preſſed him to engage, why ſhould he loſe any of his friends, even though he got the victory? why ſhould he ſuffer his ſoldiers, who had deſerved the beſt of him, to receive any hurt or wound? Why, laſtly, Cæſar's com. de bello civili, lib. 1.

[1] Corona quernea ſervati gratia civis. Livy, book 2.

Horace ſays to Pompeius Varus, who was his companion in flight at the battle of Philippi,

Tecum Philippos, & celerem fugam
Senſi, relictâ non bene parmulâ:
Cum fracta virtus, & minaces
Turpe ſolum tetigere mento. Hor. lib. 2. ode 7.

The bloody wars, Philippi's field,
Ignobly having loſt my ſhield;
With thee I ſaw, ſecure from wound,
I ſaw the fight, when Pompey proud
To Cæſar's ſtronger virtue bow'd,
And baſely bit the bloody ground.

[2] Speaking of Julius Cæſar,

Dubium cautior an audentior. Suetonius.

ſhould

ſhould he run the riſque of fortune, eſpecially when it is not a leſs part of a commander to get the better by management and contrivance, than by the ſword?

Knoles's, and Sir Paul Rycaut's hiſt. of the Turks, life of Amurath the ſixth.

This has been the wiſdom not only of the ancients but of much later ages. It is written, that Scanderbeg, prince of Epirus, ſlew with his own hand three thouſand Turks, in his wars againſt Amurath the ſixth and Mahomet his ſon: he ever fought againſt the Turks with his arm bare; and with ſuch fierceneſs that the blood oftentimes burſt out of his lips; yet this valiant man, in his ſpeech to encourage his ſoldiers and citizens of Sfetigrade againſt the coming of Amurath in the year 1449, ſays theſe words: "Truly that victory ſhould be unto me lament-"able, which I ſhould buy with the blood of my ſoldiers; "and, believe me, it would be unto me a more ſorrowful "than pleaſant fight, to ſee eight or ten thouſand of my "enemies ſlain, with the loſs of a few of you."

Swediſh intelligencer, 1632.

At the ſiege of Franckford upon the Oder, Guſtavus Adolphus, the great king of Sweden, having commanded the aſſault to be given, and perceiving his chief officers prepared to fight unarm'd, commanded them to put on their armour; and at the ſame time told them, he that did it not, loved not the king; for when his officers are killed, who were to command his ſoldiers? And, no doubt, had he perceived the private men unneceſſarily expoſing themſelves to dangers, he would have reprimanded them in the ſame manner, and would have aſked them, how he was to proſecute his great undertakings, if he loſt the inſtruments through a fooliſh contempt of their own defence, by which he was to do it?

Plutarch's life of Pericles.

It is plain, theſe experienced and brave commanders were of the ſame opinion with Pericles the Athenian; who,

who, when with great difficulty he could reſtrain his men from action, told them, they muſt not expect that men, like trees, when they were cut down would ſhoot up again: in ſhort, his experience had taught him to depend more upon conduct and ſtratagem, than an hardy valour. He ſucceeded ſo well, that he directed the helm of the Athenian adminiſtration for forty years [3].

Wherefore, we muſt now beg leave to inform our countrymen and fellow ſoldiers, for whoſe reading theſe ſheets are compiled, that had it been our fate to have lived in ſome countries, we ſhould not have thought the neceſſity ſo great to make an apology for having applied our attention ſo much to the ſhield, by putting them in mind, the great men above-mentioned, whoſe valour and intrepidity was temper'd with prudence and wiſdom, thought it far from not being honourable to defend themſelves, as well as thoſe under their command; and when victory was not to be attained by the ſword, to keep off defeat and diſgrace by the ſhield: and even at the very times victory hovered over them, they thought it incumbent upon them to have their attention as much attached to the one as the other. The ſtudy of the defence in every branch was eſteemed by them as important and neceſſary to troops of every nation, and of every degree, as that of the offence; the former being the preſervation of our friends and companions, the latter the deſtruction of our enemies; the former ſecuring the retreat of armies, throwing troops into beſieged towns, eſcorting neceſſaries for diſtreſſed armies and garriſons, and to be performed for the generality againſt ſuperior

[3] Une valeur féroſe eſt plus dangereuſe qu'une timidité ignorante. La férocité eſt une monſtrueuſe copie de la bravoure, comme la poltronerie eſt une fauſſe imitation de la douceur. Turpin, tom. 2. li. 3. ch. 2. Inſtructions militaires, ch. 41. note.

forces, at whoſe option it is to attack or not; at whoſe option it is, when they do attack, to chuſe their method: but the latter have but two ways to determine, which is what way they are pleaſed to attack, ſhould they think it worth their while; ſhould they not, to let the defenſive troops purſue their march undiſturbed.

However, notwithſtanding what has been ſaid, from the knowledge we have ourſelves of the temperature and diſpoſition of our countrymen, as well as from what their enemies, from fatal experience, have been pleaſed to tell us[4]; we cannot but ſuſpect the ſword glitters in their eyes with an higher luſtre than that of the ſhield; and that the greater glory is attached more to the former than the latter. Should this be really ſo, our purpoſes have not been to deaden the one, but to enliven more the other; not to tie up the arms of our countrymen from attacking their enemies, but to give them more liberty when attacked by them: this will ſurely ſerve for a farther excuſe, when they recollect, by having learnt the ſafeſt methods to defend themſelves, they are not in the leaſt untaught to offend their enemies.

To the better underſtanding the target, which is to be the chief ſubject of the following ſheets, it will be neceſſary to ſay ſomething of the poſitions which are at pre-

Memoirs of the marquis de Langallerie.

[4] At the ſiege of Namur by king William the third and the elector of Bavaria, in ſixteen hundred and ninety-five, againſt marſhal Boufflers and the count de Guiſcard, Langallerie entered the place with the marſhal, who was of opinion not to ſurrender but at the laſt extremity: the marſhal placed a great confidence in the dragoons he had brought in with him, from whom he expected wonders: but the Engliſh, ſays Langallerie, whoſe extraordinary courage and intrepidity in aſſaults renders them dreadful, brought the count de Guiſcard to other ſentiments, and not to venture the loſs of a garriſon compoſed of the beſt troops of France, but rather to put his troops into the caſtle, and ſurrender the town, which was done the fourth of Auguſt.

ſent

ſent practiſed by troops in the ſame circumſtances, that according to our notions require the target to be prefered before them, by which the advantages and diſadvantages will be more clearly and explicitly ſhewn. As the poſitions in the target are entirely upon the defence, and the worſt or moſt dangerous ſort of defence, being compoſed of infantry only, which are to make their ground good, or their retreat ſafe, againſt every ſort of enemy; upon a ſuppoſition that it is in the power of the enemy, though ſuperior in number, according to their different qualities, to make their different efforts, as cavalry alone, or united with infantry. Before we come to an explanation of it, as is already ſaid, for the better underſtanding it, it will be neceſſary to run over the poſitions that are at preſent in uſe, to throw infantry in to enable them to ſupport themſelves againſt a ſuperior force of cavalry alone, or cavalry and infantry together, in an open country, where they are as liable to be attacked on one ſide as another, or on all ſides together. As the modern poſitions for theſe purpoſes are ſquares or orbs, whoſe methods of forming, acting, and reducing muſt be well underſtood by every one of the profeſſion, we ſhall, in a curſory manner, go over them in general, and dwell more upon particulars.

The SQUARE.

IN all poſitions there are ſome conſiderations to be regarded more than others; in a ſquare, expedition void of confuſion in their forming, and a ſort of equality in their defence, that an enemy ſhall have no more hope

to ſucceed by attacking one part more than another whilſt forming; and when formed, to be able to preſerve the ſame equality in their defence, and to have every where a good one. But ſquares do not ſeem to have theſe properties lodg'd in them, according to the common method in forming them; nor, when formed, according to their common method of fighting. We have ſeen three different ways only of forming the ſquare; there may be others: the one is (plan 1. fig. 1.) preſerving the four center platoons ſtanding (if a ſingle battalion) to keep a front to the enemy, whilſt the others face to them, and form the ſide faces and rear by moving by half files, and beginning with the half files next to thoſe that ſtand faſt. Another method is, preſerving the four center platoons for the ſame purpoſe, and forming the other three faces by the other platoons going to the right about, and wheeling till they compleat the other three faces; by which the moſt exterior parts have a face entire to form after the other three are upon their proper ground 2. The third method is, the fourth part of the whole battalion upon the right faces to the left; the three other diviſions go to the right about; the ſecond diviſion next to the right wheels to the right, and forms the right face; the third diviſion marches forwards, and forms the rear; the diviſion upon the right of all, that faced to the left, marching into it's place by half files, and forms the front; the diviſion upon the left of all wheels to the left, and forms the left face: the grenadiers cover the angles in all theſe methods as uſual; the whole facing outwards when the ſquare is formed 3. Theſe are methods to form it from a ſingle line. But when a ſquare is intended to be formed upon the march, (eſpe-

Plan. 1st

Fig. 1.











(eſpecially by any number) it is abſurd to ſuppoſe them marching in a ſingle line, as from ſuch a poſition they require more time: wherefore the uſual method is to march them by grand diviſions, if a ſingle battalion; if ſeveral battalions, in four columns; and form as a ſquare does, marching by grand diviſions. (fig. 4. plan. 2.)

However, the ſquare has now been formed four different ways; neither of which preſerves an equality in their defence, if attacked whilſt forming, ſome parts being more expoſed than others: for ſuppoſe a ſingle battalion, or ſeveral in a ſingle line, or four columns, has a ſquadron or more on each ſide, with abſolute orders to charge that part of the enemy that expoſes their back toward them: there will be found in all theſe methods of forming the ſquare, one face in each with their back to the enemy, and no fire to defend it, which will ſerve to ruin the reſt, and to ſhew the little ſignification there is of having one face ſtand faſt, when the whole is as ſoon diſconcerted by the ruin of either of the others.

In a ſmall ſquare there is not much probability of being charged before it is compleated; but the danger increaſes with a large one. As the danger is great if attacked whilſt forming; ſo is the ſecurity ſmall if attacked when formed, by the weak reſiſtance it can make. It has been an opinion, if infantry knew their own ſtrength, they need not be under thoſe apprehenſions they frequently are from cavalry: and there are inſtances to be found which ſeem to corroborate this opinion.

In the year ſixteen hundred and ninety, prince Waldeck brought off entire over the plains of Fleury, 'till they reached the cannon of Charleroy, ſixteen Dutch battalions formed into one ſquare, deſerted by the cavalry and left

Gen. Cane. left to ſhift for themſelves: he baffled the attempts of all the French cavalry, and proved their ſeveral efforts to break them were vain, for the want of the infantry unable to come with them.

Gen. Cane. In ſeventeen hundred and five, ten Bavarian battalions formed likewiſe into one ſquare, and defended themſelves 'till they reached the walls of Louvain, defying the fruitleſs attempts of the cavalry of the right wing of the army of the duke of Marlborough; the infantry being not able to join them: this happened when he paſſed the French lines in Brabant. Theſe examples, and the ideas one has oneſelf of the ſmall hopes of ſucceſs, if the infantry is to be depended on, are enough to deter one from attempting the like, (unleſs in the ſituation above mentioned) which is, to be quick enough to charge before the ſquare is compleated. But when we abound in cavalry, we are at liberty to do as Cyrus the ſon of Cambyſes adviſed his Perſians: perceiving them under apprehenſions leſt they ſhould be obliged to bear the brunt of the fight on horſeback, not having thoroughly learnt the management of their horſes; If ſo, ſays Cyrus, I muſt tell you, we are neither able foot ſoldiers, nor good horſemen; for it is not difficult to clear this to you: whenever we pleaſe we may diſmount and fight on foot; for having been taught the diſcipline of horſe, does not in the leaſt unteach us the diſcipline of foot. Should we be imitators of Cyrus, who was a great commander, and whoſe life is handed down to us by a great commander alſo as well as a great philoſopher; ſhould we be imitators of Cyrus by diſmounting our cavalry, which is the principal uſe of dragoons; it will make a great alteration in the defence of the ſquare; ſo great, it ſeems an

Xenophon's Cyropedia, book 4.

abſurdity

abſurdity to attack otherwiſe, or at leaſt with cavalry alone.

The battles of Rocroy and Kalis are ſufficient evidences of the truth of this. The Spaniſh infantry that formed the hollow ſquare at Rocroy (being deſerted by the cavalry) were eſteemed as good as any in Europe, were commanded by an expert general, and had eighteen pieces of cannon, in thoſe days no inconſiderable number. But all availed but little againſt the famous prince of Condè; who finding his cavalry made no impreſſion, brought his infantry to the attack. The combat ended with the total deſtruction of the ſquare.

The affair at Kalis in 1706, was not very unlike it: the Poloneſe cavalry having deſerted the Swediſh infantry, at that time eſteemed invincible; a body of them, with Mardefeld their general at their head, formed the hollow ſquare, and in that poſition was obliged to ſurrender priſoners to the Saxons and Ruſſians. Thus we ſee the difference of the ſquare when attacked by infantry as well as cavalry. Adlerfield, hiſt. ch. 12.

It muſt be granted, troops when thrown in theſe poſitions, generally acknowledge a ſuperiority in the enemy, by putting them entirely upon the defence; like four men ſtanding with their backs to one another, to have the enemy always in front: and all troops upon the defence, to be ſure from labouring under ſome inequality, ſhould endeavour to make themſelves as nearly equal as poſſible to the enemy, by finding out a poſition advantageous to them when attacked, and inconvenient to thoſe who attack: but ſquares do not ſeem poſitions deſigned for theſe purpoſes; though in an open country, where they are liable to be ſurrounded, which is the only time there is a neceſſity for theſe poſitions, when

when foot alone are to cope with horſe, or horſe and foot together: for there is no part in a ſquare defended by any fire beſides it's own, which is reaping no more advantage than the enemy; nor is there any part ſupported by another, which is not being upon an equality with the enemy: the grenadier companies might indeed ſupport their own regiments, by being in their rear in the ſquare: however, ſhould the little fire that is, be idly thrown away, they lay themſelves open; and according to the manner we have ever ſeen the ſquare make uſe of it's fire, there are ſome parts approachable almoſt without any. (pl. 1. fig. 4.) Here are two plans ſhewing the ſame body of men in four ſmall ſquares, and afterwards in one great ſquare. Theſe ſixteen battalions divided into four brigades, and each brigade formed into a ſquare, being but a fourth part as large as a ſquare formed from the whole number, have but a fourth part of the ground to march over; and conſequently can do it in the fourth part of the time: but the defence they can make when it is done, is no ways adequate to their numbers. Theſe eight thouſand men are ſurrounded by ſeven thouſand eight hundred, an inferior number, which may be ſuppoſed to be half cavalry; and every trooper to have a muſqueteer behind him, or all dragoons: ſhould they be dragoons, they will conſiſt of fifty-two ſquadrons, an hundred and fifty men in each. It can ſcarce be thought, when an enemy is to attack four ſquares to charge every face, they would be ſo inconſiderate as to venture themſelves between the ſquares, to be between two fires; as there is a great probability, ſhould the front and rear faces be charged and broke, the confuſion that muſt enſue would be ſo great, the whole would be equally ruined. If this is granted,

it

it muſt be granted alſo, by throwing troops in theſe forms, all the ſide faces are rendered uſeleſs, according to the preſent method practiſed in their firing; and have nothing to do but look againſt one another, and wait the impending blow: and the ſide faces being as large, contain as much fire as the others, that half the fire is loſt; and out of eight thouſand there will be but that of four thouſand; and upon examining there will not be ſo much as this: for the troops that attack may be diſpoſed in ſuch a manner as to ſuffer very little more from the front and rear faces than from the ſide, by attacking the angles with oblique lines; by which the ſquares will receive all the fire of the enemy in oblique directions, when the enemy will receive none from the ſquare's being in ſtraight directions; (except the grenadiers upon the angles attacked) and according to fig. 4. pl. 1. is as follows. Fifty-two ſquadrons, divided into eight parts, will be ſix to every front and rear face, and four remaining to be diſpoſed where there is moſt occaſion: four ſquadrons being diſmounted out of every ſix, conſiſting of nine hundred men, will make a ſtronger front than any face in the ſquare. When they are thus diſmounted, ſhould they which are deſigned for the two center ſquares march in two lines by half files, directly to the interval between the two ſquares, they will receive little or no fire in their march (except from the grenadiers upon the angles); when they are advanced in this manner within ſuch a diſtance as the commanding officers of theſe troops ſhall think proper, they wheel a part of a circle to the right and left, the troops upon the right to the left, thoſe upon the left to the right; by which they will come with a full front againſt the angles, and then may fire as their officers ſhall direct. The foot upon the flanks of all,

march and wheel in the ſame manner: when the troops diſmounted are thus diſpoſed, the two ſquadrons allotted to every front and rear face, may advance oppoſite the faces they are to charge, keeping at ſuch a diſtance as not to receive any hurt from them, their fire being directly againſt them; which will keep the enemy in a ſtate of ſuſpence, not knowing which to have their attention to moſt: they might continue at this diſtance till they ſee the faces growing into confuſion, then they might draw a little nearer; by which method they would be ready to charge to a good purpoſe, when the fire of the oblique lines had quite confounded them; which muſt ſoon happen, theſe troops receiving little hurt themſelves from the ſtraight directions of the fire of the ſquare; conſequently will be able to do more to the parts they fire at. The four remaining ſquadrons may be oppoſite the intervals between the ſquares, to prevent the ſide faces altering their poſition to aſſiſt the parts attacked: by diſpoſing the fifty-two ſquadrons in this manner, the four ſquares, conſiſting of eight thouſand men, will loſe the uſe of all their fire, except the grenadiers upon the angles attacked; and will receive from the enemy, conſiſting of ſeven thouſand eight hundred, the fire of four thouſand eight hundred (allowing a few to hold the diſmounted horſes) and twenty ſquadrons ready to charge, when the fire of theſe troops ſhall have leſſened both the difficulty and the danger, by firing againſt an enemy who have it not in their power, by their poſition, to return it again.

To make it ſtill an eaſier conqueſt. Let the four bodies of infantry that attack the ſquares in the center (fig. 5.) be equally divided, and added to the troops upon the flanks of all, and the four ſquadrons of obſervation ſupport them: the other cavalry may remain as they

they are in fig. 4. by this method the two ſquares, conſiſting of two thouſand men each upon the right and left, will have each of them two thouſand four hundred foot, and ſix ſquadrons to charge, when theſe great bodies of infantry ſhall make it eaſy by their ſuperior fire; greatly ſuperior! not being able to receive any aſſiſtance from the two center ſquares; which have alſo four ſquadrons in their front, and as many in their rear, to awe them: that the ſquares upon the right and left muſt fall an eaſy conqueſt, and ſhew the way to the two others, who may be attacked afterwards in the ſame manner, by troops who can have received but little damage from the weak reſiſtance they meet with, having to deal with men that are not in a ſituation capable of receiving any aſſiſtance from their friends, though unemployed; nor even of making a right uſe of themſelves.

The reſiſtance theſe four ſquares can make, formed into one great ſquare, is much the ſame: the neceſſity to attack every face is no greater than it was found to be in the four ſquares, and it would be as abſurd to attempt it; and whoever would argue to the contrary, might as well argue a fortified place could not be taken unleſs attacked in every part; but it is known to be imprudent to act in ſuch a manner, as it would be rendering the whole force of the beſiegers weak in every part, and leſs able to do execution in any. But when the whole ſtrength is bent againſt ſome particular parts, the probability of forcing thoſe parts muſt be greater; and it is known, when once a breach is made, though almoſt ever ſo ſmall, the place is generally taken, though ever ſo great. So far a ſquare may be compared to a fortified town, they are ſafe as long as they can keep the enemy out of it: but

when penetrated in any one place, from that moment (unleſs ſome great good fortune intervenes) the whole may date their ruin. Wherefore as there is no neceſſity to attack every face of the ſquare, the whole force almoſt may be brought againſt ſome particular parts. (Plan 2. fig. 1.) the ſquare in this plan conſiſts of the ſame number of men as the four ſquares, every battalion being ſupported by their own company of grenadiers formed for that purpoſe withitn it: and is attacked by the ſame number of horſe and foot; that is, eight thouſand men are engaged by ſeven thouſand eight hundred. The principal attacks are againſt the front and rear faces; theſe two faces ſupported by their own grenadiers in their rear, as well as the grenadiers of the faces not attacked, which may be detached, will conſiſt of two thouſand two hundred each, except making a little allowance for a few to cover the angles; and will be attacked by four thouſand four hundred foot, ſupported by twelve ſquadrons, being two thouſand two hundred foot, and ſix ſquadrons to each face. Now the queſtion is, whether two thouſand two hundred foot can put into ſuch a confuſion, by their continual firing, two thouſand two hundred, an equal number, when they can receive no other aſſiſtance, as to make it ſafe and eaſy for ſix ſquadrons to charge? By this diſtribution of the troops, there will remain four ſquadrons and two hundred foot for each ſide face; the ſquadrons may be called ſquadrons of obſervation rather than execution, and may continue at a diſtance to amuſe thoſe faces; the officers that command them may make the rear rank of each ſquadron fall back and face the intervals between the ſquadrons under his command, by which they will appear double the number and in two lines: and at

that

Plan 2.





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

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

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

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

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that diſtance not eaſily diſcovered by the enemy, eſpecially at a time when even their fears would double their numbers without it: he may command them to their proper places, and charge when he ſees the whole growing into confuſion by the fire and ſquadrons of the principal attacks. The two hundred foot allotted to each ſide face, may be divided in platoons or ſmall bodies equally in the front of thoſe faces, and fire as often as they can, to ruffle them and make them throw away their fire. The officers who command the principal attacks, may make their diſpoſitions as they ſhall think moſt advantageous, having a very ſuperior force to do them with: every face in this ſquare is ſix hundred half files, beſides the grenadiers in their rear. Should the front be attacked by two columns of four lines each, both together will make an hundred and eighty-three in front: and it can hardly be doubted, if the four fires are tolerably well given from each of the columns ſucceſſively, cloſe after one another, but they muſt make two openings in that face of the ſquare for the ſquadrons to enter; notwithſtanding the oblique fire of the parts of the ſame face that are not particularly engaged, as it is well known a ſingle fire well given, has made the party fired againſt give way: it would be like battering in breach; as ſoon as the breach is fairly made, the aſſault is then to begin. But as an hundred and eighty-three half files, which is the front of the two columns, can cover no more than the like number, the front of the ſquare conſiſting of ſix hundred, will have four hundred and ſeventeen that has received little or no fire: and though the parts of the face oppoſite the columns are entirely ſwept away, and the ſquadrons ſhould have an eaſy entrance; it might be an entrance to their own deſtruction, ſo large a part of the

the face remaining entire, as well as the ſide faces; ſhould a part of them face inwards together, with the remainder of the face attacked, they might fire to do great execution: ſhould this be thought hazardous, it might be prevented in a great meaſure, by advancing the rear line of each column of foot even with the front lines, as the rear face of this ſquare is attacked, which makes a third body of two lines, and the other two have three lines each; and conſequently when they are equally diſpoſed, they will cover a third more than they did before: proper intervals between the diviſions muſt be preſerved large enough for a ſquadron to charge without interruption: the ſquadrons that are to charge, muſt draw up oppoſite the intervals as many as can, at ſuch a diſtance in the rear as to be out of danger; or elſe in the rear of the infantry, by which they will in ſome meaſure be covered from the danger of having their horſes ruffled by any rambling ſhot, as well as from the obſervation of the enemy; they muſt continue their ground till the face is actually in confuſion from the muſketry, which muſt inevitably happen, even though it ſhould have the advantage over the foot that attack them; as ſoon as this is obſerved, the ſquadrons muſt charge together as many as can through the intervals; which will break the face of the ſquare in ſo many places, there will be great probability to imagine, inſtead of opening at every place, as was obſerved might happen in the other method to let the cavalry into the ſquare, the whole face would be drove into the ſquare; which would prevent the ſide faces going to the right about and firing, through the fear of killing their own men; even though they were under no apprehenſions from the ſquadrons of obſervation and infantry that were oppoſite to them, and trying

all

all ways to annoy them. In all theſe methods, as ſoon as the ſquadrons prepare to charge, the infantry that begins the action muſt march as faſt as poſſible to their ſupport.

The ſudden paſſing of cavalry through intervals properly left for them between the infantry, to charge an enemy conſiſting wholly of infantry; or the paſſing of infantry in the ſame manner through cavalry when the enemy is all cavalry; if well conducted generally has a good effect, eſpecially ſhould it be unexpected: the ſudden change being not only apt to intimidate but confound ſo much, that very ſeldom troops can withſtand it.

C. Caſſius when he led his army into Syria againſt the Parthians, drew out his cavalry in front, but concealed his infantry in a rough place behind them; then ordering his cavalry to retire through places they were well acquainted with, he drew the army of the Parthians among his infantry that were prepared for them, and overthrew them: as the enemy advanced, inſtead of Caſſius's infantry paſſing through his cavalry, the cavalry retired through the infantry. Frontinus's ſtratagems, book 2. chap. 5.

In the bloody battle near Lieſna, in the palatinate of Miciſlaw near Propoiſk, count Adam Lewis Lowenhaupt, who commanded the troops of Charles the twelfth king of Sweden againſt the Ruſſian army, under his Czariſh majeſty and his principal generals, in the year ſeventeen hundred and eight, being informed the enemy's cavalry was at hand, preſently ranged his own on two lines, and placed his foot in the rear in a valley where they were hid from the enemy: when the battle was begun, they were to enter at ſome openings between the ſquadrons: this diſpoſition diſconcerted the enemy, who were ranged in order of battle, and did not expect Adlerfield's hiſtory of Charles XII. vol. 3.

this

this motion. Lowenhaupt, who inſtantly perceived the order in which they ſtood, went to the right, and major general Stackelberg to the left, and marched at the ſame time with the two lines to attack the enemy, who turned their backs and fled. Horſe and foot acting in this manner, may properly be called aſſiſting one another.

Arrian's hiſt. of Alexander, book 5. ch 16.

Alexander the ſon of Philip, ſeemed ſenſible of this mutual aſſiſtance, by the diſpoſition he made with his troops for the attack of the army of Porus king of the Indians: for knowing himſelf to be much ſuperior to the Indians in horſe, and that their chief ſtrength was in their front, he moved with the beſt part of his cavalry towards Porus's left wing, reſolving to break in upon that quarter; and diſpatched Cænus with his own and Demetrius's troops to the right, with orders that when he perceived the barbarians turn their horſes to reſiſt the fury of his attack, he ſhould fall upon their rear: the phalanx of foot he ordered to be led on by Seleucus, Antigonus, and Tauro; and commanded them not to engage before they ſaw the enemy's horſe and foot in diſorder by his and Cænus's attacks: but when they came within reach of their miſſive weapons, they ſhould immediately diſpatch about a thouſand archers againſt the enemy's left wing; that by the violence of thoſe, and the irruption of the horſe, that part of the army might be put into diſorder: he with his auxiliary horſe flew ſwiftly to the left wing, with deſign to engage them warmly before they could recover themſelves from the confuſion his archers muſt neceſſarily bring them into. The fruits of this conduct was a compleat victory; and Porus afterwards ſurrendered himſelf to Alexander.

Thus we have endeavoured to ſhew the attack of the ſquare, and the defence it can make when attacked, in as

as ſhort a manner as poſſible: otherways there are other methods to attack it, as well as arguments to prove it's weakneſs in it's defence; and that it is not a poſition of that ſtrength and convenience, which is natural enough to ſuppoſe from the general practice of it is conceived to be: but what has been already ſaid, ſeems convincing enough.

To be ſure there may be a time when it muſt be thought right for troops to be in this poſition; for ſhould a body of foot be deſerted by their cavalry in an engagement, and through the courſe of the action be drove into poſitions and forms which with the leaſt variation becomes a ſquare, no body then can diſpute it's uſefulneſs, but muſt think it the greateſt good fortune; ſhould they not be accidentally thrown into the above poſitions, and are ſo preſſed by the enemy, as not to have time to tell them off for any poſition; in this ſituation, an orb is the ſafeſt, as it is the eaſieſt and plaineſt, ſhould there be time to tell them off, to form a regular ſquare; in all probability there may be time to form them into any other regular, and, according to our judgement, a better and ſafer poſition.

But notwithſtanding what has been ſaid, if other reaſons are to be found to prove the uſefulneſs of the ſquare, ſome of the above inconveniences might be avoided, both in the forming it, and in it's defence when formed. It was obſerved in the methods we have ever ſeen the ſquare formed, there was no equality in it's defence ſhould it be attacked whilſt forming; as in each method the enemy might come one way that had no fire to defend it: the method of moving by half files requiring the ground to be firſt marked out, is unmilitary and tedious, therefore not ſo ſafe. Some one face in the other methods going over as much ground again as the others;

conſequently makes the ſquare as long again in compleating: theſe are inconveniences, though not ſo great but may in ſome meaſure be avoided; and from a ſingle line, by forming it in the following manner. (fig. 2.)

The twelve center platoons go neither to the right, left, right or left about; but march and wheel directly: the four center march directly forward; the four upon the right of them wheel to the left; the four upon the left wheel to the right; by which they have a full view of one another almoſt all the way, and conſequently ſee plainer what they are doing: the front face ſweeping the whole ſpace of the ſquare, is a ſufficient guide for the right and left faces to wheel by, being ſhewn all the way their proper diſtance: the ſpace of ground the right and left faces wheel upon, and the front face marches over being nearly equal, they will reach their proper places nearly together; and ſhould the front face not move from it's ground, 'till the ſide faces have wheeled a little, they will meet juſt together; and conſequently the left half file of the right face, and right of the left, will be marks for the front face to halt and dreſs by: the two platoons upon the right flank, and the two upon the left face at the ſame time to the right and left inwards; by which they look full one againſt another, and can ſurvey the whole; wherefore if they can march in a direct line by any point, they can't miſtake; their whole buſineſs being to join one another as ſoon as they can; the two platoons upon the right, by the right half file of the right face, the two platoons upon the left, by the left half file of the left face; being the two half files the ſide faces wheel upon; and the cloſer they bruſh upon theſe half files, the cloſer and more compact the ſquare will be. By this method every face has ſome part of another

another ſo plain to guide itſelf, that it is not eaſy to miſtake: when it is formed, the whole faces outwards, and the grenadiers cover the angles as in the other methods. It may be formed in the ſame time, ſhould it be required, by the two platoons upon each flank making the front face; and the twelve center going to the right about and forming the three others; the front face that was before, making the rear.

There is but one objection to the method of forming a ſquare by the advancing the front face in the manner mentioned: and that is, it preſerves no part ſtanding faſt to receive the enemy, and this we don't allow to be an objection; for it will be ſhewn it has been eſteemed a greater advantage to advance upon the enemy, than to wait for the enemy; the firſt ſerving to intimidate them, the other rather to encourage: nor can there be any neceſſity for one face to ſtand faſt more than another, unleſs the whole enemy is before that face; in that caſe, to be ſure, it would make them more deliberate in their motions, though ſhould the ſame face advance, one would imagine it would make them equally as deliberate in their motions, ſeeing a body as ready to receive them; and conſequently would aſſiſt the other faces equally the ſame, by giving them time to form undiſturbed in it's rear. All other ſituations that require troops to be thrown in this defenſive poſition, muſt be from an apprehenſion the enemy intends to ſurround or attack in ſeveral places at once: and whoever in this caſe would make a good defence, muſt be ready to receive them in thoſe ſeveral places at once; which makes the neceſſity of being every where equally prepared as great, as for a beſieged town, to be every where equally ſtrong. Wherefore the method of having the front, or any other face, ſtand faſt, is de-

trimental to the whole, ſhould either of the others by that means be deſtitute of defence, if attacked before it is formed; in all probability it being as difficult to judge, where the real attacks would be made, as it would be abſurd to expect them in the places moſt ready to receive them. That it is acting but an imprudent part to be ſo over cautious in keeping the enemy from penetrating this one face; when the whole is as ſoon diſconcerted, ſhould they break through either of the others; and it would be unreaſonable to ſuppoſe any perſon, thought capable of conducting a body of cavalry, deſigned to ruin a body of infantry, would attempt it in a raſh inconſiderate manner: but if he acted ſuitable to the truſt repoſed in him, and planted his cavalry ſo as to be able to charge this body of foot from oppoſite quarters at the ſame time; in theſe circumſtances, it would be of little ſignification to have any one part ſtand faſt, when the others can make no defence. Or in an engagement, ſhould one army be obliged to retire, the natural conſequence of moſt actions, and the horſe of both wings of the victorious army ſhould purſue them in their retreat; it would not be impoſſible for a body of their infantry, that quitted the field laſt (if they retired either by their right or left) to fall in between the two wings of the victorious horſe: and then preſerving a front face ſtanding faſt in order to form a ſquare; when the cavalry would be ready to charge them as ſoon in the rear, would be of little or no ſignification.

But in forming, according to fig. 2. upon ſuch an emergency, the whole halts in the middle of their forming, which gives it the poſition of fig. 3. as it ſhould be a ſtanding order; whenever it halted in the middle of the forming, for the platoons on the flanks (if it is a

ſingle

ſingle battalion) that form the rear face, to face to the rear; and wheel of their own accord the eighth or ninth part of a circle inwards, which gives them the croſs fire that defends the rear of the front face as well as themſelves: the ſide faces muſt go at the ſame time, of their own accord, to the right about; by which they defend the rear of the platoons, that form the rear face, as well as themſelves; the front face defends itſelf, and the rear of the ſide faces: thus, during the forming from a ſingle line, tho' the back of every man is open to the enemy, the back of no one man is approachable to the enemy, but through the fire of one whole face; every part defending the rear of ſome other beſides itſelf. Theſe motions no enemy can well hinder, unleſs the charge is made actually before they are halted; as the platoons that form the rear face wheel that ſmall part of a circle with a full front, and towards the enemy. When they are in theſe poſitions, they command a fire every way, tho' it is not requir'd, unleſs the enemy charge every face at once, which is very probable they might not; and then they may have the front of ſome of the faces, as well as the rear, defended by the fire of another face, beſides their own; and may command more fire, than when the ſquare is actually compleated, by every face ſtanding their ground, or going to the right about, whichever way their fire is wanted moſt. Such is the advantage of theſe oblique poſitions in this ſituation; the grenadiers muſt cover the exterior points.

We have made theſe movements with a ſingle battalion, as it is ſeen as well by one as by more, tho' there could ſcarce be a neceſſity for theſe poſitions in a ſquare ſo ſmall; ſhould there be ſeveral battalions, they might march in much ſafer poſitions than a ſingle line to form

form a ſquare; but not the ſame as are commonly practis'd, which are by four grand diviſions or columns, as they are liable to make miſtakes in their wheeling, and not judge their proper diſtances, before they begin to wheel; beſides having one face defenceleſs, during the time it is forming, as has been already mention'd, fig. 4. And if it is ſo difficult to do it at common exerciſe, when there is no enemy to annoy, it is not to be ſuppos'd any one would venture to march in theſe poſitions with an enemy in view, with an intent to form a ſquare, if attack'd, for the advantage of forming eaſier into battalion; that ſeeming the chief advantage of marching in the above poſitions: therefore, this method can be of little real uſe. However, the difficulties and apprehenſions we have juſt mention'd, are entirely taken away, by the following method: (fig. 5.) When it is judged there might be a neceſſity to form a ſquare upon the march, and it is the buſineſs to find out a poſition ſafe and commodious for the march, and at the ſame time ſafe and convenient to form when requir'd, is to form according to fig. 2. at firſt ſetting out; and when form'd, face the front and rear faces inwards, and march them towards one another, till they meet in the center: (fig. 5.) Let as many half files of the center of the ſide faces ſtand faſt, as are requiſite to cover the flanks of the front and rear faces when in the center, and order the remaining parts of the ſide faces to the right about; then wheel them inwards, till they are cloſe and in parallel lines with the front and rear faces; the grenadiers may continue their proper ground when the ſquare is form'd, to guard the whole from irregulars, or may wheel with the ſide faces, as is judg'd beſt: the colours in both theſe methods muſt be in the center, being the

place

place eaſieſt to fall into the ſquare from, when it forms: the whole faces whichever way they march, which is by half files; and being four half files together, will be twelve deep, except in the center, and upon the flanks, where they are only ſix. We will now ſuppoſe a body of horſe has entirely ſurrounded this body of infantry, marching in the above poſition; wherefore the whole is halted, and faces outwards to form the ſquare, which ſwells almoſt inſenſibly upon the enemy, by the ſide faces wheeling with a full front towards the enemy; the front and rear faces marching to their firſt poſition with a full front alſo: that here is not the back of one man, nor any one interval expos'd to the view of the enemy; nor is there any probability of miſtaking, nor any neceſſity to be in a hurry: for ſhould they advance too quick, it is only halting them in the middle of their movement, juſt to ſettle themſelves to receive the charge, and they are in a poſition as ſtrong, if not ſtronger, to make a defence, as when the ſquare is compleated: if the grenadiers wheel'd with the ſide faces, they muſt wheel back with them again, fig. 6. In forming in this manner, the half files next the center of the ſide faces, muſt not wait to bring the half file that joins their exterior ſide from the center with them, (unleſs the ſquare conſiſts of more than one battalion) but every half file muſt move as faſt as it can to their proper ground, for the ſquare; otherways, the front and rear faces can't ſtir till the ſide faces reach their proper ground by the half files next the center, who have not near ſo great a part of a circle to wheel, waiting to bring round with them the moſt exterior half files; by which means, the half file next thoſe that ſtand faſt in the center, will not get to it's proper ground, ſooner than

than the moſt exterior half files of all; and conſequently the front and rear faces can't advance, till the half files next to them of the ſide faces give them leave, by getting out of their way. The ſide faces may join in the center, and the front and rear may double upon them, whenever it is thought more convenient: from either way they can form ſquare; and from ſquare, battalion; by all the parts retiring to their firſt poſition, by going the ſame ground back again, according to fig. 2.

We will ſay nothing more of the ſquare, but the firing; nor indeed ſhould we have dwelt ſo long upon it, was it not a poſition much practis'd. To be ſure, from the conveniency and ſafety it has been thought to afford to troops, in the circumſtances before-mention'd, it was obſerv'd, in plan 1. fig. 4. ſhould an enemy front the angles of ſquares with oblique lines, according to the methods we have ever ſeen practis'd in their firing, they receive only the fire of the grenadiers that cover the angles; but if the faces that form the angles wheel their platoons or ſub-diviſions one after another, or according to any other regulation before concerted, towards the enemy, the enemy will receive then, inſtead of ſcarce any fire, or of the grenadiers upon the angle only, the fire of the two faces that form the angle attack'd, beſides the grenadiers that cover the angle; nor can there be any danger in wheeling ſo ſmall a part of a circle, with ſuch ſmall bodies, which are ſo ſoon wheel'd back again; nor is it thought ſo in thoſe parts of a ſquare, which wheel for the grenadiers to march in and out upon the angles; tho' it is more hazardous, could a ſquadron be quick enough to follow ſo cloſe, as to enter the ſquare with the grenadiers; the platoons that wheel'd at that time,

time, not being able to wheel back, till the grenadiers are enter'd; and conſequently the ſquadron, during this, has nothing to oppoſe it.

The great ſquare in pl. 2. was not attack'd in this manner; becauſe any perſon, undoubtedly, would rejoice at the opportunity of having the fire of two faces, inſtead of one, to defend themſelves with: however, a very great ſquare is not ſo convenient; the oblique line of the enemy not being able to cover the faces, unleſs at ſuch a diſtance, as will render great part of the fire uſeleſs: however, ſhould it be thought not right, to wheel in the above manner, they may incline their firelocks: but if neither is approv'd of, when the angle is attack'd, it is evident, the faces which form the angle, are not in a capacity to return the fire they receive; which muſt be the ſtrongeſt inducement for an enemy to attack in that manner, as they muſt infallibly get the better: ſhould it be thought prudent in a ſquare, it muſt be prudent in all other poſitions, whoſe ſituations are the ſame, with regard to the enemy that attacks them. This we will remember, as it is what may be mention'd again.

The ORB.

BEFORE we proceed to the explanation of our own inventions, we will give the deſcription of one other poſition, intended to anſwer the purpoſes of a ſquare; not that we think it has much greater merit (if any) to take up our attention, than the ſquare: but that the reader may judge better, by having more than one of this ſort before him, and conſequently by comparing them with what we ſhall offer ourſelves, will ſee plainer which have the advantage over one another.

The orb, tho' not much practis'd by Britiſh troops, has been thought of conſequence enough to employ the attention of a perſon greatly ſkill'd in military affairs. Puyſegur's Art de la Guerre. Mareſhal de Puyſegur, in his art of war, prefers this circular poſition, to throw a body of infantry in an open country to reſiſt cavalry, or a ſuperior force of infantry; and for the following reaſons: becauſe it is regular, and equally ſtrong; and gives an enemy no reaſon to expect better ſucceſs by attacking one place more than another. (plan 3.)

Puyſegur draws his battalion up ſix deep; and it is form'd into an orb by the two flanks wheeling towards one another till they join; by which they form a circle; he ſays, in the manner one would draw the two ends of a thread upon a table, till they met. When it is thus form'd, he attacks it in the following manner by two ſquadrons; and ſhews the advantage it has over the two ſquadrons, by being attack'd in the ſaid manner. When an orb is form'd by a battalion ſix deep, the circumference will be only half ſo great, as when three deep; the diameter the ſame: the orb by this means is contracted into a very ſmall compaſs, and gains double advantage by it, being ſtrengthened by three more ranks; and B A of the ſquadrons being equal to the diameter of the orb contracted in this manner, will be the only part able to hurt the orb, and they very little; ſuppoſing they ſhould perſevere after they had receiv'd the fire of the orb: for as it is impoſſible for a ſquadron to advance in the form of an arc, there will be no part great enough to do any execution, by advancing againſt the orb, to charge all together; conſequently they loſe their force: and B A which fronts the diameter of the orb, and is the only part which can be brought to charge, muſt

Plan 3.d

o

p

x

m

m

m

muſt firſt touch the orb at (i), then incline their flanks inwards. The advantages an orb has, when attack'd in this manner, are very evident: the force of cavalry conſiſting in their charging together with cloſe compact bodies and a full front, is of little effect, when the charge is made againſt a poſition that will reſiſt ſome part of the ſquadron before the reſt; as muſt be the caſe againſt a point or a circle: for B A muſt firſt touch almoſt a point, as (i), every part which can be charg'd being orbicular; wherefore it is very probable, this little part which charges, by meeting with reſiſtance at (i), before it can be aſſiſted by the other parts, will be broke. Theſe are the advantages this circular poſition has againſt horſe; and according to Puyſegur, it has as many over foot: for he tells us, the infantry, when advancing to the attack, is ſubject to the fire of the orb; and through the difficulty of marching, have it not in their power to return the fire again: beſides, would they engage every part of the whole circumference, they muſt reduce their extent into a circular form; and then can attack no part of the orb, but the front it preſents; which is every where equal; and being oppoſite one another, muſt wound one another: and the ranks and files being cloſe and connected, and the diameter ſmall, ſhould the troops which attack make little impreſſion, being diſorder'd and disjointed in their march, they muſt receive great hurt themſelves. The orb, by the advantages juſt mention'd, having it in it's power then to fire to a good purpoſe.

By what Puyſegur has ſaid, concerning the attack of the orb, it is plain he points out the advantages of this circular poſition; in what it's ſtrength conſiſts; then attacks it the only way, which gives it an opportunity to

reap the ſame advantages; and by which it can exert this ſtrength moſt. He has told us, the ſtrength of the orb conſiſts in being ſix deep; more cloſe and compact than the troops which march to the attack; the diameter ſmall, and every part orbicular, no extent of front is left to receive any great ſhock of the enemy. In ſhort, he has as good as told us, the power of the orb does not conſiſt ſo much in the fire it commands; but by being a compact body and circular, can withſtand any great ſhock: as a wall that is orbicular, or preſents a ſaliant angle to a battery, can reſiſt this battery much longer, than a wall that preſents an even front; every ſhot loſing part of it's force. Wherefore, as we now know the excellency of the orb, it would be abſurd to attack it the way that gives it an opportunity of making the better reſiſtance: it would be prudence to endeavour to find out a method which might deprive it of ſome of the ſame advantages: it can't but be obſerved to be a poſition ſo far upon the defenſive, that it is hardly ever capable of acting offenſively upon any equality, but at the very critical time a charge is made againſt it: that could troops be brought in a poſition to act offenſively at a diſtance againſt the orb form'd ſix deep, they might ruin ſuch a body with little loſs to themſelves.

Puyſegur farther tells us, the orb form'd in this manner, is founded upon the ſame reaſon as Polybius ſays the Macedonian phalanx was, when compar'd with the Roman legion. The Romans, by the diſtance they preſerv'd between one another, had but one ſoldier againſt two files of the Greeks: and the phalanx being form'd with ſixteen ranks, one behind the other, by the length of their pikes, when their ranks were cloſe, five pikes paſs'd beyond the firſt rank. Puyſegur obſerves, tho' the

the firelock with the bayonet at the end has not the advantage of the Grecian pike, being not of ſo great a length; yet it has the other advantages, for it has equally two files againſt one cavalier; which two files can ſtrike twelve ſtrokes [5].

This would be of much greater weight to us than it is, if we did not know the phalanx (notwithſtanding the advantage Puyſegur obſerves) apparently acknowledged a ſuperiority in the legion, by the many victories they had gained over it: if we did not know alſo, how long Polybius himſelf dwells on the commendation of the Roman legion, eſteeming it infinitely more eligible than the Grecian phalanx. Polybius, lib. 17.

Puyſegur here ſeems a little like the Grecians; who were ſo blinded with the few advantages (if they may be called ſo) of their phalanx, that they did not in the leaſt ſee, whilſt they were endeavouring to reap theſe advantages, the many much greater diſadvantages they underwent. This it was that gave the Romans the opportunity of bringing almoſt every enterprize againſt the Greeks to an happy iſſue: this it was (as Polybius ſays) made the moſt part of the Greeks look upon it as a kind of prodigy, that the Macedonians had been beaten by the Romans; and others to wonder what there was in the Roman legion ſuperior to that of the phalanx. Poly. lib. 17

However, Puyſegur ſtill to add to the merits of his orb, tells us of an intire army being thrown in this poſition by Julius Cæſar: wherefore as he has thought it a poſition of conſequence enough to introduce ſuch an inſtance, it obliges us to dwell much longer than we intended upon it, by endeavouring not only to prove the

[5] De plus ces deux files peuvent tirer douze coups. Puyſegur.

compariſon

compariſon by no means juſt; but all troops thrown into theſe poſitions, whether ſquares, orbs, triangles, or any ſingle figure of any ſhape, formed upon the principle of preſerving a front every way, to prevent the enemy attacking the rear of any part: all ſingle figures of theſe ſorts are formed upon weak principles; and what may be ſaid relating to one, may be applicable in the chief reſpects to the others: they are deficient in what has been ever eſteemed very eſſential in the diſpoſal of troops for every kind of action; and that is, they have no reſerve, no ſupernumerary body to act occaſional parts; and conſequently have nothing to depend on but themſelves; which is being expoſed too much to chance and fortune; and acting contrary to that military maxim, which tells us, nothing, or as little as poſſible ſhould be left to her [6]. What we mean here by a want of a reſerve, is, the whole force is ſwallowed up in the ſingle figure itſelf; it has not the leaſt aid to call to it's aſſiſtance, though it ſhould require ever ſo much: this is a diſcouraging circumſtance to any troops, but much more to thoſe on the defenſive, and greatly encouraging to the offenſive; having not only no real danger to fear from any other quarter, but where they attack; but nothing even to amuſe and divide their attention from the real attack: which makes it reaſonable to ſuppoſe their attack would be conducted with much greater order, and conſequently be more efficacious.

No order of battle or diſpoſition of troops can be perfect, without ſome ſupernumeraries to act occaſional parts, which will neceſſarily ariſe in the courſe of an action: otherwiſe upon every unexpected circumſtance or varia-

[6] Livy, lib. 22. Duces nullo loco niſi quantum neceſſitas cogit, ſe committere fortunæ debent.

tion,

tion, we muſt take from the main body to act theſe ſecondary parts, which would be breaking in upon the general diſpoſition and order of battle, and be of very dangerous conſequence, ſerving to confound and ruin the whole.

Notwithſtanding in the poſitions we are here treating of, this has been ever diſregarded (from no other reaſon one would imagine but the difficulty of having them) in all other poſitions or orders of battle, a reſerve is one of the principal things conſidered; to neglect it, would be imputed to ignorance and want of capacity in the higheſt degree: though the neceſſity does not ſeem ſo great for a reſerve in other poſitions as in theſe; there being no poſitions like theſe ſo totally ruined if any one part is broke; for which reaſon they greatly require ſome other aſſiſtance when any one part is principally attacked, to prevent it from being broke; and conſequently bringing deſtruction to the others, as apparently it does.

The general practice of all armies in allotting a portion of troops for theſe purpoſes in all orders of battle except the above, would ſerve, was there nothing elſe to teach us the great uſe a ſupernumerary body or reſerve has been ever thought to be of. The ancients were as ſenſible of it as we can be. Elian, after he has given the deſcription of the heavy-armed phalanx, proceeds to the light-armed, which was an additional phalanx, being the ſame in length, but only half in depth; and was what the Grecian commanders thought proper to have as an help-mate to the heavy-armed; to aid and aſſiſt according to the motions of the enemy, and as the nature of the action required: and ſometimes was planted in the front, ſometimes on the right or left, ſometimes in the rear: this light-armed phalanx conſiſted of ſlingers, and

Elian's Tacticks.

thoſe

thoſe who made uſe of arrows and darts, and other miſſive weapons; and conſequently were more light and conveniently armed than the other, for activity and every kind of expeditious movement: Elian ſays, it was of infinite uſe, and did many great things. This ſupernumerary phalanx, though it might begin the action, was nothing but a reſerve to the other; for the word reſerve here, is not to be underſtood ſo ſtrictly as a body of troops only to be called in at the concluſion of an action, and reſerved for no other purpoſe: but a body ſeparate and independent from the main order of battle, in reſerve for the commander's call, whenever any circumſtance ariſes that requires him; that he might not break the order of his army, by taking troops from any other parts to anſwer theſe purpoſes. Which ſhews the reſerve may begin the action as well as conclude it.

Arrian, lib. 3. chap. 12.

Alexander had one of theſe additional phalanx's at the battle of Arbela. It is related, when he had ranged his my in front, he added alſo another phalanx, which ſhould be a kind of flying party or ſquadron; having given orders to the commanders thereof, that if they perceived their own countrymen ſurrounded by the Perſian army, they ſhould ſuddenly turn backwards and charge the barbarians, and contract or dilate the phalanx as occaſion offered.

Veg. lib. 3. chap. 17.

The Romans ſeemed as ſenſible of this prudent method of proceeding as the Greeks. Vegetius ſpeaking of this part of military conduct, ſays, the beſt method, and moſt conducive to victory, is to have the choiceſt of both horſe and foot ready; ſome in the rear of each wing, and ſome in the rear of the center, who might ſuddenly advance wherever the enemy preſſed moſt; and by their additional ſtrength abate their courage and give a turn to

to the action. This the Lacedæmonians firſt found out; the Carthaginians imitated them, and the Romans afterwards every where obſerved the ſame. Vegetius further ſays, there is no better diſpoſition than this; for without changing the principal order of the army, they could anſwer any method or form of attack by theſe ſupernumerary troops, which could be thrown in any ſhape ſuitable to that of any detach'd body of the enemy: this was eſteemed, and juſtly, ſuch an advantage, the Romans thought it far better when they had not troops enough, even to ſhorten their line of battle, that they might preſerve a good body for theſe uſes: by which method, when they wanted to ſupport or ſtrengthen any part of their army, they were not under the neceſſity of expoſing and weakening any other part, by taking any troops away from it.

Veg. lib 3. chap. 14.

Thus it is manifeſt, there is one eſſential point wanting in the orb, or any other ſingle figure of the like nature, whether circular or not. However, we will now proceed to the inſtance Puyſegur mentions, of an intire army being thrown into this poſition. We will relate it more fully than he has done, to be able to judge better if the authority of ſo great a man as Cæſar, who formed his army into this circular poſition, is ſufficient for us, notwithſtanding the above diſadvantage, to imitate; whether it is as good a poſition according to the modern arms and method of fighting, as it was according to the arms and method of fighting in Cæſar's time.

This battle was fought between Cæſar and Labienus. Both armies being drawn oppoſite one another, expected which would begin the charge: Cæſar thought it not his buſineſs; being inferior to them in number, had more occaſion to make uſe of ſtratagem than force. When on

A Hirtii com. de bel. Afri. ſect. 14.

a ſudden the enemy's horſe began to ſtretch out upon the hills on every ſide, in order to ſurround Cæſar's cavalry, who could ſcarce maintain their ground: in the mean while, the bodies advancing to charge each other, the light-armed Numidian foot intermixed with horſe, ſally'd from their line of battle, and caſt their darts amongſt our legionary ſoldiers: but when our men attempted to return their charge, they immediately retreated; and the foot received our attack till the horſe had time to rally, and come again to their relief. Cæſar obſerving this new method of fighting, conſidered his ſoldiers broke their ranks, by advancing too far; for whenever our foot purſued their cavalry, who retreated a conſiderable way, and eaſily evaded our piles by flight, we were flanked by the Numidians: wherefore Cæſar commanded not a ſoldier ſhould move above four feet from his colours. Labienus's cavalry all this while deſpiſing ours for their inequality of numbers, were endeavouring to ſurround them: our men overpowered by the enemy, and having their horſes wounded under them, began by degrees to give ground; which made their cavalry purſue with greater ardor: thus the whole army was inſtantly ſurrounded, and being intangled like beaſts in the toils, were obliged to caſt themſelves into an orb.

Labienus rode up and down bareheaded at the head of his army; ſometimes encouraging his own men, ſometimes ſpeaking to Cæſar's; calling them raw ſoldiers, and aſking them, why they were ſo very fierce? if Cæſar's fair promiſes inſpired them with all that courage? telling them he had brought them into a fine condition; and he pitied their ſituation. To this, one of the perſons he ſpoke to made anſwer, he was no raw ſoldier, but a veteran of the tenth legion: Labienus replied, he did

did not ſee his colours; No matter for that, ſaid the ſoldier, you ſhall ſoon know who I am; then pulling off his helmet to diſcover his face, at the ſame time darted his pile with the utmoſt vigour againſt Labienus, which gave his horſe a wound in the breaſt. Now, ſays he, Labienus remember! it was a ſoldier of the tenth legion caſt that pile at thee. However, the whole army was mightily daunted, eſpecially the new levies: for now they caſt their eyes only upon Cæſar, without doing any thing except endeavouring to defend themſelves from the enemy's darts. At laſt Cæſar perceiving the enemy's deſign, commanded the army to extend themſelves as far in length as they could, facing about at the ſame time to form a double front: thus he broke the enemy's circle with his right and left wings; and attacking them from both ſides at once, after he had received their horſe into the middle of his forces, his infantry caſt their piles and ſoon obliged the enemy to fly.

This is the relation of the orb formed by Cæſar: and as Cæſar has given us in his commentary of his war in Gaul, another inſtance of this circular poſition, we will here mention it, though Puyſegur does not. Cæſar's com. de Bel. Gal. lib. 5. ſect. 33.

This orb was formed by Sabinus and Cotta, as follows. The length of the army rendering it difficult for the lieutenants to viſit all parts, and give the neceſſary orders for relief, they commanded the ſoldiers to quit their baggage and caſt themſelves into an orb; which though proper at ſuch a conjuncture, at this time the ſucceſs did not anſwer the deſign; for it daunted our ſoldiers and encouraged the enemy, becauſe they looked upon it as the effect of deſpair in us; beſides, as it always happens upon ſuch occaſions, the ſoldiers forſaking their enſigns, ran to the carriages to receive from them what they ſet

the greateſt value on: and the whole army was filled with clamour and weeping. The Gauls underſtood their buſineſs better; the officers gave orders that not a man of them ſhould leave his ranks ſince the baggage was theirs; and whatever the Romans had taken ſuch care to lay up, would certainly fall into their hands: for all depended on the victory. The Romans were equal to the Gauls both in courage and number, though deſerted by fortune and their general: however, they placed all their hopes of preſervation in their valour; and whenever a cohort ſallyed out, they made a conſiderable ſlaughter of the enemy on that ſide: which Ambiorix obſerving, gave orders they ſhould caſt their darts at a diſtance, not approach too near the Romans, give way whenever they made a ſally, and purſue them when they returned again to the army; for the lightneſs of their arms, and daily exerciſe, had made them ſo nimble, they could eaſily avoid the fury of our aſſault. Theſe directions they obſerved ſo diligently, that whenever a cohort left the orb to attack them, they fled away; in the mean time, the place from whence we ſallied, was left expoſed to the enemy's darts: and when we endeavoured to retreat again to our poſt, we were ſurrounded by thoſe that we put to flight, and the parties that ſtood next them: wherefore to pretend to maintain our ground had been in vain; for we could neither have an opportunity of ſhewing our courage, nor was it poſſible for us, though we ſtood ever ſo cloſe together, to avoid the darts of ſo numerous an army. However, notwithſtanding the many diſadvantages we had to ſtruggle with, and the many wounds we had received, we fought from the break of day to the eighth hour [6].

[6] Two o' clock in the afternoon.

Theſe

Theſe are two inſtances of entire armies being thrown into the form of an orb by the ancients; both which give us no great encouragement to imitate them: and quoting the authority of Cæſar, does not prove the orb, tho' bearing the ſhape of Cæſar's, capable of making the ſame reſiſtance; unleſs it could be prov'd, the arms offenſive and defenſive were the ſame alſo: but when there is ſo great a difference in the arms of the moderns, and thoſe of Cæſar's time, it is but reaſonable to ſuppoſe, if expected to be equally ſerviceable, there muſt be ſome difference in the poſition the men are to be in who uſe them; perhaps as great as the Macedonian phalanx to the Roman legion; or according to Puyſegur, the long pike of the Greek, to the modern ſoldier with the fire-lock, and bayonet at the end.

But to imagine any method of diſpoſing troops, becauſe invented by a warlike people, as the Greeks and Romans, practis'd and approv'd of by their ableſt generals; to imagine the ſame method muſt be practis'd and approv'd of in theſe days, as equally uſeful; with all the difference of arms, both offenſive and defenſive; is ſuch an abſurdity, that could theſe very Greeks and Romans riſe again, and behold poſterity aping them in ſuch an inconſiſtent manner, one would think it muſt either move their pity or laughter.

For tho' the Greeks and Romans drew up their troops in ſeveral ranks deeper than the moderns, they were not depriv'd of the uſe of their miſſive arms by it. Theſe arms being darts, arrows, javelins, and ſtones; by the leaſt elevation, the rear ranks could throw a javelin, or ſhoot an arrow, to do as much execution as thoſe in the front; that the thicker the body was, the thicker the ſhower of arrows. Elian, in his deſcription of the phalanx,

Elian's Tacticks.

lanx, which was a fourth deeper than the Roman legion, ſays, they in the rear could eaſily ſling or throw ſtones, or ſhoot arrows, quite over the phalanx; that their deep order did not deſtroy the uſe of their miſſive weapons [7]. But it is very different with fire-arms, for only the three or four front ranks can uſe them: that if they are drawn up deeper, according to the preſent method of firing, the fire of the ranks behind theſe muſt be uſeleſs: a ball from a muſket, flying in a direct line, and not deſcribing a circle like a ſtone, javelin, or arrow, till it is almoſt ſpent, and paſt doing execution. Nor did the ancients require ſo much room to prepare for a ſecond volley, or ſhower of arrows, as the moderns in loading their firelocks: which ſhews further, the ancients form'd in this cloſe deep order, which enabled them the better to ſuſtain a cloſe fight and be upon the defenſive, could alſo, at their uſual diſtances, act equally the ſame offenſively: and from what we have ſeen already from the attack of the ſquare, we may judge the ſtrength of the orb will be of no more conſequence than the ſquare, ſhould an enemy be brought to engage it at a diſtance, being then oblig'd, as well as the ſquare, to depend entirely on it's fire for it's defence.

However, as we have ſeen two inſtances of armies thrown into this circular poſition by the ancients; we will now ſee the ſtrength of Puyſegur's orb, when attack'd the way we think it leaſt defenſible.

[7] There was no abſolute neceſſity for a javelin or dart to be thrown in a ſtraight line, as a ball from a muſket.

Cæſ. Com. l. 3. ſect. 33.

Cæſar, ſpeaking of the ſtorming Pompey's camp, ſays, At laſt being able no longer to ſtand the ſhowers of darts our ſoldiers pour'd upon them, they quitted the rampier, and betook themſelves to the mountains.

By this is underſtood frequent ſhowers, and coming in a curve.

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It muſt be remembered, all troops that form a front every way, do it through fear of being attack'd in one place as ſoon as another; and are therefore upon the defenſive; as is the orb form'd by Puyſegur. And it is in the power of the enemy over all troops upon the defence, to attack or not; if they attack, we may preſume it is in their power to chuſe their method: and when there are ſeveral ways, and the troops attack'd are in a poſition capable of making a good defence, one or two only, it is as great an abſurdity to expect the enemy to engage it the way that gives it an opportunity of making the beſt reſiſtance; as for the engineer who conſtructs ſome parts of his fortification very ſtrong, others as weak, to flatter himſelf the enemy would overlook the weak parts, and break ground againſt the ſtrong.

When Puyſegur forms the orb ſix deep, to be ſure it can ſuſtain the better any ſhock of the enemy, eſpecially cavalry; for it will be ſo far like the Macedonian phalanx to the Roman legion, every cavalier will have two files to engage: but of what ſervice is this advantage when attack'd by foot? for being ſix deep, does not enable them to do execution with their fire-arms, in proportion to what they may expect to receive, as the ancients could with their miſſive weapons: notwithſtanding the continual fire Puyſegur tells us it commands, by the five front ranks kneeling, whilſt the rear ſtands to fire; and the next then riſing, and ſo on; by which there is a ſucceſſion of fire of a ſingle rank at a time.

But we ſhall be better judges of this continual fire by (plan 3.) which contains the ſame orb attack'd by fire-arms, but not ſurrounded with a ſingle line; as he has already ſhewn us the inconveniences of attacking it in that manner. It is attack'd by two ſquadrons only; and

conſequently

conſequently ſeven hundred and twenty men by three hundred: that unleſs it is to ſhew even two ſquadrons can't be brought to charge, it ſeems nothing ſtrange, that ſeven hundred and twenty ſhould be able to reſiſt the force of ſuch an inferior number; it ought to be much more ſtrange, if they could not; if three hundred could beat ſeven hundred and twenty. For what are three hundred dragoons? Montecuculi would tell us, they were three hundred men ſet upon horſes to be carried faſter, and fight equally the ſame on foot or horſeback. Wherefore, we will ſuppoſe the two ſquadrons (o) (p) attack the orb in the following manner: As ſoon as they advance near the orb, but not ſo near as to be hurt by the fire, the ſquadron (o) leaves two and forty men in a ſingle hay, oppoſite the ſide of the orb they happen to be (s); they continue in this poſition till they ſee the ſquadron (p) and remaining part of (o) are march'd to the oppoſite ſide of the orb; which they may ſoon do, tho' they muſt deſcribe a large part of a circle to keep out of reach of it's fire; the orb being oblig'd to ſtand ſtill whilſt it is in this orbicular poſition. This ſingle hay then diſmounts, and forms into a line two deep, and divides themſelves into four platoons, to form in a column for ſtreet firing (y); which will be ten men to each platoon, and two to hold their horſes. Theſe platoons ſhould preſerve a conſiderable diſtance in the rear of one another, otherways they will certainly fire too faſt, for only four platoons; as this is only a ſham attack to amuſe and ruffle the ſide (r) of the orb, and prevent it's altering it's poſition to aſſiſt the other ſide, where the real attack is made: they muſt not approach very near, leſt they expoſe and diſcover their weakneſs too much; which is the reaſon the largeſt body marches

Monte. Mem.

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to the furtheſt ſide; as we are to ſuppoſe in every method of attack as well as defence, as much cunning is to be us'd as the nature of the action will admit. The remaining part of the ſquadron (o), and twenty half files of (p), when they arrive at their proper ground, diſmount and form into a line alſo, three deep; which will make ſix platoons nine half files each, wanting three men; we will allow eight men to hold their horſes. They now form into a column (x), and fire after the manner as the other, but advance nearer to the orb: the ſquadron (p), tho' now reduc'd to thirty half files, will have much the ſame extent as the diameter of the orb; and muſt keep as near the column as poſſible, ſo as to be able to charge without interruption from it, or to be ruffled by the fire of the orb before it makes the charge; nor muſt they think of making it, till a breach is fairly made, and the whole in the greateſt confuſion; which muſt inevitably happen, from the frequent fires they will receive in the ſame place, and the little they will be able to return: for tho' the ſide (r) has but forty men to engage; their own ſituation, and the unexpected ſuddenneſs of the change of the poſition and attack of theſe forty men; and having their attention divided by the watching the march of the others round them, with the uncertainty of the numbers of all parties, which their fears would be ſure to increaſe, would render them ſo confus'd and irreſolute, that inſtead of being able to aſſiſt the ſide where the real attack is made, it would not be ſurpriſing if they found it difficult to defend themſelves againſt theſe forty that are to fire at them. When the ſquadron charges, the infantry ſhould form in a line, as well as they can, and march to their ſupport immediately with fix'd bayonets.

We don't ſay abſolutely theſe three hundred men, dispos'd in the above manner, muſt entirely defeat this orb, their numbers being ſo very unequal; tho' we think there would be a very great probability. But where is the merit of a poſition that ſwallows up ſeven hundred and twenty men, and expoſes this ſuperior number to a great probability of being beat by a little more than a third part of the number? To give any poſition the merits Puyſegur ſeems to think his orb deſerves, ſhould be that which puts it in the power of a leſſer number to reſiſt a greater, inſtead of a greater not being able to reſiſt a leſs. For it may be aſk'd in what manner the ſpaces (u u) will be able to bear a continual fire from the two columns; whether there is a probability of the ſpaces (u u) ever loading, after they have once delivered their fire? whether it is poſſible for (u u) to be reliev'd by ſome other parts? whether the fire from the other parts can hurt the columns? Whoever is fond of a circular poſition ſix deep, muſt anſwer theſe queſtions; otherwiſe it will be found a poſition capable of making but a weak defence, when attack'd in this manner. To a common diſcernment, it ſeems hardly probable for the parts (u u) to bear a continual fire, eſpecially oppoſite the great column, where is the real attack; notwithſtanding the fire it has been ſaid to command itſelf, unleſs it could be reliev'd by freſh men; nor is there much (if any) greater probability of being reliev'd, when contracted in ſo ſmall compaſs: for ſhould the parts (u u) retire in the orb, the vacant part within the orb is ſo ſmall, there muſt be ſcarce room to contain the parts retir'd; much leſs to give others at the ſame time room to march into their places: ſhould they march out, when the whole is ſo contracted and confin'd by this circular poſition, they would

would tear the orb to pieces, and tend to confuſion. Nor could it be wonder'd at, if theſe ſix ranks crowded in this ſmall compaſs, did not deliver their ſix diſtinct fires, according to Puyſegur's method; much leſs ſhould they not be able to load, whilſt ruffled and diſorder'd by a warm continual fire from two columns, that can have been but little hurt themſelves, both together preſenting a front not half the extent of the orb; and all the other parts of the orb inclining from them, there will not be the fire of more than a fourth part, in directions capable of doing them hurt. Unleſs theſe objections can be better anſwer'd, it is far from improbable, but theſe two columns will make it very eaſy for the part of the ſquadron (p) which is out of reach of their fire, to charge and compleat their ruin; by having firſt demoliſh'd their orbicular form, and render'd it of no effect, and reduc'd their ſix ranks to little better than a mob.

Tho' by what has been already ſaid, it muſt be ſeen, theſe cloſe ſingle figures that have no reſerve or ſupernumerary body, loſe greatly their ſtrength when engag'd at a diſtance: we will give ſome other inſtances to ſhew it has been the opinion of others, as well as us, to attack theſe poſitions in the above manner, at a diſtance. The firſt is in Alexander's expedition againſt the Scythians. Spitamenes, when he rais'd the ſiege of the caſtle of Maracanda, retir'd towards the capital city of the Sogdian kingdom. Pharnaces and his forces purſued him as far as the confines of Sogdia: but not being able to overtake him, fell accidentally upon a party of Nomadian Scythians; and irritated them to that degree, that about ſix hundred horſe of them haſted and join'd Spitamenes; who receiving ſuch a recruit, was reſolv'd to revenge a late inſult of the Macedonians: to which end,

Arrian's hiſt. of Alexander's expedition, li. 4. ch. 5.

drawing up his forces in a plain place, on the edge of the Scythian wilderneſs, he determin'd neither to wait for the enemy, nor yet to meet and attack them; but taking a compaſs with his horſe to gall their phalanx of foot with their arrows.

Arrian, lib. 6. chap. 8.

The other inſtance is of Alexander himſelf. At his paſſage of the river Hydraotis, the Indians ſeeing him and his forces in the middle of the water, retir'd haſtily, yet orderly from the bank, and were purſued by Alexander: but when they perceived their purſuers only a party of horſe, they faced about, and reſolv'd to give him battle, being about fifty thouſand in number. He ſeeing the firm and cloſe order of their army, and conſidering he had no foot forces, reſolv'd only to ride round them, and gall them at a diſtance, but not to venture a cloſe engagement. Theſe two attacks being intended to be at a diſtance; it was in thoſe days more convenient for cavalry than infantry, being able to ſhoot their arrows from on horſeback, as well as on the ground, and they ran no riſk of being brought to a cloſe fight, being able alſo to ride away, if the enemy advanc'd.

As what may be ſaid of the orb, may be applicable in many reſpects to any ſingle compact figure of the like nature, whether the ſhape is quite orbicular or not; we will draw a compariſon between the orbs formed by the Romans and Puyſegur's, to find out whether it is a defenſive poſition, ſuitable moſt to the ancient or modern method of fighting: and we will finiſh this chapter, by finding out alſo the real uſe it may be of, according to modern arms and method of fighting.

The orb formed by the ancients had certainly the advantage over thoſe that attack'd it, more than a modern orb can poſſibly have. For if this poſition is capable of making a better

a better defence when engaged in a cloſe fight than at a diſtance; it is very plain, from the long diſcourſe Labienus held with Cæſar's ſoldiers, they could not be far from one another: and in the other, they made a ſally from the orb, which would have been too hazardous, had the enemy been far from it. It is alſo as plain from the nature of their miſſive weapons, had they been far from one another, they could have done one another little or no harm. And among the ancients, theſe cloſe compact poſitions for the defence, though inconvenient for the quick management of their miſſive weapons, had this inconveniency balanced by the advantage they gained by it with their ſhields, their defenſive arms; which when ſo cloſe, formed almoſt an intire ſhell, like the German phalanx: which advantage Cæſar's ſoldiers were very ſenſible of, when it is mentioned, "now they caſt their eyes upon Cæſar without doing any thing but endeavouring to defend themſelves from the enemy's darts." This implies nothing but the uſe of the ſhield; and ſerves to prove the orb, formed by the ancients, had advantages more than the modern, on the defenſive part as well as the offenſive [8].

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[8] Cæſar, in his war with Arioviſtus, ſays, "As ſoon as the ſign of battle was given, our ſoldiers charged the enemy very briſkly; and they received them ſo warmly, they did not allow our legions time to throw their darts; which obliged them to have immediate recourſe to their ſwords. But the Germans caſting themſelves into a phalanx, according to the cuſtom of their country, received their charge with little loſs: which ſeveral of the legionary ſoldiers perceiving, leap'd upon the phalanx, pulled away the targets with their hands, and ſlew thoſe that lurked under them; by which means the enemy's left wing was routed." Cæſar's com. de bel. Gal. li. 1. ſect. 52.

The Romans underſtood this uſe of their ſhields as well as the Germans; and when Publius Scipio beſieged New Carthage, his ſoldiers formed the tortoiſe with their ſhields, and ruſhed even to the gates to endeavour to cut them down. Anthony in his retreat from the Parthians being to deſcend ſome declivities that were ſteep, where they could march but very ſlow, and the Parthians charging them with continual vollies of arrows, ordered Polybius, b. 10. ch. 2. Plut. life of Anthony.

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It is ſaid afterwards, " Cæſar commanded the army to to extend themſelves as far in length as they could, facing about at the ſame time to form a double front: thus he broke the enemy's circle with his right and left wings; and attacking them from both ſides at once, after he had received the horſe into the middle of his forces, his infantry caſt their darts, and ſoon obliged the enemy to fly." This ſeems to corroborate what has been already ſaid; that their deep order did not take away the uſe of their miſſive weapons. There is a difference with an orb ſo large as Cæſar's, and a ſingle battalion when formed with many ranks behind one another; by forming a double front with Cæſar's, there was room to receive the enemy's horſe in the middle to be charged from all ſides; which was the caſe here, and by dividing them from the reſt of their forces contributed chiefly to his victory.

The orb formed by Sabinus and Cotta, ſhews farther the advantages the ancients had by ſuch a poſition more than the moderns can poſſibly have, by their different arms both offenſive and defenſive. It is ſaid of this orb, " whenever a cohort ſallied out, though they were ſub-

the infantry that had large ſhields to face about; and ſhutting the light-armed in the center, the firſt rank kneeled on the ground, covering themſelves with their ſhields; the ſecond did the ſame, holding their ſhields a little higher; and the third the ſame, 'till it had the appearance of the degrees in a theatre; and formed a ſafe defence againſt the arrows of the Parthians. The Parthians taking this method of proceeding for a mark of their being fatigued, drew near for a cloſe fight. In that moment the Romans raiſed themſelves, and with a great cry advanced upon them, and ſlew many, and put the reſt to flight.

Plutarch. The ſtrength of the phalanx among the Grecians, ſeemed to conſiſt almoſt wholly in their ſhields. It is ſaid to be like a maſterleſs beaſt, whilſt it was embody'd into one, as it were, and locked together target to target, all as in a piece: but if once broken, every ſingle ſoldier loſt of his own ſtrength, &c.

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ject to be ſurrounded, they made a conſiderable ſlaughter of the enemy on that ſide: which Ambiorix obſerving, gave orders they ſhould caſt their darts at a diſtance, not approach too near the Romans."

This ſtrengthens what has been already ſaid, that it was giving the orb a great advantage if they came to a cloſe fight; of which Ambiorix was ſo ſenſible, he ordered them "to caſt their darts at a diſtance." It ſerves alſo to ſhew us the execution even a ſingle cohort could do, by it's compact order when engaged cloſely. It is alſo plain Ambiorix rendered the ſtrength of this orb in a great meaſure uſeleſs, by the little diſtance he attacked it; for it is ſaid, "wherefore to pretend to maintain our ground had been in vain; for we could not have an opportunity of ſhewing our courage:" and the line that follows argues, the thicker and cloſer the body was among the ancients by the help of their ſhields, as we have already ſaid, the ſafer, "nor was it poſſible for us, though we ſtood ever ſo cloſe, to avoid the darts of ſo numerous an army."

We will now aſk, whether the modern orb, by being ſix ranks deep, have as much uſe of their fire arms as the ſoldiers in Cæſar's had of their darts? for "they caſt their darts, and ſoon obliged the enemy to fly." And though there is no mention of any miſſive weapon they had in Sabinus's and Cotta's orb, they fought from break of day till two o' clock in the afternoon. Could a modern, formed ever ſo many deep, withſtand a fire ſo long, when they have little or none to return? for it ſeems hardly poſſible for the front ranks to load after they have fired, as the rear ranks will be firing over their heads; or in ſhort for any rank, when crowded and diſordered, as has been already mentioned. The difference

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is but ſmall whether they have fire arms or not, ſhould they by their poſition become uſeleſs. Nor can a modern orb detach a part to do any execution like the cohort of Sabinus and Cotta, as it may be attacked at a much greater diſtance by fire-arms, and conſequently muſt be detach'd ſo much further; and we are told even here, the cohort detach'd was ſurrounded by thoſe they had put to flight. If by this deep and ſtrong order they are almoſt diſenabled from acting offenſively when attacked in this manner, where are their defenſive arms like the ſhield of the Romans? becauſe the orb formed by the ancients, the thicker and cloſer it was, by the help of their ſhields, the ſafer: does the modern orb without the ſhield, by being more deep and cloſe, become more ſafe againſt the diſtant blow? become they not rather an eaſier and fairer mark? Suppoſe the modern orb in the ſituation of Cæſar's! where it is ſaid, "they now caſt their eyes only upon Cæſar, without doing any thing but endeavouring to defend themſelves from the enemy's darts." See, if they can, like Cæſar's, after this ſituation, get a victory. Is there then any reaſon for a modern orb to be formed ſix deep, when there are no more troops than a ſingle battalion to do it with? would it not have been more advantageous for three of theſe ranks, which in a great meaſure impede the whole fire, to have been diſpoſed of in ſuch a manner, as to have enabled the whole to have uſed their fire, and defend themſelves equally againſt foot as well as horſe?

What got Cæſar's orb the victory? It was the enemy having it not in their power to engage at ſo great a diſtance, as to prevent the orb, which was large and deep, from forming a double front, and opening their flanks and breaking the enemy's circle with their right and left wings,

wings, and attacking them from both ſides at once. In ſhort, it was getting out of this orbicular poſition as faſt as they could.

Can a modern orb, formed ſix deep by a ſingle battalion, by opening, extend their flanks even to be any ways ſerviceable, when it can be attacked at ſo much greater diſtance? or if penetrated, can the three inward ranks huddled all in a heap, by facing inwards, fire to any purpoſe when the enemy is ſo near at hand?

What loſt Sabinus's and Cotta's orb the victory? Was it not chiefly the ſtrict orders Ambiorix gave his ſoldiers to throw their darts at a diſtance, not venture too near the Romans, but retire when they made a ſally? Was it not this little diſtance that rendered them incapable of reaping the advantages of the ſtrength of this orbicular poſition? It is ſaid, "they had not an opportunity even of ſhewing their courage." That as Cæſar got the victory by getting out of this orbicular poſition; ſo, in effect, did the troops of Sabinus and Cotta meet with a different fate.

Can the modern orb ward off this ſame unhappy fate, when it is unable to detach a part to be of any ſervice, though it is liable to be engaged at a much greater diſtance by fire-arms? Wherefore from what has been ſaid, there does not appear to be any thing very eligible, even in the orbs formed by the ancients [9]. We will relate a paſſage as it is deſcribed in Livy, which ſeems to confirm this. "The rebels being ſurrounded, had every man of them been puniſhed for his rebellion, had not Vectius Meſſius, a Volſcian, more famous for his actions than his birth, cried out to them with a loud voice, as they were forming the Lib. 4. ſect. 28.

[9] In orbem pugnantes ad unum interfecti ſunt. Livy.

orb, Is it here (ſays he) that you intend to become a mark for your enemies to ſhoot at, without any defence, or hopes of revenge? Is it for this you have taken up arms, and brought a war upon your backs? you, who in time of peace are raiſing tumults and ſedition, in war backward and ſlothful! What expectations have you in ſtanding here? or do you think ſome god will come and protect you, or ſnatch you away?"

This paſſage does not incline us leſs to think, that ſhould an orb, formed according to Puyſegur, be attacked and defeated in the manner we have mentioned, it would be plain it's ſtrength, conſiſting of ſix ranks deep, is the chief cauſe of it's ruin, being reduced to an helpleſs crowd; that it might be ſaid even of this little orb, ſtrength void of conduct falls with it's own weight[1].

We have now ſeen orbs formed by the ancients and moderns, enough to have a ſort of idea of the ſtrength of this circular poſition. Wherefore we will finiſh this chapter, by mentioning ſome other circumſtances that attend it, both for and againſt; by which we ſhall find out how far this poſition may be of ſervice: for there is a time, when it may be of great ſervice, notwithſtanding what we have ſaid againſt it: and by mentioning alſo, the different nature of defence between the ancients and moderns.

The orb without doubt, as Puyſegur obſerves, has one very great advantage: that is, it is a poſition ſo plain and eaſy to be conceived, it requires no calculation; can be performed by the ignorant and undiſciplined ſoldier, equally as well as the all knowing and diſciplined: in ſhort, it requires little or no genius. This is a very great

Puyſegur, art de la guerre, chap. 13. art. 6.

[1] Vis conſilî expers mole ruit ſuâ.

Hor. li. 3. ode 4.

advantage;

advantage; but would be much greater, if in the performing it, it was attended with no diſadvantage. It muſt be remembered, the orb is formed equally the ſame as a ſquare, from the apprehenſions of being ſurrounded or attacked in ſeveral places at once. And ſhould the enemy be in front and rear, and ſo near as not to give time for telling off for any other poſition, by which the orb has the advantage over other poſitions: it muſt be obſerved, whilſt it is reaping this advantage, it is expoſed to a diſadvantage as great: whilſt troops are forming an orb to the front, the back of every man that compoſes it is expoſed to the enemy in the rear; whilſt they are forming to the rear, the back of every man is expoſed equally the ſame to the enemy in front. We muſt not forget neither how near the enemy muſt be, by being obliged to have recourſe to this poſition, through want of time for any other. However, this danger might be leſſened in ſome meaſure, by ordering a platoon upon each flank to ſtand their ground, and defend either the front or the rear of the battalion, that have their backs to the enemy whilſt the orb is forming. The advantages this circular poſition has over infantry, does not appear to be greater than the ſquare, by being attacked in particular places by columns, as in this plan.

If two columns can be brought to fire againſt it; it may be ſurrounded by a number of them (m), and of any length: then it is obvious to every one how much more fire it will receive, than it can poſſibly give; and how much eaſier they march to the attack, than the method Puyſegur ſuppoſes them: nor is the danger of killing one another ſo great, as Puyſegur ſeems to imagine: for ſhould the columns advance to the orb only near enough to have their fire do execution upon it, it

does not argue the ſame fire will do execution above as far again; which it muſt do to kill their own men, who are at the ſame diſtance the other ſide of the orb.

Thus, as Puyſegur has told us, how difficult it is for cavalry to charge the orb with any hopes of ſucceſs; and makes the two ſquadrons (c) joſtle againſt it in the moſt incommodious manner they poſſibly could: ſo he has taken care to give it all the advantage poſſible over infantry, by the method he takes to attack it. This is being rather too partial to what we favour moſt ourſelves; to ſhew the ſtrength of any defenſive poſition moſt, that we may not deceive ourſelves, is to attack it the way it is leaſt defenſible.

Puyſegur has purſued the contrary method; conſequently ſets off the merit of his orb in a ſtronger light than it deſerves. It is evident the orb as well as the ſquare is ruined, ſhould any part be thoroughly broke; and there is a much greater probability of breaking any particular part by bringing the whole fire againſt it (as it cannot be aſſiſted by the other parts) than by attacking it according to Puyſegur's method. As the ſtrength of the orb conſiſts in the compactneſs and cloſe connection one with another, as well as it's orbicular ſhape, it muſt reap the advantage of this ſtrength moſt in a cloſe fight: for when it is fired at, at a diſtance, this very cloſe connection is rather a diſadvantage than real ſervice; as they crowd and hinder one another in the quick management of their fire-arms, which are the only arms requiſite at ſuch a conjuncture: it is obvious the ſtrength lay in a cloſe fight in the two orbs we have mentioned. And in the inſtances of Spitamenes and Alexander, it is plain they ſaw a great advantage in attacking the phalanx, or any cloſe compact body at a diſtance, with a great probability

probability of getting the better, even with an inferior force; otherwiſe they would not have choſe that method.

Though there has been already ſeveral inſtances ſhewn of the diſadvantages cloſe compact ſingle bodies, when attacked at a diſtance, undergo, which are ſufficient: however, as two of them formed by the ancients were orbicular, we will farther ſhew two ſquares formed by the ancients, and one of them conſiſting of an intire army, labouring under the ſame diſadvantages; the enemies that engaged them ſtrictly obſerving to ſhoot at them at a diſtance: which were thoſe of Nicias the Athenian, and Craſſus the Roman.

Nicias and Demoſthenes the two Athenian generals, having made a ſpeech in their retreat from Syracuſe, to encourage their army afflicted by their ſeveral defeats, marched forward: Nicias who led, formed his troops in a ſquare; thoſe who were with Demoſthenes brought up the rear. During this march, which continued ſeveral days, the Syracuſians kept following and annoying them; they ſhot their arrows at them from all quarters, and wounded many. When the Athenians charged, they retired; when the Athenians retired, the Syracuſians charged. Nicias being in the front, marched faſter than Demoſthenes, and was got far before him: for he thought their ſafety conſiſted not in ſtaying and voluntarily fighting, but rather in a ſpeedy retreat; in fighting only when they could not prevent it. But Demoſthenes was both in greater and more continual danger, becauſe he marched in the rear, and was conſequently preſſed by the enemy. Wherefore ſeeing the Syracuſians purſuing him, he went not on, but put his men in order to fight; till by his ſtay he was encompaſſed and reduced, he and the Athenians with him, into great diſorder. For being

Thucydides, lib. 7. Hobbes.

being ſhut within a place encloſed with a wall, which on every ſide had a way that opened amongſt many olive-trees, they were charged from all ſides at once with the enemy's arrows. The Syracuſians aſſaulted them in this manner, and not in a cloſe fight, upon very good reaſon; for to hazard a battle againſt men deſperate, was not ſo much for theirs, as for the Athenians advantage: beſides after ſo manifeſt ſucceſſes, they ſpared themſelves a little, being unwilling to wear themſelves out before the end of the buſineſs: and they thought by this kind of fight, to ſubdue and take them alive. Nor did they judge amiſs, for Demoſthenes with the Athenians and their confederates, to the number of ſix thouſand, after having been continually ſhot at from every ſide, and ſpent with their wounds and other fatigues, ſurrendered to Gylippus, the Syracuſians and their confederates. Nicias and thoſe that were with him, reached the ſame day, the river Erineus; but the next, the Syracuſians overtook him, and told him of Demoſthenes's ſurrender, and willed him to do the like. But Nicias not believing it, ſent a horſeman to inquire the truth; upon the return of the meſſenger, Nicias would have yielded upon conditions to Gylippus; but the conditions not being accepted, they charged his army, and hemm'd them in and ſhot at them with their arrows, as they had done the other army, from every ſide till evening. Nicias however the next day led his army forward again; the Syracuſians and their confederates ſtill preſſing them in the ſame manner, ſhooting at them with their darts and arrows from every ſide, in ſuch a manner that when they reached the river Aſinarus, which they endeavoured to paſs, the army was utterly defeated, and Nicias yielded himſelf up to Gylippus, who from that time took them priſoners. Thus ended Nicias's troops in the form of a ſquare, and Demoſthenes's

moſthenes's in nearly the ſame form, being a ſingle ſolid body; with the lives of their generals who were afterwards put to death.

The end of Craſſus was no better. In his expedition againſt the Parthians, there came to the camp an Arabian tribune, named Ariamnes; a cunning, ſubtle fellow, that was known to Pompey's old ſoldiers; but was now ſuborn'd by the king's officers, who enticed Craſſus from the river and hills into the plain, where he might be ſurrounded; for the Parthians deſir'd any thing, rather than be oblig'd to meet the Romans face to face. And before the cheat was diſcover'd, he rode away; having perſuaded Craſſus he would go and contrive how to diſorder the affairs of the enemy. And Craſſus drawing up his army in a ſquare, made a front every way, each conſiſting of twelve cohorts; and to every one he allotted a troop of horſe. Thus they march'd till they ſaw the enemy; whoſe firſt deſign was, with their lances to beat down and force back the Romans: but perceiving the depth of their battle, and that they kept their ground, they made a retreat; and pretending to ſeparate, broke their orders, and encompaſs'd the Romans round, ere they were aware of it. Then Craſſus commanded the light-arm'd ſoldiers to charge in; but they had not gone far, before they were receiv'd with ſuch a ſhower of arrows, that they were glad to retire among the heavy-armed; which was the firſt occaſion of their diſorder and terror: for now the Parthians dividing themſelves, ſhot from all ſides, which made the ſtate of the Romans deſperate: for if they kept their ranks, they were wounded; and if they charged, (tho' they hurt the enemy ever ſo much) they ſuffered nevertheleſs; for the Parthians threw their darts when they fled. However, the

Plutarch's life of Craſſus.

the Romans had ſome comfort to think, that when they had ſpent all their arrows, they would either give over, or come to a cloſe fight. But when they underſtood there were ſeveral camels loaded with arrows, and when the firſt rank had diſcharg'd thoſe they had, they wheel'd off and took more, Craſſus ſeeing no end of it, was out of all heart; and his army was totally defeated, and Craſſus and his ſon ſlain.

By theſe ſeveral inſtances of troops formed into cloſe ſingle figures, and rendered in effect uſeleſs, by being engaged at a diſtance; (Cæſar's orb, indeed, recovered itſelf, by getting out of that poſition): however, by producing theſe inſtances, it may be thought we don't favour theſe poſitions ſo much as ſome have; but we ſhould be ſorry, was it thought we meant to take from them the merit they deſerve: and as the ſquare has it's merits, ſo has the orb alſo. For ſhould a regiment, during the courſe of an action, be ſo jumbled and diſordered, as to have an extent without any diſtinction of platoons, which frequently happens in engagements; in this irregular and diſordered poſition, ſhould there be an occaſion, with one word of command the moſt ſtupid may have ſenſe enough to form a circle; and with more ſafety in a line of battle, being defended by ſome other troops whilſt it is forming: and if a regiment can do this, a larger body may alſo. This muſt be allowed to be a great advantage; as it might happen there was time to do this, tho' not enough to compleat and dreſs them in a manner ſuitable for any other poſition that requires a freſh calculation or telling off. But when this circular poſition is form'd, it is not a convenient one to move, and conſequently to march off a ground; notwithſtanding Puyſegur's method of changing the poſition for the march,

march, by having the center company of the four oppoſite parts ſtand faſt; and the companies upon their right and left, to wheel outwards, till they are in ſtraight lines with the companies that ſtood faſt: the inward ranks of the circle that do not take up the ſpace of the outward ranks, are then to extend themſelves to cover the rear of the outward ranks: the whole then dreſs themſelves to form as ſtraight lines as they can; by which they form a ſquare with uncovered angles. As this method of marching by means of the change firſt required, is not the moſt expeditious; it conſequently gives an enemy, when there are no other troops to defend it, more time to make any diſpoſition to attack it: and ſhould it be attacked, as has been already ſhewn, (eſpecially by an equal force) the ruin of it ſeems inevitable: tho' that method of attack may take more time alſo; being ſlow here, is being ſure; and what is done well to the purpoſe, is done ſoon enough[z].

As here has been a compariſon between the ancient and modern orb, both which were intended for a defenſible poſition; we will take notice, the defence of the ancients might be called two-fold, when the modern is only one: the ancient conſiſted both in receiving, as well as returning the enemy's arrows: the modern is not in receiving the enemy's ſhot, but by putting a ſtop to the enemy's ſhot, by driving them away by a larger quantity; conſiſting ſolely in being able to keep the enemy from them by this means. And the advantage the ancients gained by a very cloſe poſition by the help of the ſhield, overbalanc'd the diſadvantage that attended this cloſe order, with regard to their miſſive weapons: for to be ſure, when they were ſo wedg'd toge-

[z] Satis celeriter fit, quicquid commode geritur. Sex. Aurelius Victor.

ther, they could not ſo freely uſe them; tho' they might not require ſo much room, as is required for the uſe of fire-arms. This defence is plain in Sabinus's and Cotta's orb; where it is ſaid, they had not an opportunity even of ſhewing their courage; yet they fought from break of day, till the eighth hour; which with us is two of the clock in the afternoon: their defence all this time, was chiefly ſkreening themſelves with their ſhields. When we ſay the defence of the ancients conſiſted in receiving as well as returning the enemy's arrows, we mean by it, the number of arrows they would receive upon their bucklers: and we will give an inſtance that happened during the civil wars between Cæſar and Pompey, conſequently not very diſtant from the time the orbs abovementioned were formed.

Appian. During the ſiege Cæſar carried on againſt Pompey at Dyrrachium, there were many ſkirmiſhes. And one night Pompey underſtanding Cæſar was abſent a little way, attack'd his works; but was beaten off with conſiderable loſs, and forced to retreat into his old trenches. In this encounter one Sceva, a centurion, behaved with a wonderful bravery; killing two officers after he had been wounded in the eye, ſhoulder and thigh, and receiving two hundred and thirty arrows upon his buckler.

We will now conſider, as ought to be done in all poſitions, whether the advantages gain'd by this cloſe order, are adequate to the diſadvantages that attend it. If it is a good poſition, they will overbalance; and ſhould cavalry be the only enemy that is to attack it, we then are upon an equality with the ancients; as we do not doubt but our cavalry may charge theſe poſitions with as much hopes of ſucceſs as theirs; and againſt a ſudden charge of a ſquadron, it may be a good poſition. But why are we,

we, more than the ancients, to flatter ourſelves that no enemy but cavalry will ever come againſt it? It is not doing juſtice to ſuppoſe any one ſo infatuated, as to attack a body of troops the only way there is the greateſt probability of being beat, when there is at the ſame time a method as likely to be crowned with ſucceſs. Wherefore we will ſuppoſe theſe moveable forts, theſe ſquares, and orbs, to be battered in breach, as we have already done; nor will we think of our cavalry or entering, till a breach is fairly made; more than we would run againſt a wall ſtuck full of ſpikes, before part of it was beat down [3]. It is obvious to prevent a breach being made, we have no defenſive weapon like the ſhield of the ancients to form almoſt an intire ſhell, or receiving even one ſingle ſhot; much more any quantity. To us it is as obvious againſt the columns or batteries, as we will now call them; we have attacked theſe poſitions; there is little or no fire in return: therefore the advantages gained by this cloſe order, ſuitable only to the charge of a ſquadron, by no means balance the loſs of almoſt all it's fire; when it muſt be known our defence conſiſts almoſt wholly in the quantity of fire to keep the enemy off. This we ſhall ſtrictly adhere to, through the following new poſitions we advance ourſelves; nor can any thing alter our opinion, but thoſe poſitions are the moſt eligible that command the moſt fire; when at the ſame

[3] Je veux qu'elles ſoutiennent bien une premiere attaque, ce qui n'eſt pas très-vraiſemblable pourtant, puiſque elles augmentent tous les avantages qu'avoit déja l'ennemi; on leur en fera une ſeconde, une ſixiéme s'il le faut, elles ſeront entamées à la fin, & des ce moment perdues. C'eſt ce qui arriva à Craſſus contre les Parthes, à deux lieutenants de Céſar contre Ambiorix, aux Eſpagnols à Rocroy, au Suédois à Kaliſch, en un mot à tous les ronds ou quarrés que l'ennemi a combattus, c'eſt-à-dire, à tous ou preſque tous ceux qu'on a formés. La phalange coupée et doublée, ch. 15. ar. 2.

time they loſe no conſequential advantage neceſſary to the nature of the action. This we ſhall adhere to, as long as the preſent faſhion of fighting by fire-arms is continued, and no new ſuperior method found out.

The TARGET.

WE concluded the laſt chapter by declaring our opinion was, that thoſe poſitions were the moſt eligible that commanded moſt fire; when at the ſame time they loſe no material advantage by it neceſſary to the nature of the action.

The preceding chapters have already ſhewn how much fire is loſt in the ſquare and orb, or any ſingle figure, (tho' it may differ a little in ſhape) if formed for the ſame purpoſe; which is to have a front every way to keep the enemy from entering.

Therefore the preſent buſineſs is to find out in what manner this very great inconvenience, or whatever it may be called, is to be avoided. No poſition anſwers this end ſo well, at leaſt, that has reached our knowledge, as this new poſition we call the target[4], for a ſmall

[4] As every thing muſt have a name to diſtinguiſh it; ſo the diſpoſition we are now treating of being for a ſmall body of men, and intirely upon the defence, we have given the appellation of the target; which is a leſſer kind of ſhield: for Iphicrates the Athenian reformed the arms of the infantry; and in the room of their broad unweildy ſhields, he introduced a lighter ſort of targets, and made horned in the ſhape of an half moon, called pelta; from whence the foot were called peltaſtæ*; rendering them more light and active.

Corn. Nepos life of Iphicrates.

We do not think it any ways hurtful to be imitators of the ancients in this particular: as every thing muſt have ſome name, it cannot be more unreaſonable now, than it was formerly, to give them names that carry with them an idea of what they are intended for. The Greeks had a poſition called the

* A πάλλω vibro, πέπαλται to brandiſh. Lunatæ peltæ, Virg. i. & xi. Æneid.

roſtrum,

ſmall body of infantry: which is here invented, formed, and calculated for the ſame uſe as the ſquare and the orb has been thought to be of: that is, to defend itſelf againſt cavalry; or infantry and cavalry together in an open country. The target we are going to treat of, is formed with the ſame number of troops as the orb; a ſingle battalion divided into eighteen platoons, drawn up three deep, with their bayonets fixed, and ranks cloſe: and grenadiers equally diſpoſed upon the flanks according to the preſent Britiſh method, with the colours flying in the center.

Though this target is formed by a battalion, it may be looked upon in the light of a detachment. And it is obſerved, a detachment may be attacked without forming an ambuſcade; that is, by an open force; but Turpin, tom. 1. li. 2. ch. 7.

roſtrum, which ſignified the beak of a ſhip; formed like a wedge or head of an arrow, to penetrate as an arrow, or beaks of ſhips did among the ancients; the roſtrum equeſtre Philip king of Macedon invented. The ancients had likewiſe the hog's head, the tete de porc; which implied the ſtrength thoſe animals have to bore forward. As alſo the cuneus, the etimology of which is councius; which means a cloſe union or uniting together of ſoldiers in the ſame body. The Roman legion was ſo called, *quod lecti ex omnibus militares*, being choſen and pick'd men; the cohort, *a mutuâ cohortatione*; the maniple, * *quod conjunctis manibus pariter dimicabant*; *quod manum pleat vel impleat*, § an handful: and their chief battering engine was the ram; which had that name from the uſe intended for it; being to butt and beat down fortified places, and ſtone works; and the head or part which butted, reſembled the head of a ram, to anſwer better the name they had given it, and the uſe it was deſigned for; it had that force that nothing could withſtand it; which gave riſe to the following motto, when virtue flouriſhed and was in high eſteem among them, *virtus ariete fortior*. The ancients had likewiſe the ſcorpion, which they ſo called from it's deſtructive quality.

Elian.

Iſidorus li. 9. ch. 3. De vita Romuli, lib. 4. * Veg. § Pliny.

Louis XI. fit faire douze canons de fonte, ſous le nom de douze pairs: les Eſpagnols leur donnoient des noms de ſaints, témoin les douze apôtres que l'empereur Charles V. fit fondre à Malaga pour ſon expédition de Tunis. Il eſt fait mention d'une ſerpentine de Malaga, qui étoit de 80 livres de boulet, dont le bruit faiſoit avorter les femmes groſſes; d'une autre de 70 livres, de la pimentelle de Milan, de la diableſſe de Bolduc.

Ray, ch. 1. art. 3. part. 1.

it

it muſt be with a ſuperior force, or at leaſt equal; and the ſucceſs depends upon a good diſpoſition and a briſk attack. Detachments form the youngeſt officers; they execute in detail, what a general does with an army. With a little reflection, in a ſmall time we may qualify ourſelves by degrees for great enterprizes, better than by ſeeing in a long courſe of years the execution of a few conſiderable actions. By detachments, one may learn the knowledge of the country; to march with cunning and circumſpection; to chuſe an advantageous ſituation; to make diſpoſitions juſt and ſuitable to the place; to retreat with order, and to attack with every advantage the ground will admit of. And if we can't ſay of him, who knows how diſcreetly to conduct a detachment, that he is a good general; we muſt grant, he has one part of what is requiſite towards the attaining that character. And they are much inferior to him, who with a thouſand or fifteen hundred men, perform wonders and gain conſiderable advantages upon the enemy, and at the ſame time are ignorant by what means and how, they were brought about; ſuch can be called but mere hands, though they may be uſeful. Detachments of theſe ſizes are more frequent in a campaign, than larger bodies; becauſe general officers are not always to be had to conduct them. Theſe are the ſentiments of count Turpin upon detachments; which we have mentioned, to ſhew the uſe we are told they are of; and being near the ſame number that compoſed the ſquare and orb, and that the target before us is to conſiſt of. Wherefore, as there are frequent occaſions during the courſe of a campaign for ſmall detachments, it behoveth us the more to know how to conduct any ſort of them. For to meet with checks in theſe little bodies, may prove dangerous to the whole; an army looking upon them as the preſages of greater evils. Alex-

Alexander and king Porus gave their whole attention to the events that followed their detachments; as being the ſource from whence the ſoldiers gathered their auguries, and according to their ſucceſs, conjectured the fortune of the battle. We have mentioned this to make the target of more importance.

It has been obſerved, when one ſide of the ſquare is attacked by fire-arms, the other three ſides lend it no aſſiſtance, eſpecially ſhould they be in the leaſt amuſed by ſham attacks; it is the ſame in the orb: by theſe methods, a battalion of eighteen platoons makes uſe of the fire of only a fourth part. Had the target no better qualities to recommend it than this, we ſhould not eſteem it a poſition ſuitable to the uſe intended for it. But no body of infantry can contrive any way to attack the target by fire-arms, capable of depriving it of any of it's fire; for out of eighteen platoons, it makes uſe of the fire of eighteen; and loſes no material advantage by it, neceſſary to the nature of the action: for at the ſame time, it preſerves a front every way, and can occaſionally be ſix deep againſt the charge of a ſquadron (plan 4. fig. 1.) This plan is a battalion of ſeven hundred and twenty men. The dotted lines repreſent the firſt poſition of the battalion, fronting us in a ſingle line; and from a ſingle line, the target is formed in the following manner.

Unleſs the whole enemy is oppoſite the front of the battalion, the two platoons on the right, and the platoon on the left go to the right about; and wheel inward the eighth part of a circle, then ſtand faſt: the five center platoons of the other fifteen ſtand faſt alſo: the five platoons on the right of theſe center that ſtand faſt, face to the left; the five on the left of them, face to the right at the ſame time; and move by half files the ſpace of

five

five platoons in the rear, inclining obliquely till the left half file of the ſeventh platoon forms a ſaliant angle by joining the right half file of the thirteenth platoon, oppoſite the center of the five platoons that ſtood faſt: the whole then halts and faces outward; which forms an equiangular triangle of five platoons on each ſide.

As our intention is to give a reaſon for every principal movement we make, we will begin by ſaying, why the triangle is formed in this manner from a ſingle line. The reaſon is, rather to ſhew how it may be done, when there is an occaſion, than that it is the method we ſhould chuſe, if we thought there might be a neceſſity to form it upon a march: for then we ſhould not march in a ſingle line with an intention to form the target from it. However, by forming to the rear as in this plan, the front that ſtands faſt defends itſelf; the platoons upon the right and left of all going to the right about, and making a ſmall wheel to the right and left inwards, rake the whole flanks of the other two faces whilſt they are forming: and thoſe faces moving in that oblique manner by half files, are in no danger of being hurt by the platoons on the right and left of all, which ſtand their ground on purpoſe to defend them by their croſs ſhot. Should it be thought moſt neceſſary to form to the front; the five center platoons then go to the right about; the five on their right, and five on their left, move by half files to the front: the platoons upon the flanks wheel a little inwards; and the whole is defended the ſame as before. By this method, there is a regular direct fire againſt any ſquadron that attempts to charge before the triangle is compleated. It will perhaps be thought dangerous for the platoons on the flanks to ſtand their ground, in the manner juſt mentioned, as it certainly is: but

Plan. 4.

Fig. 1.



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

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

but it is a military maxim, always to riſk a few to ſave the much greater part: for ſhould a ſquadron be quick enough to charge the ſide faces before the triangle is compleated, the triangle muſt inevitably be ruined; by that ruin, theſe platoons fall of courſe: but when they ſtand their ground, and give a good fire, it muſt ſtagger and put a ſquadron in ſuch confuſion, as to give the triangle time to compleat; theſe platoons, as ſoon as they have fired, ſhould the ſquadron ſtill advance, and againſt them, might diſperſe and collect again under the fire, or in the center of the triangle: and a ſquadron that ſees even a ſingle platoon prepared to fire upon them, will be much more deliberate in their motions: for to attempt to charge a ſingle platoon, would be running a riſk, and anſwering no end. However, the triangle is now compleated, and no opening left to the enemy: wherefore it is already as ſafe as a ſquare; every face commanding as much fire, beſides the three platoons ſhut out. We will now ſee how this ſtrength may be improved, either againſt horſe or foot, or both together. The triangle being compleated, and the whole faced outward with the platoons on their guard on the right and left, make the ſecurity ſo great as not to dread the ſudden charge of a ſquadron. The motions of infantry being no quicker than thoſe of the infantry that are to compoſe the target; nor ſo quick, if they are dragoons or cavalry diſmounted: the triangle is at leiſure to make what other changes and alterations it pleaſes. Wherefore if the left platoon of each face falls into the triangle, and the right platoon of each face wheels to the right, 'till it cloſes the opening by joining the exterior point of the other face; it will form the body with three platoons within it. (fig. 2.) When we have proceeded ſo far, the ſmall ſide

of the body, that has the largeſt number of the enemy's infantry neareſt, ſtands faſt: the two platoons that make the other ſmall ſides fall off from the body, which we will ſuppoſe here to be the eighth and ſeventeenth: the three platoons that were ſhut in, march out by half files, at the openings theſe platoons make by falling off, one at one opening, and two at the other, and join the platoons that are out of the body, ſo as to make three on each ſide, expanded like two wings which are to change and vary their form, as will preſently be ſhewn; according to the diſcretion of thoſe who command them. (fig. 3.) As ſoon as they are in this poſition, they caſt their firelocks over their left arms, and continue them there, 'till they form battalion again; which different poſition will diſtinguiſh them clearly in all their movements from the other parts who are ſhouldered.

Whilſt theſe platoons are marching out of the body, the rear rank of the platoons of the ſide faces, that joined the two platoons which firſt fell off, ſlip in and form into platoon in the hollow. The face that joined the two platoons that fell firſt off from the body retires back, 'till it cloſes the openings by joining the rear of the other faces: the wings face to the ſmall face, unleſs otherwiſe ordered. Notwithſtanding theſe changes ſteal inſenſibly upon the enemy, in ſuch a manner that no enemy can well prevent; the whole body, as well as the grenadiers and platoon out of it, muſt be upon their guard whilſt theſe changes are making; which will be at the diſcretion of the commanding officer: for this purpoſe, as ſoon as the triangle is compleated, the platoon next the grenadiers upon the right goes to the right about again, and inclines a little to defend the front, during theſe little changes: by which every face will have a platoon to defend it, beſides the defence

defence they can make themſelves; being faced outwards the whole time. (fig. 2.) The target now conſiſts of a body of ten platoons, forming three large faces, and one ſmall one, beſides a platoon in the hollow; with two wings, each of equal ſize with the large faces, and a platoon of grenadiers at ſome diſtance from each of them, of equal ſize with the other platoons. When the body is compleated; the face oppoſite the ſmall face is always to be underſtood the front, as the little face is the rear: notwithſtanding it generally fights by the ſmall rear face; being a poſition ſuitable to it's expectations; which are, to be attacked in one place as ſoon as another. This being the diſpoſal of the troops that form the target, we will ſee in what manner they can act according to the nature of the enemy. Should the enemy conſiſt wholly of cavalry, and not diſmount; the target then is under no great concern; the circumference cavalry muſt take to keep out of reach of the fire of the target, in changing from one ſide to the other, to leave it uncertain where they will charge, is ſo great, that the different parts of the target may make their little movements, which will throw their fire in very different directions with great ſafety. The wings have nothing to do, but watch the motions of the ſquadron oppoſite to them, and cover that face of the body the ſquadron ſeems to threaten; which will make it ſix deep. The breadth of each face conſiſting of only three platoons; it is impoſſible for more than two ſquadrons to charge at a time, therefore, they can charge no face, but what will be five, ſix, or more deep: for ſuppoſing two ſquadrons are oppoſite the right and left faces; the right wing will cover the right; the left, the left face: and the platoon in the center pre-

pares to ſupport the part that firſt requires it. (plan 5. fig. 1.) Should they be oppoſite the front and right face; the right wing covers the right face; the left, the front. (fig. 2.) If the front and left faces are threatened; the right wing covers the front; the left, the left face. (fig. 3.) If the front only, it has both wings to cover it; though it is better for one only to cover the face, which is full ſufficient with the platoon in the center, that face with that platoon being ſix and nine deep; and the other wing may wheel even with the front face, and conſequently the front gains by it the fire of three platoons. (plan 6. fig. 1.) Thus it is impoſſible for any part of the body to be charged, that is not either five, ſix, eight or nine deep. When the wings cover theſe faces, they muſt move by half files, beginning with the half file next the body, for theſe reaſons: by moving by half files, they don't go over ſo much ground as they muſt do, ſhould they wheel, and conſequently can do it ſooner: and by marching cloſe by the faces they are to cover, they are in leſs danger of being hurt by the fire of the grenadiers that defend them whilſt they are making theſe movements. And if they think they ſhall be charged before they are compleated, they may halt in the middle of their movement; and by only facing to the front, ſome will be ſix, though not all; and none will be leſs than three deep: this irregularity may ſerve to diſcompoſe a little, if not break, the order of the ſquadron. When by any changes the front rank of any wing or face, becomes the rear rank; the officers may, as they find an opportunity, move up in the exterior rank to be always next the enemy: the ſerjeants may retire into their places. When a wing covers any face, the officers of the

Plan. 5.

Fig. 1.





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

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the wing only, move in the front rank: the officers of the face that is covered, may retire in the rear rank; by which all the officers will be in the front and rear lines, and the ſerjeants in the center. For it may be as neceſſary to have officers in the rear, to encourage and keep the face from giving ground; as in the front, to encourage them to bear boldly the charge of a ſquadron. But theſe ſhiftings of places are to be performed, only when there is a fair opportunity, the enemy being at a diſtance. It can hardly be ſuppoſed a ſquadron would attempt to charge the ſmall face, as it would be like running againſt a point almoſt, in compariſon of the ſquadron, the breadth of that face being only one platoon However, if it ſhould, the ſquadron will find that platoon ſix deep, by the platoon formed in the center of the target, with two lines and odd men, which make a third line, joyning the rear of it; the two ſide faces will be covered by the wings: and ſhould the front be threatened by another ſquadron, at the ſame time with the other faces; the platoon in the body ſupports the rear, the wings cover the ſides; and the platoons of the ſide faces, that jet out beyond the front, which are the horns, wheel back upon the front face, and move by half files 'till they join in the center: the parts of the wings that covered the horns may wheel back alſo, and cover the remaining parts of the front face: the remaining parts of the wings, (as there will be ſtill a few half files) may wheel back and cover the angles: by which the front is five deep in the center, and ſix upon the flanks, (fig. 2.) and the body now will have the rear face ſix deep, the ſide faces ſix deep, and the front as abovementioned, with the two angles moſt open, covered by ſix half files each; and a platoon of grenadiers on each ſide at ſome diſtance, which are called the flanks; and which, during all theſe movements,

movements, are to watch the enemy in ſuch a manner, as to prevent any ſquadron charging without firſt receiving the fire of one of theſe flanks, beſides the fire from the face they attempt to charge: for which they wheel backwards and forwards, as in the plans, to flank with a direct fire the faces threatened moſt, as does at the ſame time the platoon in the hollow, by which thoſe faces beſides being of a double thickneſs, are aided and aſſiſted in front and rear. Theſe are the defenſive poſitions of the target: but it is not to be ſuppoſed it is ever incapable of acting offenſively againſt cavalry or infantry alone, or both together. For it can make uſe of it's fire againſt both; and againſt cavalry in the following manner.

We will ſuppoſe a ſquadron oppoſite every face: in this ſituation every face takes care of itſelf: for though it is impoſſible for every face to be charged together, the breadth of each ſquadron being much wider than any part of the body, it may be very uncertain where the charge will be made. It muſt be remembered from the time the triangle is formed, the danger of a ſurprize is over: from that inſtant, there is a ſtate of defence; conſequently the commander is at liberty, as occaſion offers, to make what other alterations and changes he pleaſes: as when the gates of a beſieged town are ſhut; the beſieged both within and without, can coolly deliberate, and conſult the propereſt meaſures to be taken afterwards; which they do according to the motions of the enemy, and the neceſſity of their affairs. For they without the gates are defended by the fire coming from the works, beſides the defence which they can make themſelves. It is the ſame in the target; the parts that form the wings and flanks, defend and are defended by the body: as ſoon as the body is compleated, the platoons both within and

Plan. 6.

Fig. 1





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

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and without are at leiſure to be diſpoſed ſuitable to the quality and diſpoſition of the enemy. We have now ſuppoſed the body covered in the manner mentioned; the enemy to be cavalry only, and oppoſite every face: wherefore every face being equally threatened, is under ſo great a neceſſity for guarding themſelves, as not to be able to aſſiſt one another. However, the enemy that reduces the body to the neceſſity of keeping it's ſtrength thus divided by looking different ways, is equally divided alſo: and no more can be expected from it, than to make uſe of all it's fire; and at the ſame time not loſe the ſtrength lodged in it, ſufficient alone to render ineffectual the charge of any ſquadron, by being five and ſix deep.

When the body is ſo many deep, there are two ways to fire the hindmoſt ranks; the one is by the front ranks kneeling, and the rear firing over their heads; the next then riſing and firing, and ſo on, as Puyſegur fires his orb. The other is in the following manner: when the whole body is covered and becomes double, the parts that cover are called exterior faces; as front, rear, right and left exterior: the parts covered, are ſtill the body. And to have all the exteriors uniform, to diſtinguiſh them from the body; the horns and rear face, as long as they continue exteriors, caſt their firelocks over their left arms. Wherefore, let the right half of each exterior face, both great and ſmall, face to the right, and move by half files, beginning with the right half file of each exterior face, and march 'till the half file that joined that part of the exterior face that ſtood faſt, joins the angle of the body in an oblique manner, ſo as not to be hurt by the fire from the part it covered; it then halts, and faces immediately to the part of the exterior they left ſtanding. (fig. 3.) Whilſt theſe movements of the exte-

rior

rior faces are making, the body remains intire, and conſequently ſecure. The parts of the body that are uncovered, are the firſt to fire; and for that purpoſe move a ſtep or two forward; the moment they have fired, they retire to their places; the parts of the exteriors that covered them, reſume their former places alſo, and front the enemy immediately. Whilſt this is doing, the parts of the exteriors that ſtood their ground, keep themſelves in perfect readineſs to fire and receive the enemy; ſhould they endeavour notwithſtanding the fire they have had, to perſevere and charge, whilſt theſe little movements are making: however, as the ſpace of ground they go over is but little more than a platoon in ſome places, and not ſo much in others; as every face has a fire in readineſs to defend them, beſides the flanks, and the whole body in compleat order alſo; it is great chance but the enemy would be ſtaggered. When this is the caſe, as they find an opportunity, the left parts of the exterior faces move in the like manner to the left, till they join the ſaliant angles next to the body; by which the other parts that had not fired, are uncovered on purpoſe to fire as the others did before them: the parts that moved out of their places reſume then their places again. This they may do as often as there is an occaſion; for by it the three inward ranks that form the body, fire; the three outermoſt which cover them, and are towards the enemy, preſerve their fire for the laſt reſort. No part of the body ſhould be left uncovered with leſs than three deep: where any part is but five deep, the two exterior ranks only ſhould move for that part to fire.

Theſe poſitions of the target are ſuppoſing an equal force of cavalry againſt every face. But as it may much oftener

oftener happen that one face is threatened by cavalry more than another, or that one or two faces may have no enemy oppoſite them; it changes it's poſition to make uſe of it's fire, which we call here acting offenſively, as well as it did before, to enable it the better to be intirely upon the defence; which was to ſtrengthen it againſt the charge of a ſquadron. For ſhould the enemy threaten one ſide more than another, by drawing towards it a larger part of their force; it then applies it's attention to that part chiefly; not unneceſſarily keeps it's fire where there is no call for it. To do this, it obſerves ſtrictly to keep it's body compleat, which is, as we have already ſaid, no more than a beſieged town keeping her gates ſhut: the troops that defend it are drawn to ſtrengthen the places principally engaged: any face of the body only is not to be frightened by little ſham attacks, more than thoſe parts of the town that are but thinly manned; therefore can detach the wings and flanks where there is the greateſt need.

The figures (3 in plan 4. and 1 in plan 5.) are for the firſt approach of cavalry only; before it can be judged whether they intend to diſmount or not; being figures eaſy to be changed into poſitions ſuitable to anſwer the enemy's infantry. For ſhould the enemy diſmount, the wings then expand themſelves as before, only at a greater diſtance from the body; as will be ſhewn preſently, with the reaſon why. The figure (2 in plan 6.) which has every face of the body covered, and which is covered almoſt inſenſibly to the enemy, is to be formed when there is no apprehenſion from the enemy's fire; the enemy either not diſmounting, or diſmounting ſo few, that the danger is judged to be intirely from the cavalry. When this is the ſituation, there is no figure the body

can put on better than the preſent, which in effect is a double body, being cover'd all over, and conſequently of a double thickneſs. To ſhew the uſe of this figure, we will ſuppoſe two ſquadrons to be ſkirting round it, with an intention to charge as they find an opportunity. We muſt firſt obſerve in all theſe figures, the two flanks are diſtinct parts, and at liberty to act independent of the body. When there is an occaſion for the parts to fire, that are five and ſix deep, as they all are in this figure; when alſo the enemy is not oppoſite every face, as we are now ſuppoſing; the parts then that are five and ſix deep, muſt fire as Puyſegur does his orb; the three front ranks may fire together, ſhould it be thought moſt proper; and by forming a calculation of the fire, a true judgement may be had of the ſtrength of the target in theſe circumſtances.

The rear face of the target being oppos'd always to the greateſt body of the enemy, ſhould the two ſquadrons be oppoſite that face, (plan 7. fig. a.) the exterior ſides wheel up even with the rear; the exterior front divides in the center, and moves to the ſides by half files, far enough to fire without hurting the exterior ſides that wheel to the rear, and then face to the enemy, which will give (reckoning the ſide faces only two platoons each by being ſhortened in this manner) the fire of eleven platoons: the two exterior ſides and front being ſeven; the rear oppoſite the enemy remaining cover'd, two; and the two flanks one each. Should the enemy be oppoſite a ſide face only, the exteriors of the three other faces march and wheel to it's ſupport in the ſame manner, (fig. b.) which with the flanks command the fire of twelve platoons. If the front is the only face attack'd (fig. c.) the exterior ſide faces wheel till they are even with that face: the exterior rear

may

Plan. 7.



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may move by half files either to the right or left, till it can fire clear of the ſide exteriors; or elſe the exterior rear may keep it's ground, and the rear face may march and ſupport the rear of the front; by which with the flanks, the front face has the fire of thirteen platoons, or twelve with an extraordinary platoon in the rear, which ſhould it be in the center, makes it eight deep in that part. If the enemy divides and are oppoſite the front and one of the ſide faces, the ſide will have the rear exterior; the front the other ſide exterior: both which, with the two flanks, command the fire of fifteen platoons. (fig. d.) Should it be the rear and one of the ſides; they will have the other ſide and front exterior, which with the two flanks has the fire of thirteen platoons. (plan 8. fig. e.) The front and rear will have the two ſide exteriors, the one to defend the front, the other the rear; which with the flanks are fourteen platoons: here alſo the ſide face whoſe exterior defends the front, might wheel by a platoon at a time to defend the rear, which gives two more platoons; but this is to be done diſcretionally. (fig. f.) The two ſides have the front and rear exteriors, and two flanks conſequently command the fire of fourteen platoons. fig. g.) Should the enemy threaten three faces, the exterior of the face that has no enemy oppoſite, wheels up to the ſupport of ſome other. All this may ſeem more puzzling than it really is, the whole myſtery being only to wheel the exteriors of any part that has no enemy to annoy them to ſupport the part that has. The exteriors are the firſt to fire after the flanks, as they fire at a greater diſtance, inclining their muſkets towards the center of the ſquadron, and with them the face cover'd oppoſite the enemy, by a rank at a time, beginning with the rear; the exterior that covers that face, keeps their fire for the laſt reſort; (g) by which ſhould a

ſquadron perſiſt in their charge, after having receiv'd the fire from theſe exteriors and flanks, it muſt charge againſt bayonets ſix deep, and the reſerv'd fire of the three firſt ranks of the face they charge, juſt in their breaſts; beſides the two flanks in readineſs to fall with their bayonets upon the rear or flanks of the ſquadron. As ſoon as theſe exteriors have fired, they wheel back with recover'd arms, and load as faſt as they can, in order to wheel forward again. If the enemy does not keep advancing in their charge, an exterior ſometimes might move by half files in the rear of the face they cover'd after they have fired; by which that exterior then becomes the face, and the face the exterior, and conſequently may wheel up immediately, or ſtand their ground as occaſion requires, being ready to fire when the others are not; but this is to be done diſcretionally. It may perhaps ſeem irregular to have a face of the body ſometimes become the exterior, and the exterior the face; or to have ſometimes the platoons divided as at the flanks of the front exterior; for the front face conſiſts but of three platoons, and yet four cover them and the angles; or to have the rear ranks of the horns fall into the body and form a platoon of two ranks. Theſe ſort of irregularities we do not regard, or any other, when there is a uſe in them in real ſervice. It is an obſervation, and a juſt one, that in the exerciſe of the troops of moſt nations, there is more attention and regard paid to the beauty and appearance, meaſure and cadence, than to things of much greater uſe and moment, was the exerciſe a real action. The reaſon is obvious; for before troops are concern'd in one real action, perhaps they will have performed their exerciſe an hundred times: therefore the ocular ſenſe is delighted by this beautiful appearance and exactneſs an hundred times to one; as this

one


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one muſt be a real action, that diſcloſes to us the real uſe of what at another time ſeems an irregularity, and diſguſts the eye. For ſhould the exterior of the front face be formed in a more irregular manner than it is; the uſe of it when done is as manifeſt, as the wheeling it is eaſy. It has been ſhewn, that it is as eaſy to wheel this exterior as any other; and that the platoon of two ranks which form'd in the center of the body, is of no ſmall uſe againſt cavalry; and it will appear preſently to be of no leſs againſt infantry.

It muſt be obſerv'd, the platoon in the center of this body is three deep, which makes it of equal ſtrength with the others; the odd men or ſupernumeraries, which here are eighteen, were plac'd in the center of the battalion, to ſtrengthen the colour platoon, by making it four deep; conſequently when the target is formed, it becomes the center of the front face of the body. (plan 4. fig. 1. 2. 3.) Therefore by taking away the rear rank, and joining it to the two other ranks, leaves the hollow of the body inclos'd three deep every where, with an additional platoon three deep alſo in it; which is of greater ſervice, being gain'd without weakening any material part; and the ſituation of the horns making it of no ſignification whether they looſe their rear line or not, equal to the great advantage gain'd by the platoon in the hollow: as that platoon is of great conſequence, it requires a ſenſible officer to conduct it; being like a heart plac'd near the center, to animate, ſupport, and encourage the whole, as the heart of a man from whence flow the ſprings of life and action. As this platoon is a diſtinct and ſeparate command, it falls after the commanding officers are appointed to the wings, to the ſecond eldeſt that remain with the body.

The

The half files that cover the angles are not to wheel up with the exteriors; their ſtanding their ground when the exteriors wheel, keeps the body more compact and ſtrong, and is a good additional fire in reſerve, ſhould a ſquadron venture to charge, after the exteriors have delivered their fire: this is to be always obſerved, being their proper places when the body is covered, unleſs elſewhere particularly ordered by the commander in chief; or in his abſence, by the commander of the body: they might then be as uſeful in being detached, to act perhaps as irregulars, without breaking the order of the other parts. As the front exterior, with the half files that cover the angles, conſiſts of four platoons; there will at leaſt be four officers to command them; wherefore the officers that command the flank platoons of theſe four, as ſoon as theſe flank platoons divide to cover the angles, muſt move to the intervals they make by dividing; which will be nearly the center of their platoons: they will then command the demi-platoon that makes part of the front exterior, and the demi-platoon that covers the angles: and may be detached with this laſt demi-platoon; whenever it is thought a ſerjeant might not be ſufficient. When the demi-platoons join, the officers reſume their former places. (o, fig. 2. plan 6.)

However, enough has been ſaid to judge of the ſtrength of the target, both offenſive and defenſive againſt cavalry only: for a ſquadron can be oppoſite no one face, but it will be ſubject to the fire of eleven platoons, which the rear commands; and in this method of firing has the feweſt of any: but the rear has an advantage againſt a ſquadron, which ſufficiently ballances the not commanding ſo much fire as the other faces. It has been already ſhewn, that the ſtrength of a charge conſiſts in bearing

bearing down all before it, by advancing compact and briſk with a full front; and the breadth of the ſquadron which ought to help it moſt, by it's weight againſt the rear of the body, ſerves to ruin it; the rear conſiſting of only one platoon in extent, which here being thirteen half files, is equal to no more than ſeven or eight cavaliers: therefore ſeven or eight cavaliers, ſhould they eſcape the above fire, are to break this body to pieces, notwithſtanding five and ſix deep every where; with the two flanks at liberty to act as they pleaſe beſides. This would be like a ſhip furiouſly drove with her broadſide againſt a pier or beak of another ſhip, that has on each ſide of her a ſmaller veſſel waiting to compleat the wreck, as ſoon as ever ſhe ſplits in the middle; which ſhe muſt inevitably do by the force of her own weight.

There can be no objection made againſt wheeling the exterior parts, the body remaining ſo compleat and ſtrong the whole time: and the greateſt wheel that is made, is no more than a fourth part of a circle with three platoons, which is the front exterior; and all theſe wheels proceed from the ſquadron moving round alſo: therefore it may be eaſily judged what a compaſs the ſquadron muſt take, what a large part of a circle it makes to march from one ſide of the target to the other, and keep out of the reach of the fire, in compariſon to the wheelings made by the exterior parts, to anſwer the motions of the ſquadron. Should a compariſon be drawn between this target, and a ſquare conſiſting of the ſame number of men; a ſquadron oppoſite one of the faces of the ſquare is ſubject to the fire of five platoons, reckoning the grenadiers upon the two angles one: ſhould this fire be indiſcreetly thrown away, the ſquadron then charges a

front

front with the grenadiers, that has an extent of five platoons only three deep, with no independent body to aſſiſt it either in front or rear; that if the face is drove into the ſquare, the other three are equally ruined with it. It is evident, any face of the body of the target with the flanks, has the fire of ſix platoons more; no face having near ſo great an extent of front, but every where almoſt a double thickneſs; and the two flanks acting independently, and to be uſed as occaſion requires.

This is the difference between the ſquare and target, againſt a ſquadron: and there has been enough ſaid to judge between both of the defence they can make againſt cavalry in general. Which has been here firſt related, becauſe the original intent of poſitions, in open countries, that form a face every way, was deſigned chiefly againſt cavalry; whoſe motions being much quicker than infantry, put it in their power to ſurround them at will. However, though this was the original intent, and they who have made uſe of them ſeem to have thought it not poſſible for cavalry ever to diſmount and attack them with fire-arms or what is ſtill worſe, with cavalry and infantry together, though this ſeems ſcarce ever to have entered into their thoughts; we are ſenſible the advantages theſe poſitions have over cavalry alone, become diſadvantages when the nature of the attack is changed, by the cavalry or part diſmounting and fighting on foot. Then it is the quantity of fire only, that can be of ſervice. Wherefore as it is infantry the target dreads moſt, being ſenſible infantry may fire ſucceſſively at them at a diſtance; which renders their cloſe compact order, and preſerving a face every way, of little or no uſe, unleſs they have a ſucceſſion of fire alſo to anſwer them. To command

Plan 9.

Fig. 1.



2.d

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mand this ſucceſſion of fire, the target obſerves one principal rule; which is, always to have the rear towards the largeſt body of infantry.

The target as yet has been formed only from a ſingle line, which is not the moſt eligible poſition for a battalion to march; when it is imagined there might be an occaſion to form upon the march: it would be thought imprudent to do ſo, as there is a much eaſier, quicker, and ſafer method. For if a triangle is formed at the head of the encampment, or place of parade, from a ſingle line according to fig. 1. plan 4. and the target afterward compleated according to the two following figures. When it is in the poſition of figure the third, which is the body in the center, with the wings expanded on each ſide, and the flanks in their original places; to give it a more commodious and ſafe poſition to form from upon the march, at the ſame time convenient to march: and what is ſtill of greater conſequence, to put it in it's power always to have the rear face oppoſite the greateſt body of the enemy's infantry, or what part of the enemy it pleaſes. To do this, (plan 9. fig. 1.) let the front and rear march a ſtep or two beyond the extremities of the ſide faces; the platoon in the center firſt joining the rear of the rear face, the ſide faces at the ſame time go to the right about, and wheel inwards the circle (b); 'till the two faces are in parallel lines, making the half files next the rear face, the hinges firſt to wheel upon; the two faces then march to one another till they meet in the center of the front and rear face (cc). The front face, except the center platoon, which covers the flanks of the ſide faces, go to the right about, and wheel the remaining part of that face till they join in parallel lines cloſe with the ſide faces: the whole then halts and faces

outwards, or whichever way they are to march. By which the front face having covered a platoon of each ſide face, thoſe faces, as far as they are covered, become ten deep, the reſt only ſix. When it is in this poſition, by wheeling upon the center half files of the center platoons, making the two rear men of thoſe half files the hinge to wheel upon, by wheeling a ſmall part of a very ſmall circle in this manner, the rear face is brought oppoſite any one point. (e, plan 10.) For the whole length of the body being only three platoons, beſides the three half files at the ends; the wheel that is made from the center, is but a platoon and half, and half a file at one end, and a file at the other: therefore it may be done in as little time as a ſubdiviſion which conſiſts of two platoons. And as the occaſion which requires the body to bring the ſmall face oppoſite any particular part of the enemy, is the enemy either being infantry, or having diſmounted their cavalry to attack with fire-arms; the movements of the infantry that attack, being no quicker than the target they attack, which is infantry alſo; and the ſpace of ground they muſt go over in making their preparations proper for the attack, at the ſame time to keep out of reach of the target's fire; being twenty times more than the ſpace of ground the body takes in it's wheel to ſuit itſelf to the movement made by the enemy; it is but reaſonable to ſuppoſe, it may be done in twenty times leſs time: wherefore, there is no fear from the foot in doing it. Even this wheel upon the center, at the time the enemy are making ready to form for the attack, may often be avoided, by always keeping the little face on the march towards the enemy to be dreaded moſt. When the enemy is behind, the target can march by the front as well as the rear, by the whole facing to the front.

Should


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

Should the body march by either of the broad ſides, it is not then ſo wide as a grand diviſion of a battalion. Wherefore, as it can march either by front or rear, right or left, the enemy will find it very difficult to prevent it's rear being towards them on the march; conſequently the wheeling on the center is avoided, when perhaps they might be wanting to do ſomething elſe. As the target in this poſition is under no fear from infantry by the ſlowneſs of their motions; ſo is it under as little from cavalry, from the nature of their ſtrength. Should it be ſurrounded by ſeveral ſquadrons, it halts; the whole faces outwards, and wheels almoſt imperceptibly into their former places, with the back of not one man, nor no one opening expoſed to the enemy: the ſpace of a platoon and half is the greateſt any part goes over to come into their proper places again. Whilſt theſe wheels are made, the rear and platoon of the front that cover the flanks of the ſide faces, ſtand their ground, and are quite prepared: the reſt may halt in the middle of their wheel, if the enemy is very cloſe; being then in as good a poſition to receive cavalry, almoſt as when the body is open and compleated, therefore need not be in any hurry: for ſhould a ſquadron charge the target in it's marching poſition, they can come upon the back of no one man: ſhould they not wheel to attack both ſide faces together, which is very difficult to do, they then will charge againſt ſix deep in ſome parts, ten in others, and thirteen upon the flanks, being the number of half files the platoons in this target conſiſt of. It is as ſafe for the body to march in this manner, as it was for the ſquare in plan 2. fig. 5, 6. they both ſwell imperceptibly upon the enemy, and being ſhort and compact, are alſo convenient to march: when the ſides have opened, the front

and rear retire a little back to their proper places. This is the ſituation of the body, ſhut and formed for the march; and the defence it can make by itſelf, when ſhut, without the wings and flanks. But as it never is without wings and flanks, which anſwer the end of reſerves and ſupernumerary parties, we will ſhew they are as ſerviceable for the defence of the body, in it's marching poſition, as they are when it is halted and opened.

If the target is in it's firſt poſition, having it's wings expanded on each ſide, (fig. 3. plan 4.) with the flanks at ſome little diſtance from their exterior parts, as in that figure: as ſoon as the order is given to ſhut for the march, the commanding officer of each wing and flank, in this poſition, firſt marches them to their proper diſtances from the body, and then they form the wings into triangles, by the center platoon of each ſtanding faſt, the other platoons wheeling back 'till they meet; which forms a triangle on each ſide. (m, plan 9. fig. 1.) This wheel being only with ſingle platoons, and a ſmall part of a circle, is done almoſt in an inſtant, and of great ſervice when done; by giving the body an opportunity to perform it's wheelings with ſafety, and at it's leiſure, by the defence they make: though there can ſcarce be any neceſſity for this defence, as it is not to be ſuppoſed an enemy much to be dreaded is very near, when the target is ordered to form for the march. The danger being, when upon the march it is ordered to open and prepare for it's defence, as the enemy then is ſuppoſed to be near: for which reaſon, whenever the target halts, the wings form triangles without inquiring the reaſon of the halting: theſe triangles being formed upon the march with no trouble, by the wheeling the twelfth part of a circle with ſingle platoons. It has already been ſhewn how the

wings

wings form triangles; but as they cannot march well in that triangular form, when they are to march, the platoons that wheeled back to form the triangles, muſt firſt wheel a little forward again, 'till they are perpendicular upon the center platoons that ſtood faſt, when the triangles were forming: (i) The half files they wheel upon which join the platoons that ſtood faſt, muſt ſtill keep joined to the rear points of thoſe platoons, as the hinges to wheel backward or forward as required. They are now perpendicular upon the platoons that ſtood faſt, in parallel lines to one another; conſequently form three ſides of a ſquare with one open, and march as a ſquare does, the center platoons marching by platoon, the others by half files, like the ſide faces of a ſquare marching to the rear; unleſs the body marches to the right or left by one of the ſide faces; the platoons of the wings that marched by half files, then march by platoon, and the other platoons by half files; that they might ſtill keep their proper ſtations, to anſwer the end intended for them; which is, to move with the body in ſuch a poſition as to be able to defend it either ſhut or open. Wherefore the wings muſt be upon the watch, ſo as always to veer round in ſuch a manner, as never to loſe this commanding poſition, which flanks directly the ſide faces; and at the ſame time be at ſuch a diſtance, as to give the ſide faces, and themſelves, room to make all their wheelings and fire clear of one another. When they are in this poſition, the ſpace of half a platoon forms the triangle, by both the platoons wheeling together till they meet: as this wheel is ſo ſmall when the body halts, they make it of courſe, which gives it time to open undiſturbed and with ſafety, by the center platoons flanking the ſides; whilſt the croſs fire of the other platoons

next the front face, defend the front as well as each other. (s, fig. 2.) Thus the wings and body defend reciprocally each other upon the march: for the ſides and parts of the front that wheel'd, flank and defend the center of the wings (Q), and the center platoon of the front face, defends the inward faces that defended them (g).

Beſides the wings, there are the platoons of grenadiers which form the flanks when the body is open; and may ſerve as a front and rear guard upon the march, or to march on the flanks (x, fig. 1.) or next the enemy, or in little diviſions on every ſide, to keep off irregulars, or wherever they are thought moſt neceſſary. Theſe are the poſitions a regiment or battalion, conſiſting of eighteen platoons, is thrown in, to march in an open country, when it is apprehended there might be an occaſion to form the target upon the march; which may be called a target ſhut. Nor is there any neceſſity to alter this poſition, though the open country ſhould lead to an incloſed, which broke into an open country again: the body then might march by the front and rear face; the wings might form ſtraight lines, and ſerve as a van and rear guard; the flanks might ſcour the incloſures, or be a van and rear guard to the wings: when they have paſſed the incloſure or defiles, the wings and flanks might form as before again.

Thus we find the ſquadron that makes ſo ſudden an onſet, as to charge before the target is prepared, muſt firſt receive the fire of both flanks, which are to watch the whole; then of one of the wings, if not both: and having perſevered through theſe fires, and the fire of the body, will charge againſt men drawn up with fixed bayonets, ſix, ten, and thirteen deep; with no one opening, nor the back of any man expoſed to their view.

Such is the ſituation of the target ſhut, the moment it

it halts upon the march; the whole faces outward, unleſs the enemy is on one ſide only; then it faces to the enemy, till it is ordered to open; the wings the ſame. That this marching poſition againſt the ſudden charge of a ſquadron, is as good in ſome reſpects, if not better, than when it is open. For though this cloſe compact order is not ſo convenient to uſe all their fire, it can make uſe of a great deal; is more firm to receive any ſudden ſhock, as the charge of a ſquadron: that with the fire it can give in this irregular poſition, and with the wings and flanks being four ſeparate parts, and the ſtrength lodged beſides in the body itſelf; it is ſo ſecure and ſafe againſt cavalry only, that unleſs they diſmount to form ſome other poſition to attack by fire-arms, the target need not be in any hurry at the firſt appearance of them; and may halt at leiſure to open: when the enemy prepares to attack by fire-arms; the time they muſt take in their preparations, is full ſufficient for the target to make their preparations alſo to anſwer them [5]. Which we are now going to ſhew.

We have already ſeen the target formed from a ſingle line, with the defence it makes againſt cavalry, as well as the poſition it changes to for the march. What remains, is to ſhew the diſpoſition it makes towards the reception of infantry, or cavalry and infantry together: and the

[5] This method of marching the target, correſponds with the rules to be obſerved for the march of troops, with an enemy near. L'Ordre de battaille qu'on a dans l'idee ou deſſiné ſur le papier, ſert de regle à l'ordre de marche. Mem. de Montecuculi li. 1. ch. 4.

In the wars of the Low Countries, it is ſaid: Chiapino Vitelli, camp-maſter general, was born in the dutchy of Spalato; and that his progenitors firſt taught the Italian foot, the diſcipline of marching in the form of a cockle. Which we have mentioned here, imagining it could not be very unlike the body of the target, if it marched open; which might be done, though for ſeveral reaſons would be more inconvenient. Strada, an. 1575.

farther

farther uſe of the target ſhut, or it's marching poſition towards this diſpoſition.

The greateſt difficulty in all poſitions conſiſting of one ſort of ſtrength, as infantry only is, when they are to contend with different ſorts of ſtrength, as infantry and cavalry together; as we are ſuppoſing, where cavalry can act equally the ſame as infantry, conſequently mutually aſſiſt one another. This is moſt difficult with the target. Cavalry and infantry together, divide the attention of the target, much more than cavalry and infantry alone: conſequently the target is in a greater uncertainty where the real attacks are to be made, as well as the manner; whether it will be with infantry or cavalry, or both together. When there is this uncertainty, there ought to be a clear diſcernment, and a judgement not apt to be deceived, in thoſe who are the principal commanders: that they may not be deluded by ſham attacks, as not to guard againſt the real: like the unſkilful boxer endued with great natural ſtrength, which he waſtes by his ignorance in defending the part where the blow was never aimed, and laying ſome other open to the rebuke of his antagoniſt where he never expected.

It is in art military, in one reſpect, as in art phyſical. We are to reduce as many doubts as we can to certainties. The phyſician's firſt art, is to ſearch out the real diſeaſe: then, if it is fluctuating, unſettled, and flying about the patient, he endeavours to fix it in ſome leaſt dangerous part: when he has done this, he is in the path of knowledge, and preſcribes according to rule. The target is already reduced to the certainty, as will preſently appear, of having a defence ſuitable to any evil; that is, to any ſort of attack. Wherefore the chief art is to ſee where the attack is to be, and not to be deceived in

in this principal part, which is no ſmall difficulty; when there is horſe and foot together, and when their aim is to leave it doubtful in this particular [6]. However, the marching poſition of the target, puts it in it's power pretty well to determine this. At the firſt appearance of the enemy, we will ſuppoſe it ſhut on the march; which it purſues 'till it is ſenſible by their motions they intend to moleſt it; upon a nearer approach halts. When halted, (as has been already ſaid) theſe poſitions are ſo ſecure againſt the ſudden onſet from a ſquadron; that the whole attention of the body is taken up in finding out the deſign of the enemy's real attack. This it does ſafely, under the protection of the wings and flanks, which are four ſeparate and diſtinct bodies, that defend it in the mean time. Were the troops that form this target marching in a ſingle line, though from a ſingle line they could ſoon be thrown in a ſafe poſition, which is a triangle with three platoons ſhut out to defend it whilſt forming; yet to form the target from the triangle afterwards, with the little movements ſuitable to the poſture of the enemy, which exceedingly ſtrengthen it, and give

[6] What we would have underſtood by reducing uncertainties, as near as poſſible, to certainties; may be beſt explained by the following inſtance. In 1691, the marquis de Villars came to Tournay, and aſſembled his little army between Cambrin and Pont de Pierres. He then writ to marſhal de Luxembourg, and explained to him by ſeveral juſt military reaſons, that the only method for a general to defend lines, is to ſeize (if poſſible) ſome advantageous poſt, intrenched without the line, in order to oblige an enemy who intends to attack the lines, to determine his attack either to the right or left. Mem. of the duke de Villars marſhal general.

What he meant by this, was to confine the enemy, that had this extent of lines to make their attempt upon, to a narrower compaſs; drawing him nearer to a point, by which he knew the better where to be prepared for him.

Marquis de Villars was appointed to defend the lines which cover the whole country from the Scheld to Dunkirk.

it many advantages, to make theſe little movements, it ſtill takes more time; which it cannot employ too carefully in watching the enemy, that it might judge the better the change neceſſary to be made: therefore, the more forward it is, the more time it has to find out, and make this change. Should the enemy march round it at a diſtance; (pl. 10.) this poſition enables it to follow them, by wheeling upon the center, ſo as always to keep the rear of the body pointing againſt the largeſt body of infantry, ſhould there be any; if not, the largeſt body of cavalry. The wings veer round with it, as was before ſaid; and the flanks are the moſt advanced towards the enemy. Should the enemy be all cavalry; (as in all probability they might at their firſt approach) and oppoſite one ſide only; by the body wheeling in this manner, they will always front the rear; in this ſituation, the wings are expanded and front the enemy. Should they be on different ſides, the rear is ſtill oppoſite the largeſt part of the enemy; and the wings form triangles, till it is perceived what the enemy's intention is. As ſoon as the enemy halts, the target halts likewiſe, and as occaſion offers, opens: ſhould they not diſmount, the wings cover the faces next the enemy, as in plan 5. fig. 1, 2, 3. as they find time, the whole body afterwards is covered according to plan 6. fig. 2. and defend themſelves as in thoſe plans, which are calculated intirely for cavalry. If the enemy after having reconnoitered the target, ſhould move off again, the body might ſhut, though it is covered; by which every part being double in breadth, the rear face ſtands faſt with the center platoon of the front, as before. When it ſhuts for the march, by being covered, what it gets in breadth, it loſes in length; conſequently the wheelings are much ſhorter, therefore ſooner performed.

In

Plan. II.th



Fig. 1.



2.

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In this poſition (plan 11. fig. 1.) the target has no wings to protect it's march; but truſts wholly to itſelf and flanks: for this reaſon is not ſo convenient at any time but when it is fully perceived, the cavalry do not intend to diſmount, by having no fire-arms but piſtols, or any other ſign, and there is no danger from the enemy's fire. When it is doubled in this manner, it opens in a much leſs time than when uncovered, or ſingle; and is prepared for cavalry ſhut, as well as open, by commanding a good deal of fire, and being enabled by it's great thickneſs and compactneſs to bear the charge of a ſquadron. When it is double and ſhut for the march, the demi-platoons that covered the angles when open, fall off ſome little diſtance, and march as they ſhall be directed. The body in this poſition, having no wings to cover their march, will find a greater uſe in theſe demi-platoons being detached like the flanks to act the part of irregulars, than if they wheeled up with the exteriors: there being by this, ſtill four independent parts for a van, rear, and flank guards. When the body opens, they reſume their former places. The colours muſt be flying exactly in center of the front face, being a good guide to the whole, by ſhewing the center, and where the ſides are to divide when it does open. It was ſaid, by wheeling on the center, the rear was always oppoſite the infantry, or the cavalry to be dreaded moſt. By bringing the rear oppoſite the cavalry, is only through fear of their diſmounting, and making uſe of their fire-arms; which are the moſt dangerous againſt all poſitions of theſe kinds, that require a ſucceſſion of fire, and to preſerve a front every way. Should there be to be found in the target, what will enable it to do this? it muſt be granted there is to be found, what will prove it a poſition ſuitable to

the attack of infantry, or charge of cavalry, or both together; conſequently preferable to any other in the ſame circumſtances without the ſame qualities [7].

There has been enough ſaid to ſhew any ſingle figure attacked by a column, with almoſt ever ſo ſmall an extent, muſt give way, unleſs we can fire upon the flank of the column, or have a ſucceſſion to anſwer that of the column: being ſo convinced of this ourſelves, we attacked the ſquare and orb by columns ſupported by cavalry. We will now attack the target in the ſame manner, marching according to (c, x, i, plan 9. fig. 1.) with it's wings on each ſide and flanks diſpoſed where there is the greateſt occaſion for them. When this is the ſituation, it opens with it's rear to the column; ſhould the enemy be oppoſite one face only, the wings expand themſelves, and the whole front the enemy. By theſe poſitions the five ſeparate diviſions, body, wings, and flanks, ſtand

Dans ſe premiere lettre. Chap. 14.

[7] In the objection Savornin makes to Folard's column, he ſays, "Mais pour en venir à bout, je crois qu'on ſera obligé de s'y prendre comme le fameux prince de Condé s'y prit à la bataille de Rocroy: où ne pouvant avec ſa cavalerie victorieuſe, tirer aucune raiſon de ce fameux corps d'infanterie Eſpagnole qui faiſoit front par-tout, il lui oppoſa de plus ſon infanterie." In anſwer to this, the author of the divided and doubled phalanx ſays, "Sans parler de la comparaiſon du bataillon quarré à la colonne, comment trouve-t-on tout ceci? A quoi ſe réduit l'objection? Ni la cavalerie ni l'infanterie ne peuvent réſiſter à la colonne; elle-même ne peut ſe défendre contre les deux enſemble. Mais en cela, comme il le dit deux lignes plus bas, elle eſt de niveau avec toute autre ordonnance. Tout corps attaquè par les deux armes n'a pas d'autre parti à prendre que de capituler. Il ſeroit ridicule de reprocher, à la colonne nommément, un defaut commun à tout ce qui fait la guerre. Ce ſeroit comme ſi on lui reprochoit de n'être pas invulnérable. Que reſte-t-il donc de l'objection? qu'il y a un cas où la colonne ne vaut pas mieux que la méthode ordinaire, &c."

Thus it ſeems acknowledged by all ſides, that infantry alone is not a match for infantry and cavalry together. Should this be granted, it muſt be granted alſo, that infantry alone in an open country, can't cope with an equal number of cavalry, that are able to make uſe of their fire-arms, and act like infantry; as they may always diſmount a part for that purpoſe. However, we are in hopes to ſhew, the target can confute this.

clear

clear of one another, and are conſequently more at liberty to uſe their fire, than in the poſition calculated for cavalry only. The body having the chief part of infantry to engage; the two wings can aſſiſt with their fire at any time, ſhould there not be a greater neceſſity for it elſewhere. Againſt the column it fires in the following manner. By wheeling the platoons of the ſide faces towards the enemy one after another, it makes uſe of the fire of thoſe two faces. When they make theſe wheels, they firſt advance a ſtep or two forwards; as ſoon as they have fired, they wheel back immediately to load again, and obſerve ſtrictly to wheel but one at a time. Whilſt the ſide faces fire in this manner, the rear by the help of the platoon in the hollow may be relieved by the three platoons that form the front: when the rear has fired, it retires by half files, beginning with the right; the platoon in the hollow moves into the place immediately with a full front: the rear that retired, marches to the rear of the center platoon of the front face; which platoon advances to the ſupport of the platoon that was firſt formed in the hollow: that platoon having fired, retires in the ſame manner to the rear of the right platoon of the front, which advances in like manner to the ſupport of the rear; as does the other platoon afterwards: and ſo they keep on, obſerving ſtrictly that no platoon, eſpecially the rear, quits their place, till there is another ready immediately to march in with a full front: the ſide faces wheeling by platoons as was juſt mentioned, do not interrupt the leaſt the front relieving the rear in this manner; by which the body makes uſe of all it's fire, at the ſame time preſerves a front every way. This is the farther uſe of the platoon formed in the center for infantry. This method of relieving the rear by the front,

is

is not to be done when the front has an enemy of conſequence oppoſite to it; and when there is no part of the wings or flanks at liberty enough to engage it; which the commander is to judge: the rear and the platoon formed in the hollow then muſt relieve one another as well as they can. The meaning of firing in this manner, is to have a continual ſucceſſion of fire of two platoons at a time. But as the ſide faces have ſix platoons, and the front, rear, and platoon in the hollow only five; there is an extraordinary fire to the ſides more than the rear. Five diſtinct fires deliberately given, being ſufficient to keep up the ſucceſſion, by giving one another time to re-load before it comes to their turn again. The following rules are obſerved to make the moſt of the fire. We may be ſure the firſt fire the body, as well as the enemy gives, will be the beſt; being the time of the action they will be the leaſt diſcompoſed. Wherefore to begin well, which (as the ſaying is) is half the battle [8]: the two horns wheel up for the firſt fire, which, with the rear face, make that fire as well, as in all probability the beſt given, the greateſt; and reduces the number of platoons of the ſides, equal to the others afterwards. When this firſt great fire is given, the ſecond, which is the platoon in the hollow, will be ready to march into the place of the rear immediately; the center platoon of the right face wheels to fire with it: the center platoon in the front ſupports the ſecond fire of the rear, and with it the center of the left wheels, which makes the third fire: and is ſucceeded by the right of the front, and left of the left face, being the fourth fire: and finiſhes with the left of the front and right of the right face. The whole then begins again. By firing in this

[8] Dimidium facti qui bene cæpit habet.

manner,

Plan. 12.

Pag. 134.





manner, the greateſt fire is given without any opening; conſequently with the leaſt diſorder. The horns by their ſituation may advance a few more paces than the other platoons of the ſide faces before they wheel; by which they are at more liberty, and conſequently may fire the better. The right of the front and left of the left, the left of the front and the right of the right face being the fartheſt aſunder, make the openings fartheſt aſunder alſo in their preparations to fire; conſequently diſorder the body as little as poſſible. The openings in the front are made only by the marching a platoon at a time into the hollow, when another that has fir'd is ready immediately to fill up it's place. The two platoons next the rear being with the two laſt fires, are better able to receive the enemy, ſhould they dare to ruſh in after their their firſt or ſecond fire, by obliging them to run upon the muzzles of their muſkets loaded, and with fix'd bayonets. (plan 12.) By this time the ſeveral reaſons may be obſerv'd why the front face retires back as ſoon as it can to the ſecond platoon of the ſide faces; by it thoſe faces are more oblique and convenient to wheel their platoons, as has been mention'd, and give more room for the front to ſupport the rear; and the platoons that ſupport have but the ſpace of two platoons to march over to that ſupport. We have already ſeen that it gives the ſide faces power to cover the front againſt any occaſion as cavalry, and alſo gives the extraordinary platoon in the center without weakening any part. By firing in this manner, a column of the enemy will have a ſucceſſion of fire to oppoſe it, not very unlike a column: ſhould it be well conducted, there is not the fire of a ſingle muſket loſt: and the enemy being one way, and they all looking different ways, but at the very time they are firing will not be ſo liable

to

to throw away their fire to no purpoſe. The wings and flanks can act where they are wanted moſt, to the front, rear, or either ſide; they being to defend the body as well as themſelves, againſt infantry as well as cavalry: their own ſafety and the body's depending greatly upon it, the neceſſity of defending one another being mutual: the wings being to the body like arms to a man; the intereſt of the arms is as great to defend the man they belong to, as the defence of the man is ſmall without them: ſhould the arms ſuffer the body to be deſtroyed, their connection with it is ſo cloſe, it cannot happen otherways but they muſt be deſtroyed alſo. As the art of managing theſe wings, is as great as that of a boxer in managing his arms, they require ſenſible and underſtanding officers to conduct them; ſuch who have judgement to diſcern in what manner, and where the enemy intend to ſtrike; and know how to render the blow leſs efficacious by ſtriking at the ſame time, and obliging the attention of the enemy not to be a little employed in looking to their own defence as well as annoying them.

It may be obſerved, our chief view by this method of firing is to have a poſition anſwerable to a column; nor do we deny it; being ſufficiently ſenſible, without ſuch a poſition any other will avail but little, unleſs there are troops to fire upon the flanks of the column: ſhould there be none, it muſt be the ſtrongeſt inducement to an enemy to attack in that manner. Should a ſquare or orb be attack'd according to plans 1. 2. and 3. we could venture to affirm, after the third fire from the column, there would not be a ſingle muſket in thoſe faces or parts remain loaded to anſwer the column's fourth fire. What would be the conſequence? that the whole face or ſide would lay down their arms or run away; either of which would involve

involve the other faces or ſides in their ruin. We ſhall ever be of the ſame opinion with mareſhal Saxe in this particular; who ſays, every troop that has fired in the preſence of an enemy is a troop beat, ſhould the enemy oppoſite to them preſerve their fire. This is the reaſon why officers of diſcernment make their men march ſhoulder'd againſt an enemy prepared to receive them, becauſe it is eaſier at that dangerous time to prevent them throwing away their fire, when they are ſhoulder'd, than when they carry their firelocks over their left arms. This alſo was the reaſon that obliged officers to have ſpontons [9], not

Traité des legions. Copie d'une lettre ecrite a monſieur le comte d'Argenſon par monſieur le marechal de Saxe.

[9] As in this treatiſe the riſe and origin of moſt of the weapons in preſent uſe among our infantry has been ſhown; it may not be unpleaſing to ſhow the origin of two other inſtruments among us, which are the halbard and drum.

The firſt is a very ancient weapon, being made uſe of by the Amazons, and afterwards by the Rhetians and Vindelicians.

Videre Rhæti bella ſub Alpibus
Druſum gerentem, & Vindelici; quibus
Mos unde deductus per omne
Tempus Amazoniâ ſecuri
Dextras obarmet.

Hor. lib. 4. ode 4.

The Rhæti and Vindelici, which inhabited the country of the preſent Griſons, Suevi and Bavarians, were ſprung from thoſe Scythian women, and received from them the cuſtom of arming themſelves with the ſecuri, which was a long pole with a kind of edg'd axe at the end, a pole-axe or halbard, which in the Latin is (Amazonia ſecuris) being perhaps called an halbard from the Lombard. In the year five hundred and ſeventy, began the king of the Lombards in Italy: the name of Lombards came either from the wearing of long beards, or that they were arm'd with long bards, which was a kind of axe. Their firſt habitation was on the further banks of the Elbe; whence coming forth, and having often changed their dwellings four hundred years together, they in the end fix'd in Pannonia in the days of the emperor Juſtinian.

Mezeray.

The Indians in North America to this day make uſe of an hatchet or axe in their wars: when they go to war, they call it taking up the hatchet.

Colden's hiſtory of the ſix nations.

The origin of the drum is likewiſe very ancient, being uſed by the Parthians. Signum Parthis in prælio non tubâ ſed tympano datur.

Juſtin lib. 41.

not being able to fire themſelves, they could hinder the better the men from doing it: when they carried fire-arms they were the firſt that fired, and the ſoldiers were ſure to imitate them. It may happen, that a ſingle ſhot in the preſence of an enemy, draws away the fire of a battalion, brigade, column, or intire line. The mareſhal ſays, he has but too many examples of this ſort to mention, which their military gentlemen cannot confute. We intirely agree in this opinion of mareſhal Saxe, having ſeen enough to be confirm'd in it.

By this time we may have a clearer notion of the defence of any poſition againſt a column ſupported by cavalry, that have no ſucceſſion of fire to anſwer that of the column, or any troops to fire upon the flanks of the

Plu. life of Craſſus. In the great victory the Parthians gained over Craſſus, when the two armies approached, and Surena the Parthian general gave the ſignal, all the field immediately rung with an hideous noiſe and terrible clamour: for the Parthians do not encourage themſelves in the battle with cornets and trumpets, but with a kind of kettle-drum mixt with ſomething like thunder, making a dead and ſolemn noiſe like the bellowing of beaſts: for they well conſidered that the ſenſe of hearing which receives the firſt impreſſions, moſt eaſily diſturbs and perverts the underſtanding. So different did they think Thu. li. 5. from the Lacedæmonians, who marched ſlowly and with many flutes to the battle: which perhaps was the origin of fifes. But the moſt ancient of all Geneſis 4. weapons is the ſword, being deſcended to us from Tubal Cain, the ſon of Lamech and Zillah.

By the Lacedæmonians marching ſlowly and with many flutes, muſt alſo comprehend ſilently; otherwiſe there might as well have been no flutes, if they were not to be heard. This ſhews what different ſentiments there has been upon this head. We are juſt told the Parthians made the field ring with an hideous noiſe and terrible clamour; and Cæſar in the cenſure he gave concerning Pompey at Pharſalia, expreſſes a double uſe of clamour and ſhouting in battle: the terror of the enemy, and the encouragement or aſſurance of ourſelves.

Cæſ. com. li. 3. civil. Eſt quædam animi incitatio, atque alacritas naturaliter innata omnibus, quæ ſtudio pugnæ incenditur; hanc non reprimere ſed augere imperatores debent: neque fruſtra antiquitus inſtitutum eſt ut ſigna undique concineret, clamorem univerſi tollerent, quibus rebus & hoſtes terreri, & ſuos incitari exiſtimaverunt.

column.

column. It may be thought difficult at firſt to make the target fire in the manner we mention'd. But the difficulty does not balance the advantage gained by it, which is the ſafety of the whole: make the men ſenſible of this, and they muſt think it, as it has been thought before, a part of a divine power openly to ſave men by troops and companies [1].

It muſt be underſtood, that bodies of troops conſiſting of about the number the target may be compoſed of, which we will ſay is ſeven, eight, or nine hundred or thereabouts: it muſt be underſteod, it is more for the intereſt of their maſters and countries they belong to, for ſuch numbers when they meet to avoid an engagement. Of what conſequence towards the good of the cauſe in general can it be, for theſe almoſt to deſtroy one another, unleſs it is to carry ſome point that tends towards the gaining a much greater, which may give a change to the war in general? Therefore it is not to be ſuppos'd, ſuch corps becauſe they accidentally meet, and the one ſhould be a little ſuperior to the other, whether by number or quality, are always to endeavour to bring on an engagement, unleſs the ſuperior had a method of attacking with hopes of making a compleat conqueſt with little or no loſs to themſelves; as we have been ſuppoſing might be done againſt a ſquare, or orb, or any ſingle figure of the like nature: for the ſame reaſons as the Syracuſians thought to ſubdue and take alive the army of Nicias and the Athenians, which was in the form of a ſquare, by attacking them at a diſtance; which, as they imagin'd, by that kind of fight in a great meaſure happen'd.

But ſhould on the contrary, the inferior body throw themſelves in ſuch poſitions for their defence, as ſhall coſt

[1] Hæc divina potentia eſt gregatim ac publice ſervare. Seneca.

the enemy that attacks them, as great a loſs of their own men as of theirs; perhaps be a drawn fight at laſt, with the loſs of half the numbers on both ſides: when there are poſitions which will make it reaſonable to ſuppoſe this might be the conſequence, if they were attack'd; for which purpoſe is the target: the commanding officer of the ſuperior force or enemy muſt think it juſtifiable, wiſe and prudent, upon well reconnoitring this body of troops, to let them purſue their march undiſturbed: that he did his maſter and country more ſervice by bringing the troops committed to his charge home ſafe and unhurt; than by laviſhing away the lives of valiant men, by leaving half of them dead on the field, with the poor ſatisfaction of having deſtroyed half the enemy alſo.

Turpin, eſſai ſur l'art de la guerre, ch. 11.

It is to be obſerved, when a general has it at his option to engage or not, he ſhould firſt conſider before he is induc'd to engage, whether the advantage that can accrue upon gaining the victory, is greater than the loſs he muſt ſuſtain in loſing it. He ſhould ſuffer neither caprice, nor falſe notions of valour, nor the vanity of diſtinguiſhing himſelf out of ſeaſon, to determine him.

Chap. 8. de ſes mem.

The reaſons Feuquiere lays down for us to guide ourſelves in this particular, to know when it is our intereſt to engage, or not; are the ſuperiority of troops over the enemy, both in number and quality. The enemy's ignorance and negligence in their encampments and marches; the neceſſity of ſuccouring a place; the certitude of freſh troops coming to join the enemy; which junction would render them ſuperior, and might give a change to the firſt plan of the campaign. A battle is to be avoided, according to Montecuculi; when the miſchief may be greater in loſing it, than the profit can be to win it; when an army is inferior to the enemy, and expecting ſuccours;

Mem. li. 1. ch. 6. art 2.

ſuccours; when the enemy has the advantage of the ground; or when it is perceived that through miſunderſtandings and diviſions among the chiefs they are ruining one another; or when there is a falling off, or breaking to pieces of the league. Comte Turpin obſerves, that we may add; when the enemy's army labours under ſome diſtemper, which renders proviſion and forage ſcarce; and the diſcouragements occaſion a deſertion among the troops. We have mentioned this fully, that we may judge the better whether the target will anſwer the chief purpoſe intended for it; which is, to be able to make ſo good a defence, that it ſhall not be the intereſt of an enemy to attack it, unleſs the diſproportion of numbers is very great. The proof will be found in the calculation of fire againſt the enemy's. Eſſai, ch. 11.

The ſquares and orb in the preceding chapters, were attacked by inferior forces. We have ſeen according to the fire they command, what a weak defence they make. The orb conſiſted of ſeven hundred and twenty men; was attacked by two ſquadrons, making three hundred, (part of them diſmounted): and if the ſtrength of poſitions may be judged by the quantity of fire they command; the target will be found three times as ſtrong as that orb, though conſiſting of the ſame number of men; being able to make as good a defence againſt nine hundred, as the orb did againſt three.

It muſt be remembered, when cavalry and infantry together attack the target; the wings being three times as large as the flanks, are always to apply their attention to the part of the enemy moſt to be dreaded; as the flanks do to the other. Should the enemy diſmount one or two ſquadrons only, out of ſuch a number as ſix, the wings then preſerve themſelves wholly for the ſquadrons

not

not diſmounted. But on the contrary, ſhould the greater part of the enemy diſmount, the wings then prepare themſelves for the enemy diſmounted; and the two flanks watch the remaining ſquadrons as in this plan; (plan 12.) where four of the ſix are diſmounted and attack the target in the following manner. Four ſquadrons, conſiſting of an hundred and fifty in each, make ſix hundred men; thirty of which muſt be allowed to hold their horſes, which will be twenty to every man: there will remain five hundred and ſeventy to be thrown into any poſition for fire-arms, and two ſquadrons to ſupport them. Theſe troops thus diſpoſed, we will ſuppoſe, attack the body of the target in the manner the orb was attacked, by two columns; making a real and ſham attack; the real conſiſting of five hundred, the ſham of the other ſeventy, and the ſquadrons to be diſpoſed ſuitably. To anſwer this diſpoſition, the body takes care to have it's rear oppoſite the largeſt column; which, with two platoons of each of the wings, make five hundred and ſixty-four men; by which calculation that column receives the fire of ſixty-four muſkets more than it gives. The ſham attack being oppoſite the front face: we have advanced a platoon from each of the wings between that face and ſmall column, to engage with that column; conſequently that little column, conſiſting of ſeventy, will have from thoſe two platoons, the fire of ſeventy-eight; which is the number they conſiſt of, being eight more than the column. We have taken theſe platoons from the wings, that the attention of no part of the body might be taken off from the main object of danger, which is the great column: in this ſituation the front might face to the rear. The ſquadrons might be diſpoſed in the rear of the columns, or on the oppoſite ſides as here; for being leſs to be feared than the

the infantry, wherever they are, they fall under the cognizance of the flanks; whoſe whole buſineſs is to watch them narrowly, and keep their fire intirely for them: which gives the body and wings more liberty to make uſe of theirs againſt the columns, being in a good meaſure free from the apprehenſion of the cavalry. The ſquadrons here being oppoſite the wings, muſt charge full againſt the fire of the flanks; after that, break through the wings, which would be impediments enough to give any part of the body time to be in good order to receive their broken charge; notwithſtanding the movements and wheelings of the platoons to fire againſt the column. In this ſituation the wings and flanks ſhould be oppoſite the center of the ſide faces. Upon particular occaſions the horns might be detached, as when the wings and flanks want aſſiſtance more than the body: a horn might alſo fall upon the flank of a ſquadron that charged a wing. Perhaps it would have been better in this plan to have kept the wings and flanks compleat, and to have oppoſed the horns againſt the ſham attack: then there is the ſame quantity of fire againſt the enemy, and the exterior platoon of the wing, ſhould it form triangle, might be covered by the flank, and be ſix deep; whereas ſhould now the two platoons of the wing and flank be obliged to form triangle, they would be but three deep. In this battalion every platoon conſiſts of thirty-nine men; and eighteen ſupernumeraries, or odd men, which are added to the platoon that was only two deep in the hollow, as was before ſaid. Thus it is plain to ſee, ſhould both ſides act up to their duty, in all probability after a great ſlaughter, one ſide might be as much intitled to the victory as the other; which ſerves to prove what we intended: that the difficulty (according to the calculation

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of fire) would be as great for theſe ſix ſquadrons, conſiſting of nine hundred men, to beat this target of ſeven hundred and twenty; as it was for the orb conſiſting of the ſame number, to reſiſt the two ſquadrons, or three hundred men: and that it ſeldom can be the intereſt of ſuch a force as here deſcribed, to attack another at ſo dear a rate; when the troops attacked can make ſo good a defence as the target. This is one of the ſtrongeſt reaſons to induce an enemy to let troops in ſuch poſitions purſue their march undiſturbed.

It has been ſhewn, that the target commands a ſucceſſion of fire to anſwer the enemy's, ſhould they attack in that manner. As there is now a defence found out ſuitable to that ſort of attack; the probability is not ſo great as it was, that the enemy will chuſe that method. Wherefore, we will ſuppoſe the ſame target attack'd by ſix hundred foot and one ſquadron, ſeven hundred and fifty in all; thirty more than the target, and in a poſition the reverſe to a column; that is, by a ſtraight line. We will alſo ſuppoſe the enemy, to deceive the target, firſt advances only an hundred and fifty, eſcorted by the ſquadron, and conceals the four hundred and fifty in a neighbouring wood or vale, till the target has formed itſelf in a fighting poſition, for the hundred and fifty and ſquadron, by having the rear towards them, with the wings and flanks on each ſide.

When the target is in this order, and not expecting an enemy from any other quarter; the four hundred and fifty march out of their place of concealment, or ambuſcade, and advance in a ſtraight line to attack the front face. In this ſituation, ſhould the body not change it's poſition, the ſide faces and rear muſt engage the hundred and fifty, whilſt the flanks watch the ſquadron; and the

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two wings and front (which may advance a little) the remaining four hundred and fifty, and the target may have as much hopes of ſucceeding as the enemy. The enemy's hundred and fifty, having two hundred and forty-ſeven to engage; their four hundred and fifty, three hundred and ninety; and the reſerved fire of one of the flanks for the ſquadron, and the other for any preſſing occaſion. By this, it is plain the diſtribution of fire is not quite ſuitable to the enemy's: though the rear and ſides of the body command more than the leſſer body of the enemy by ninety-ſeven; the greater body of the enemy commands ſixty more than the wings and front: if one of the flanks is reckoned, there will be thirty-nine more againſt the enemy: the platoon in the center is reckoned here with the front. By this calculation it is evident, though there is no great diſproportion in the numbers of both ſides, it would have been better for the body to have had it's rear towards the largeſt part of infantry; becauſe it could then diſtribute it's fire in proportions more adequate to the enemy's: for if the enemy to be dreaded moſt had been oppoſite the rear, the whole body of the target could have engaged them with one or both wings, if required: had this greater force advanced againſt one of the ſide faces, inſtead of the front, the body might have edged round ſuch a ſmall part of a circle with no very great difficulty, ſo as to bring the rear oppoſite it without ſhutting to wheel on the center. Though at preſent there is no great difference: the body muſt take care to guard againſt this ſort of deceit; otherwiſe the enemy may improve it until it becomes dangerous. Suppoſing inſtead of one hundred and fifty and the ſquadron, the odd fifty and the ſquadron firſt attack the rear; and the hundred is added to the four hundred and fifty: this makes the

diſproportion ſtill greater; for the rear and ſides cannot be diſpoſed any how to engage the troops oppoſite the front, when there are troops oppoſite the rear. The horns might upon ſuch an extremity be added to the front, by wheeling till it is even with it, which would be a conſiderable addition of fire; yet ſtill it would not be equal to that great body, being now five hundred and fifty; and the wings, front, horns, and platoon in the center, only four hundred and forty-two: conſequently, though one of the flanks is added, which is thirty-nine more, the enemy attacks the front of the target with a ſuperior fire of ſixty-nine, which is a great difference in ſuch ſmall numbers; even this might be improved by the enemy; and if it is already dangerous, might be made more ſo; as all the infantry might advance againſt this face. Suppoſing the enemy attacked the front with the ſame number formed in a column; it is a queſtion whether the target could make ſo good a defence againſt it, as the ſtraight line, though the two wings advanced upon the flanks of the column.

We have mentioned this to ſhew the neceſſity to have the rear againſt the greateſt part of the enemy; and the uſe of the body upon ſuch extremities being able to reverſe; that is, to bring the rear where the front is, and front where the rear, without ſhutting to wheel on the center; and then opening again, or edging round as was mentioned; both which take up much time, and the latter very difficult to do; eſpecially ſo large a part of a circle as is required when the front is attacked. Wherefore, when there is a neceſſity to change the whole order of the target; either a wing or flank ſhould firſt advance againſt any party that attacks the rear; according to the ſize of it; which might generally be ſuppoſed in

in theſe circumſtances to be a ſham attack: for unleſs the body is clear from being ruffled by any fire; it is not at liberty to perform any movements well; much more thoſe that require a nicety. However, when it is quite free, opened, and faced outwards, it reverſes in the following manner.

The platoon in the hollow, firſt marches cloſe to the rear of the center platoon of the front face, facing with that platoon; then let the half of the ſide faces next the front, face inwards; the rear face and platoon upon the right and left of the center platoon of the front face (plan 11. fig. 2.) faces inwards alſo; the center remaining faſt: then wheel the ſide faces the fourth part of a circle upon their centers; and let all the other platoons at the ſame time as they ſtand faced, march the length of a platoon: the whole then halts, and faces outwards immediately. By which the center platoon of the front face makes the rear: the platoon that was the rear with the platoons that join it on each ſide the front: and the ſides by their little wheel, will ſtand in the ſame oblique poſitions to the part that is now the rear; as they did before to the rear that is now become the front. The platoons upon the right and left of the front, muſt firſt incline towards one another after they are faced inwards; otherwiſe they hinder the wheeling of the ſide faces: they muſt extend themſelves as the ſide faces give them room, by wheeling on the center. Whilſt this is doing, half the ſides, the platoon that makes the rear, and the platoon upon the right and left of the front, are faced outwards; that the enemy can be oppoſite no face, but half of it at leaſt is fronting them. The wings remain triangles, except the one ordered to advance for any particular purpoſe, as here. They muſt, with the flanks, be

very much upon their guard. Before the body is ordered to reverſe, every part ſhould be made to know the new ground they are to take up, and then it is done in an inſtant.

When done, the platoons that were the horns, when only two deep, being by the reverſe next the rear, are made three deep again, by the rear rank of the platoons that are become the horns, after the reverſe, ſlipping into the body by the rear of the ſide faces, and joining the rear of the platoons two deep. It is better to compleat theſe platoons in this manner, than at ſuch a time to take the two ranks from the platoon in the rear of the rear face, that originally belonged to them; and compleating that platoon afterwards with the two ranks that ſlipped into the hollow of the body, after the reverſe; which would take up more time, and be more confuſed: and a more material reaſon, is to have the platoon in the hollow compleat the whole time.

When the body has finiſhed and is well ſettled, and faced outwards; the wings may reverſe; by marching from that part which is now the rear of the body, to take up their commanding poſition as they were in before the reverſe; which is at ſome diſtance upon the right and left of the front face; and a little more advanced. To do this, they march directly forward. The wings by reverſing, make their rear their front rank, or interior their exterior when they are in triangles, by halting the center platoons when they come to their ground; and wheeling the others round till they form triangles; by their exterior flanks joining, and making an angle oppoſite the center of the center platoons; the whole then face outwards; the officers advancing to the exterior line: and they defend the body as they did before. The

flanks

flanks and body defend the wings whilſt they reverſe; as they did the body: the flanks then reverſe themſelves. In the performance of theſe movements, every man of the target changes his place, except the center man of the ſide faces of the body that are the hinges thoſe faces wheel upon; and yet it may be done quick, and almoſt imperceptible to the enemy; if the whole is appriſed of it, and know how to do it; the ſpace of ground every man of the body goes over being ſo very ſmall; though the whole is ſo intirely changed by it. The wings may reverſe at their leiſure, as there is no nicety like the body required: the nicety of the body performing this change is of that ſort, as not to be attempted in the preſence of an enemy near; unleſs the officers and ſoldiers have practiſed it before, enough to be ſo perfect in it, as for every part, though all at once disjointed, to join again immediately in their new ſtations. When this is not the caſe, the body muſt either ſtand it's ground, or ſhut, wheel, and open again, being the ſafer methods for raw troops.

We will now finiſh what relates to the body, with one more obſervation: which is, ſhould the enemy march againſt it in a column, and at a nearer approach form up for the attack into a ſtraight line; the ſides, with a very ſmall wheel towards the enemy, can ſuit themſelves to the enemy's line, without loſing the form of the body: for making the rear the hinge to wheel upon, the two ſides open and ſhut like a compaſs: the front ſerving like a croſs bar to keep them more or leſs open, by being more or leſs retired towards the rear: and by advancing to it's firſt place again, is a guide to the ſides to reſume their firſt diſtances alſo. The front face of the body being always to be looked upon as the front; the ſide face, wing, and

and flank upon the right of the front, when faced outwards, are to be underſtood always the right ſide, wing, or flank; and the other the left; though by any accident the front ſhould be ordered to face inward. The body fighting chiefly by the rear, to prevent any miſtake, ſhould have the colours always flying in the center platoon of the front face, whether open or ſhut; and drums in the rear of that platoon when open, unleſs otherwiſe ordered: but when ſhut, upon the flanks of the center platoon of the front; and when the body opens, they enter at the flanks of the front and ſide faces. Then the body making it's chief reſiſtance in the rear, will be no more aſtoniſhing than many living creatures, who can bite ſhould you attack them in front, though they carry their ſting in their tails.

Thus we have ſeen ſeveral forms and methods the body of the target has recourſe to for it's defence. There has been enough ſaid to give an idea of what is intended by thoſe forms and methods, and of the body in general. Wherefore we will now ſay ſomething more relating to the wings: as we know how the body may be diſpoſed, we will alſo endeavour to find out in what manner the wings may be farther made uſe of, for their own ſafety and defence, as well as to act in concert with the body and flanks; ſo as they may mutually aſſiſt one another with the moſt ſucceſs. We will afterwards conclude this volume with ſhewing the farther uſe of the flanks.

The different changes and forms the body and wings have already put on, will be thought perhaps full ſufficient for common underſtandings. But it muſt be remembered, theſe changes and forms do not require every common ſoldier abſolutely to burthen his memory with, more than it is requiſite for them to be acquainted with every

every diſpoſition an army can be drawn in; notwithſtanding there has been no change or form explained; but what is ſuitable to ſome method the enemy can take to attack: in ſhort, it is the method of the enemy's attack produces the change in the body and wings to anſwer it. Wherefore it would be unjuſt to condemn theſe changes and forms, as burthening and confounding the memory of the ſoldiers; when there are the ſame methods and forms to attack a ſquare or orb, though thoſe figures are obliged to continue ſquare and orbicular, having no change or new form to have recourſe to like the target, ſuitable to the attack of the enemy. It ought to be rather ſaid, the perſon who burthens his memory leaſt, is the perſon leaſt proper to command the body, wings, or flanks. It is ſufficient if the commanders of the ſix ſeparate bodies form a right judgement and underſtanding of their ſeparate commands, with a good notion of the whole beſides. Then the principal thing required of the common men, will be a quick and ready obedience.

The commander in chief has the direction of the whole target, or eighteen platoons: the next under him, the body, or ten or eleven: the two next eldeſt, have each of them the command of a wing, which is three platoons: and the two eldeſt grenadier officers the flanks, being a platoon each: and the next eldeſt, the platoon or heart within the body. Thus the commander in chief, like the governor of a town, overlooks and directs the whole; and diſtributes the leſſer forts to be defended by officers he judges moſt ſuitable to the defence: and ſhould they be equal to the truſt committed to them, they will find that ten, three, and one, the number of platoons theſe diviſions, or ſeparate commands conſiſt of, are to be

changed,

changed, varied, and moved about, quicker, eaſier, ſafer, and with leſs confuſion, than if the ſix ſeparate bodies were ſwallowed up in one great body; whether a ſquare, orb, or any other figure. They will find alſo theſe eighteen or nineteen platoons diſpoſed in theſe ſix diviſions, become ſtronger and more capable of making a defence and reſiſtance, than in one; for the ſame reaſons as the fortified town holds out longer by the help of out-works, than it could poſſibly do, if the body of the place was aggrandized by the out-works being taken away, and formed up in it: that is, though there was the ſame quantity of matter, only diſpoſed in one great work.

It is incumbent on the commanding officer of each wing, to conſider with himſelf, the true meaning and intention of his wing; in what manner it may be made the moſt of, with regard to the defence of the wing itſelf, then to the defence of the body and flanks. As theſe wings are to act like two arms equidiſtant from the center of a man's body; or two forts equidiſtant from the center of a fortified town: it is neceſſary (if expected they ſhould act with moſt propriety and with the beſt advantage) that they obſerve an exact equidiſtance from the center of the body (unleſs otherwiſe particularly ordered) this being their proper ſituation. To do this, one wing muſt guide itſelf by the other; and the eldeſt officer commanding the right wing, that wing is a guide to the left; is guided itſelf by the body, unleſs the enemy, or the greateſt part, is oppoſite the left; then it falls to the diſcretion of the officer that commands that wing; which at that time is a guide to the right, and is guided by the body and enemy oppoſite to it. The different changes of the wings might be ſignified by beat

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of drum; for which a drum ſhould attend the commanding officer of each wing.

The diſtance the wings obſerve from the body, was ſaid to be ſo far from the front and ſides, as to give them liberty, as well as themſelves, to make all their wheelings and fire clear of one another; to be ſo far from the exterior points of the horns, as to be able to expand themſelves, and fire when expanded, to the right, left, front or rear; without endangering, or being endangered by the body: that whichever way the wing fired, the body might fire at the ſame time with ſafety; whether the platoons of the ſides fired direct before them, or wheeled to the rear. To find out this diſtance, let the commander of each wing obſerve to keep his wing more advanced, and more wide from the points of the horns when open, at leaſt the ſpace of his wing when expanded. (plan 9. o fig. 1.) This is the diſtance generally to be obſerved when there are no field-pieces; but when there are, and they are placed between the wings and points of the horns, the wings then muſt be at a greater diſtance from thoſe points. And the cannon muſt obſerve that diſtance between the wing and body, as to hinder the wheeling and firing of neither. When the wing from a triangle is ordered to expand, it expands by the platoon that ſtands the way it is to expand, keeping it's ground or going to the right about if required; and the other two wheeling up to be in a ſtraight line and facing with it. As the wing in a triangle fires three different ways; ſo from a triangle, it can expand as many; and by going to the right about, fire five different ways (plan 9. 1, 2, 3, of fig. 2.) without interrupting or being interrupted by the body. Whenever from a ſtraight line the wings form triangles; the platoons which wheel,

muſt meet exactly oppoſite the center half file of the platoon that ſtood faſt; otherwiſe the triangle will not be equiangular; nor will the wings flank and defend ſo reciprocally as they have in their power to do, when the triangles are exactly formed. The platoons of the triangles that defend the ſide faces of the body, may incline a little with thoſe faces; by which they flank more direct, and defend the rear as well as the ſide faces, by their ſhot croſſing at a diſtance oppoſite and beyond the center of the rear face (n): and the interior faces of the triangles reciprocally flank and defend at a more proper diſtance each other as well as the front of the body. But all this is left to the diſcretion of the commanders, who judge according to circumſtances and the ſituation of the enemy.

When the body wheels on the center, the wings not to loſe their commanding poſition veer round with it: ſhould it wheel to the left; the left wing marches as before, but the platoon of the right wing that defends the front, marches by platoon 'till it is in the ſame poſition when the body halts, as it was when the body begun to march: the other two platoons open at the oppoſite angle, and move by half files; and when the platoon that marches by platoon halts in the ſame poſition it was before, the others cloſing again, will be in the ſame poſition alſo. (plan 10. s.) If the body wheels to the right, the platoon of the left wing that defends the front marches by platoon; the others by half files, by opening as the right did before. During theſe motions of the body and wings, the flank next the enemy either ſtands it's ground, or advances a little to cover the whole (o). Should either of the wings, when they are firſt formed from the body, have only young officers with them, the youngeſt

youngeſt of each ſhould take the firſt proper occaſion to change with the third and fourth eldeſt of the regiment: the wings being of ſo great conſequence as to require judgement and experience to command them. However, there ſeldom can be an occaſion for theſe changes; the ſecond and ſeventeenth platoon being with the wings, two of the eldeſt officers are alſo, according to the preſent eſtabliſhed method of diſpoſing the officers. To make the moſt of their fire, each wing conſiſting but of three platoons, which are only three fires, if they fire by platoon according to the common method: the commander of each ſhould divide his wing into ſix fires: by this diviſion, he is not more obliged to make ſix fires with his wing, though he has it in his power ſhould he find occaſion, as he frequently might, was the enemy's intention by ſmall parties to draw away his fire; in theſe circumſtances they defend with more certainty, both the body and themſelves; by having his wing in ſix fires, he has it alſo at the ſame time in three, or in one great fire; and can occaſionally uſe whichever is moſt ſuitable. This increaſe of fires he can eaſily make by firing by demi-platoons; as we ſuppoſe to every platoon of this battalion, at leaſt one officer, one ſerjeant, and one corporal; therefore there will be no part without a commander.

We can now judge a little the defence the wings can make, being able to be detached either in part or entire, under the protection of the body; as upon the flanks of any kind of column when thought proper. When they are in triangles; either of the faces or platoons becomes the center upon any occaſion, by wheeling up even with it the other two; by this little wheel the whole wing is brought in an inſtant to fire any way; and wheeling

back again reduces the line to a triangle in as ſhort a time. It was obſerved when the body ſhut, halted; the wings formed triangles of courſe. When the body is open with a ſudden enemy of horſe and foot on every ſide; which muſt neceſſarily leave it uncertain at their firſt approach of the method they intend to attack; in this uncertainty, or indeed in any, the wings ſhould be in triangles; becauſe when they are in theſe forms, there is a regular and reciprocal defence with the body and wings. The exterior face of the triangle will be ſtrengthened, as will preſently be ſhewn, when we ſpeak of the flanks. The wings ſhould continue in theſe poſitions, 'till the commander determines upon ſome certainty; when there is an occaſion, the wings are changed in an inſtant. The ſtrength of the wings in theſe poſitions, is not to be conſidered equal only to the ſtrength of three or four platoons ſtanding by themſelves; more than we ſhould compare the defence of a little fort, erected entirely by itſelf, to a fort of the ſame form and bigneſs, but communicative with a large fortification. This latter makes a much longer reſiſtance, and becomes more difficult to an enemy, and ſecure to itſelf, than the other, by the fire from the large works behind it; as the wing does by the fire from the body. However, when there is that uncertainty, as was obſerved might often be the caſe, and the danger is apprehended to be equal from the enemy's infantry and cavalry: it is then the commander's buſineſs to form as well as he can his defence equal to both alſo: this is the poſition which puts it in his power ſo to do; expoſing no opening to the cavalry, and loſing no fire againſt the infantry: and by covering the body at ſuch a time with the wings, would be to gain a ſmall advantage, running into a greater diſadvantage: it would be

ſtrengthening

ſtrengthening it againſt the charge of a ſquadron, with the loſs of a conſiderable quantity of fire; when in all probability the fire would be moſt wanted: for a ſquadron can charge no part in this poſition, but what is either ſix deep, and conſequently a double fire in front; or three deep with a ſingle fire in front and flank. But when the wings cover, they can't ſhift to the right and left, to let the face of the body fire; when there is a ſucceſſion of fire from the enemy's infantry, as they can againſt cavalry where there is no fire; though formed in triangles, can expand as often as they pleaſe, to fire which way they pleaſe. For ſhould they continue expanded, a ſquadron would find the difficulty next to an impoſſibility to charge either of them in that ſituation with hopes of ſucceſs.

Thus the intention of the wings, is to vary and change about as the courſe of the action requires. As we have ſhewn againſt cavalry only; they cover the body ſo as to give it double ſtrength, by giving a large quantity of fire, and by being of a double thickneſs. Againſt infantry only, they can be ſtraight lines, or whatever form is moſt proper to make uſe of their fire. Againſt cavalry and infantry together; they can as well as the body, by the wheeling of a platoon, be ſuited to the charge of horſe: by the wheeling of a platoon to the attack of foot. That the principal thing to be conſidered, is to put officers of diſcernment at the head of them: as the defence they make depends in a great meaſure upon the adroitneſs of thoſe who conduct them. What is obſerved of field expeditions, is applicable to field fights; they muſt be left to the diſcretion of the officers commanding: no one being able to foretell what may ariſe during the courſe of an action. As the wings to the body are like arms to a man; who with every freſh antagoniſt is perhaps obliged

Mar. Turenne, Mem.

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to uſe them in a different manner, ſuitable to the different method he is engaged: ſo muſt theſe wings, for the ſame reaſon, in all probability, in every different action be made uſe of in a different manner. This is the true meaning of the wings. To make the target compleat; we ſee here two other independent bodies, conſiſting of a platoon each, formed by the grenadiers as far as they go, of equal ſize with the other platoons, which are called the flanks, being the moſt exterior from the center of the target. Theſe little diviſions may be ſaid to be offenſive as well as defenſive; their buſineſs being to ruffle and annoy the enemy as much as poſſible, by their repeated little fires. Being the huſſars, videttes, and forlorn hope of the target; the eyes that are to be continually upon the watch for it's repoſe and ſecurity. The uſe of them is beſt explained by Turpin. If an army, whether by the ſmallneſs of the number that compoſes it, or the diſadvantages of the ſituation, or any other reaſon, is under a neceſſity of being upon the defence, it may, by the aſſiſtance of a good body of huſſars, be enabled to act offenſively; becauſe the enemy will be neceſſarily fatigued by continual detachments, ſhe will be obliged to make to oppoſe them. And the huſſars, whether in great or ſmall numbers, will harraſs and oblige the enemy to be continually changing their poſitions; and taking freſh precautions to ſecure and defend themſelves againſt the alarms and diſquietudes theſe troops will be ſure to give them. This is the true buſineſs and ſenſe of the flanks; only in a leſs degree. And as the wings are guards to the body; ſo are the flanks to the wings; by keeping off all irregulars from drawing away their attention from their chief object. As the wings were defended by the body, ſo are the flanks by the wings: for

Tom. 2. li. 5. ch. 2.

for upon extremities they fly to them as to a bulwark. The officers that command the flanks, are to conſider the true meaning and uſe of them; as the officers did of the body and wings. When there is cavalry as well as infantry; the flanks being only a third part as large as the wings, watch the part of the enemy leaſt to be dreaded, whether cavalry or infantry, unleſs otherways particularly ordered: as the wings do the enemy to be dreaded moſt. By theſe methods no little muſquetry is able to annoy the whole nor ſquadron to charge, but through the fire of ſome prepared body in reſerve for it. This it is that makes the flanks ſo uſeful, giving both body and wings an opportunity to fire more undiſturbed at the infantry; and be more properly prepared for the reception of cavalry; knowing there are theſe two bodies wholly employed, in watching the leſſer objects of danger; whilſt the body and wings find employment enough with the greater. For which reaſon each flank is here in three diviſions, though without intervals: that the officer who commands it, may move with the whole flank, or detach one of theſe little diviſions; which will be a few half files wherever he pleaſes, and as often; with a ſerjeant or corporal by turns. The farther buſineſs of the flanks being to harraſs the enemy in ſuch a manner, by frequent firing upon them with theſe little parties, that they might not be able to advance for their grand attack, even at their firſt ſetting out unruffled: but this is to be done diſcretionally, according to the diſpoſition and quality of the enemy; when it is of that ſort as not to require the flanks to keep their whole fire in reſerve for any particular occaſion: then it will be found, theſe little ſallies will operate with almoſt the ſame effect as they do at a real ſiege; where nothing incommodes the beſiegers

Muller's fortification.

beſiegers in making their approaches more, than frequent little ſallies from the beſieged: for though they retire as ſoon as they have delivered their fire, it puts the beſiegers in that hurry and confuſion, that they ſeldom can be brought to work much after it for that night, and conſequently interrupts and prolongs the ſiege. There is another uſe in making theſe little ſallies with the flanks; they will make the enemy (eſpecially cavalry) more apt to determine their attack or charge, without endeavouring to amuſe with ſham attacks; in order to make the real more effectual. The proper place for the flanks, when the wings are expanded, are upon the exterior point of each wing, but not joining; (plan 9. fig. 2. k 1.) When the wings form triangles, they fill up the places of the exterior platoons, that wheel'd to form the exterior faces of the triangles. But when the wings cover the body, they fill the places of the center platoons of the wings when expanded, to be a little nearer the body; then move according to the motions of the enemy and exteriors, and retire to their firſt diſtance again, when the wings fall off from the body. Againſt cavalry only, the flanks being the firſt to fire, are for that purpoſe more advanced, moving according to the motions of the ſquadrons, in ſuch a manner as not to be hurt by the fire from the exteriors; and to be able afterwards to retire to their firſt place again, or cloſe to the angles next the front, whichever is required. (g. pl. 8.) The flanks as well as the exteriors ſhould incline their firelocks when they fire, towards the part of the ſquadron they think covers the face that is to receive the charge. When the wings are in triangles, the flanks by their ſituation, and by facing the way required, can fire either with the center, or exterior face of the wing, (u u u pl. 9.) and can alſo wheel backwards

wards or forwards, making the half file next the triangle the hinge to wheel upon; conſequently can double the face next the body, or exterior face of the triangle whenever it is neceſſary; when a ſquadron threatens that face, which is the moſt expoſed of any: though a ſquadron can never expect any advantage by charging the wing in that poſition: as it muſt charge againſt ſix deep, and only the breadth of a ſingle platoon; conſequently not more than ſeven or eight cavaliers, which is the breadth of that platoon, would add any help towards the breaking of the wing: the other parts of the ſquadron, from the force they come with, meeting with no reſiſtance like the few oppoſite this face, muſt ſeparate, and fall in an irregular and confuſed manner under the fire of the body, and oppoſite wing and flank; which in this ſituation ſtand in oblique lines to it: therefore no good can be expected from ſuch a hazardous charge. The wing with a flank being little more than a fifth part of the whole, it cannot be the intereſt of any ſquadron to charge againſt it: ſhould it be ſo fortunate as to ruin this wing, it muſt be with the ruin of the ſquadron; without hurting the body, oppoſite wing and flank. But ſhould the face covered by the flank, deliver their fire againſt the ſquadron at ſome diſtance, and beat down two or three horſes, or their riders; it would ſo diſorder the reſt, in all probability they would be afraid to perſevere againſt bayonets ſix deep; and the fire of the three foremoſt ranks, which is the whole flank in reſerve. Thus the flanks of the battle, which (as Montecuculi obſerves) ſhould be our principal attention to make ſecure, can be ſix deep; when moſt of the other parts are but three, with the body open. There has been already ſhewn two ways of firing ſix deep, either of which

li. 1. ch. 2.

may ſerve here. That a charge in this quarter is nothing ſo dangerous as it appears: in ſhort, the chief danger would be the miſchief that might ariſe from the ſoldiers fears, that form this wing and flank, more than in the real thing to be feared [2]. Fear operates upon common underſtandings, more or leſs as they hear or ſee, without penetrating into the true reaſon or cauſe of what occaſions the fear, more than what is wafted by ſounds to the auricular, or ſtrikes the ocular ſenſe by external objects. It is often in war, as in love: the eyes are firſt vanquiſhed. It would be difficult to make the men who form this wing and flank ſenſible, in what manner their ſafety lay in the body that was behind them: their fears would be ſure to ariſe from the danger they conceived, by ſeeing themſelves a ſmall part of the whole, detached from the main body, and next the enemy; very far from thinking their ſafety conſiſted chiefly in their being detach'd in this manner. In this light it might at firſt appear to common underſtandings. But to a wiſer diſcernment, it may be thought as it has been before: that what appears hazardous and is not, ſeldom fails to be a wiſe choice. And the moſt ordinary cauſe of people's miſtakes, is their being too much frightened at the preſent danger; and not enough at that which is remote.

Mem. de cardinal de Retz, vol. 1. 1648-9. Vol. 3. 1651.

It may be obſerved, when the wing forms triangle; the angle of the triangle is compoſed of two half files meeting, or ſix men; conſequently when a flank covers a face of the triangle, there is another half file added to the angle: the angle now conſiſting of nine

[2] Plus in metuendo eſt mali, quam in illo ipſo quod timetur.
Turbant homines, non res; ſed quas de rebus habent opiniones.
Cic. ad Torquatum. Epict. Enchirid.

men

men might be in danger, ſhould the enemy attack in that part; but the ſituation of the triangle here takes away the danger, being well defended by the body; and almoſt impoſſible to be come at. However, we will here obſerve, that all bodies except circular, have angles: though the angles of a ſquare are covered, the angles of the grenadiers that cover them are expoſed, being defended (as here) by the faces only of the ſquare. Wherefore, whenever the angles of any body of troops are charged, as many half files as are thought neceſſary face to the angle, and flatten a little as they find occaſion: which is to be obſerved in the target.

When the wing is ordered to expand, and has at the ſame time the exterior face covered by the flank; if that face ſtands it's ground, by being the center when it expands, the flank may ſtand it's ground alſo: or ſhould that face move, may move with it, or into it's firſt place before the wing formed triangle, whichever is thought moſt requiſite.

Thus we ſee the uſe of the flanks. When a ſquadron is oppoſite one wing only, the flank then from the other may be detached to harraſs and annoy it as much as poſſible by firing as abovementioned. As theſe flanks are little independent parts, the body and wings are not ruined by their ruin; as there would be then no opening left to the enemy, and all the fire in the ſame directions. However, it will be found very difficult to ruin even theſe little bodies: becauſe they muſt not be detached ſo far as to be intercepted by the enemy before they can retire after they have fired; though it will not be eaſy to intercept them; for being ſmall, they move about nimble and with leſs confuſion; conſequently can make theſe frequent advances and retreats with more readineſs: and

are therefore better adapted for this ſort of Parthian fighting [3], which is, when detached in this manner, to fire and fly, to the wings, when they ſtand off from the body, and to the body when covered. That as the wings may be called the arms; ſo are the flanks the feet. Neither can it be worth the attention of a ſquadron to purſue a few half files, or even a whole flank: though no ſquadron can bear repeated fires from theſe little bodies. We will here obſerve, that the target is a poſition calculated only for a ſmall number, not exceeding much a thouſand Becauſe when the number that compoſes the whole is ſmall, the parts will be ſmall in proportion. And the motions every part makes, being occaſional, and perhaps frequent, to anſwer thoſe of the enemy: when made by ſmall bodies, are more ready and quick. Was a wing very long that covered a face, a ſquadron would have a better chance of charging before the face was covered, than when both face and wing are ſhort. It is the ſame with every other movement. But the wings being ſhort, are more active and eaſier managed: as a weapon of a moderate length may be uſed with more dexterity and ſkill than a very long one.

Wherefore, when it happens that a regiment is larger than ordinary, and it is thought the platoons will conſiſt of too many half files for the conveniency and quick motions of the target: it might be contrived to have this greater number be, inſtead of an incumbrance an additional ſtrength. The target before us conſiſts of ſeven hundred and twenty men, which gives thirteen half files to every platoon, and eighteen over; which are far from

[3] Fidentemque fugâ Parthum, verſiſque ſagittis.
See Craſſus's defeat by the Parthians.

Vir. Geor. li. 3.
Plu. life of Craſſus.

ſmall

ſmall platoons; had they many more half files they would make too large openings in their wheelings, and would take too much time in their ſeveral movements. Wherefore, we will ſhew in what manner theſe inconveniencies may be avoided, though the target conſiſted of more than a thouſand men, without adding more half files to the platoons. It is not many years ſince moſt nations drew up their regiments four deep; ſome to this day do the ſame: as four deep can fire together, there is no fire loſt; and an extraordinary line is a great advantage to any poſition intended for the ſame uſe as the target. This extraordinary line gives two hundred and forty men. To ſtrengthen the target further, and to take up more men, we will make each platoon that forms the flanks, as large as two platoons and an half. As ſoon as the target is formed, a fifth part from each is detached to make the platoon in the hollow; each flank will then remain as large as two platoons. By this we get the additional ſtrength in effect of three platoons, or one hundred and fifty-ſix men; which with the two hundred and forty, make three hundred and ninety-ſix; conſequently the target will then conſiſt of eleven hundred and ſixteen, though every platoon (except the flanks) has but thirteen half files. The advantage gained by this, is an intire rank with the platoon in the hollow, without weakening the horns, and a double number of huſſars, as we will call them; which though divided in three diviſions, will make their little ſallies or detached parties to be more reſpected: when not divided, they can cover (if required) not only a face of the triangle, but the exterior angles alſo, which is very material (w, plan 9. fig. 2.) When there are not troops ſufficient to do all this: the flanks only,

only, or flanks and wings might be ſtrengthened in this manner, and the body might remain three deep. However, the target muſt then be formed in a different manner; which as the proper places and meaning of every part is known, we will ſhew. The grenadiers form the flanks as before; the three platoons next to them form triangles immediately; the four center platoons of the battalion ſtand their ground to form the front of the body; the three upon their right and the three upon their left move by half files as before, till they form a triangle: when the triangle is compleated, the platoon upon the right of the front face falls into the triangle to form the rear face; the ſides opening to make room for it; the three other platoons of the front, retire back far enough to make the horns. This method is much quicker than the other, though not quite ſo regular, nor does it give us the choice of the three angles to make the rear face. The exact diſtances of the ſeveral parts muſt be ſettled as they find opportunity. By forming in this manner, the wings and flanks may be ſtrengthened, being made with the eight exterior platoons of the battalion, which might be four deep when the others are but three: or the platoons which make the flanks being larger than the reſt.

Thus we have been endeavouring to prove, what we ſet out with. That the target was a more eligible poſition than a ſquare, orb, or any ſingle figure of this ſize, and formed for the ſame purpoſes againſt a prepared enemy; by commanding all it's fire, and loſing no material advantage neceſſary to the nature of the action. Nothing more than this can be expected from any diſpoſition. It is from the diſpoſition we ought to form

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our judgement of the merits, more than from the ſucceſs of the action: [4] chance and fortune having too great a ſhare in all actions for any diſpoſition abſolutely to command ſucceſs. Troops may be ſaid to be well diſpoſed for action, when they are all capable of being brought to fight; at the ſame time lend and borrow aſſiſtance from one another. We calculate the ſtrength of an army by the number of troops; upon a ſuppoſition they will all fight (if required): wherefore, if being ill diſpoſed at the time of action, half are excluded from lending their aſſiſtance; the calculation made of the ſtrength of ſuch an army, will be double to what is found at the time of action; conſequently, an army ſo

[4] Cicero reckons among the imperatoriæ vitutes (felicitas) good fortune: this may be called the peculiar gift of heaven. Sylla profeſſed himſelf better born to fortune than to the wars; acknowledging his happieſt victories to have proceeded from his moſt heedleſs and unadviſed reſolutions. Alexander the great carried himſelf, in ſome particulars, as if he had been of the ſame opinion. Plu. life of Sylla.

Quoties illum fortuna a morte revocavit! quoties temere in pericula vectum perpetuâ felicitate protexit! Quint. Curtius.

Timotheus the Athenian was of a contrary opinion to Sylla; for having atchieved many noble victories, would not allow of the conceit of the painter, that had made a table, where Fortune was taking in thoſe cities which he had won, with a net, whilſt he was ſleeping; but proteſted againſt her in that behalf, and would not grant her any part in that buſineſs. And at his return from the wars, Timotheus upon relating ſome of his victories, ſaid: And in this, ye men of Athens, Fortune had no part. It is obſerved, Timotheus never proſpered after, in any undertaking. Plu. life of Sylla.

Upon the defeat of the Spaniſh armada, queen Elizabeth had a medal ſtruck, to perpetuate the memory of that extraordinary event. And it is well known how the king of Spain, and others, who were the enemies of that great princeſs, to derogate from her glory, aſcribed the ruin of their fleet rather to the violence of ſtorms and tempeſts, than to the bravery of the Engliſh. Queen Elizabeth, inſtead of looking upon this as a diminution of her honour, valued herſelf upon ſuch a ſignal favour of providence; and accordingly in the reverſe of the medal above-mentioned, has repreſented a fleet beaten by the tempeſt, and falling foul upon one another, with that religious inſcription. Afflavit Deus & diſſipantur. He blew with his wind, and they were ſcattered. Reign of queen Eliz.

diſpoſed, is liable to be beat by half the number: which is generally the caſe of great armies defeated by ſmall ones. What wonder is it? when upon examination it is found there is as great, if not a greater number fight in the ſmall army, by the help of a good diſpoſition, than in the great one. As the victories of Belgrade [a], Zenta [a], Azincour [b], Arar [c], Crimeſus [d], Salamis [e], and Marathon [e], and many others witneſs. Salamis was a ſea fight; for when Xerxes entered Athens, and every one propoſed in a council of war what his fears ſuggeſted, it was reſolved to defend the Iſthmus by ſea and land. But Themiſtocles afterwards perceiving the Grecian fleet withdrawing from the ſtraits of Salamis; he oppoſed it with ſo much heat, that Eurybiades the Spartan offered to ſtrike him. Strike if you will, ſays Themiſtocles; but hear what I ſay. He then told them their chief dependance muſt be upon their ſhipping: that they were now in poſſeſſion of the narrow ſeas, which would ſufficiently perplex the enemy: that the improving that advantage was of the laſt conſequence to their affairs. Eurybiades and the generals at laſt ſubmitted to his reaſons, and were reconciled to each other. The reſult of their councils was, that they ſhould prepare jointly to receive the Perſians in the Iſthmus by land, and in the ſtraits of Salamis by ſea. And when the fight began, and the Perſians entered the ſtraits; they gave the Greeks an opportunity of exerciſing their ſkill and diſcipline without being able to uſe their only advantage, which was their numbers.

[aa] Hiſtory of prince Eugene. [b] Engliſh and French hiſtory of Henry the Vth. of England. [c] Cæſar's com. war with the Helvetians. Arar, now the Soane. [d] Plut. life of Timoleon the Corinthian. [ee] Stanyan's hiſtory of Greece.

This

This indeed is comparing great things with ſmall. But what is applicable to the one, is to the other. However, the target is ſo far well diſpoſed, that the enemy can contrive no way to prevent the body forming a front every way, and commanding at the ſame time all it's fire. Should the enemy be oppoſite one face only, it muſt be the rear; as the body will wheel the rear towards it; conſequently then makes uſe of all it's fire, as before deſcribed. Should the enemy divide, to be oppoſite more faces than the rear, the faces oppoſite the enemy may fire as they ſtand faced; the face that has no enemy to annoy it, may aſſiſt the rear as before. They may act in this manner, if they have a mind, againſt cavalry only; though to us, the others are much the better methods; commanding fire enough, and being much ſtronger againſt the charge of a ſquadron; which would be found very material at ſuch a time. By theſe methods there is no poſſibility of depriving the target of the fire of a ſingle muſket. The wings and flanks being able under the protection of the body and one another, to fire as they pleaſe: which ſhews the body can't well be taken, 'till the wings and flanks are deſtroyed: which would be difficult to do, being alſo defended by the body: the target being a poſition of that ſort, that though the body preſerves a face every way, and fire to defend every face beſides what is lodged in the face itſelf; there is no part to be attacked, but it can have the fire of the whole to defend it; though the part attacked is but a ſmall part of the whole. By this time it muſt appear by the many forms and changes the target can occaſionally put on; few of which, if any, can be proved uſeleſs; it muſt appear, it comprehends a greater part of that branch of the art of war relative to the diſpoſal of troops, for a de-

fenſive action, than might have been firſt imagined, could have been made uſe of with ſo ſmall a number as a ſingle battalion, or ſeven hundred and twenty men in an open country. This, which ought to be it's greateſt merit, will be eſteemed by ſome it's greateſt fault. Plain underſtandings will naturally think plain things are beſt; with whom we ſhould readily agree, was there the ſame uſe in them. However, though the many changes of the target employ the attention of the ſeveral commanders, the body being always compleat, there is no danger in making them; and they are made according to the courſe of the action, as things ariſe and as occaſion offers. It is a maxim, in a country ſurrounded with the enemy, we ſhould be prepared for every event: it may be called a country ſo ſurrounded, that requires the target; wherefore, it may be aſked, whether it is not as well, or better, for the commander of the target to have at his option, a poſition ſuitable to every kind of attempt that can be made againſt it, which is obſerving ſtrictly the above maxim; than to have one only poſition for all kind of attacks, as the ſquare and orb. This would be like a general, who to every different method his enemy was drawn up, had only one to oppoſe them; which ſhould the enemy know, would probably never ſuit. The target having a poſition adapted to every ſort of enemy, has it at it's option to uſe it, if it pleaſes; but is not more obliged, neither is it's ruin nearer (if ſo near) though it did not, as it is to any fixed poſition, as a ſquare, or orb, which though it ſtood in need of it, cannot have it. Should the commander of the target not underſtand it's nature, or diſpoſition in general; he might obſerve however, without being confounded, to keep the rear to the enemy, and the wings in triangles, and leave the flanks

flanks to their own diſcretion: then the defence will be greater againſt any kind of enemy than a ſquare, orb, or ſingle figure in the ſame circumſtances: but he muſt allow at the ſame time his defence to be much weaker, and himſelf greatly inferior to him who moves and varies his target pertinently and ſuitably to the motions of the enemy. [5] However, to help the memory a little, we will mention the principal rules to be obſerved at the enemy's approach. The firſt is, the body opens with the rear to the largeſt part of the enemy, and infantry before cavalry; if it is cavalry only, the wings cover two ſides, 'till it is perceived whether they diſmount or not: ſhould they not diſmount, the whole body is covered: ſhould they diſmount, the wings draw off again to their firſt poſition; and with the enemy on one ſide only, ſtand expanded: but in all uncertainties, when the enemy conſiſts of infantry and cavalry, and diſpoſed on different ſides; the wings then are in triangles (unleſs otherways particularly ordered.) Theſe are the firſt and principal movements of the target at the enemy's approach: the reſt being the natural conſequences, are ſo obvious, that the motions of the enemy would almoſt point them out to the common men, though they had never ſeen them. It may be alledged perhaps, that the target comprehends too much for one particular ſituation or country: to this it may be ſaid, if it has been thought neceſſary always to have a poſition that anſwers the purpoſes a ſquare has been thought to afford; it muſt certainly be neceſſary to have poſitions which do in reality anſwer thoſe purpoſes:

[5] Avec une ordonnance ſuſceptible de toutes ſortes de formes, & d'arrangements, ſe prêtant par conſequént à tout ſe que ſon habileté peut lui ſuggérer, un grand général ne ſera jamais embarraſſé. La phalange coupée et doublée, ch. 11. art 3.

which we deny to be in any ſquare, orb, or ſingle figure, when diſcreetly and rationally attacked.

Folard, Trai. de la colonne. ch. 3.

[6] We have long found out, what Folard obſerves, Plutarch has diſcovered in the deſcription he gives of Craſſus's army in the form of a ſquare. Plutarch (ſays he) ſeems to admire this poſition, which ſerves only to prove as great an ignorance as a general could labour under. Though this figure may ſtrike the eye of a man who is no ſoldier, to one who is, it diſcovers the ſecret of rendering uſeleſs two thirds of the infantry. Folard ſeems to hold Plutarch cheap in this point. The reaſon this poſition has ſo long been in faſhion, muſt be either becauſe no better has been found out, or having been long practiſed, no body has dared to cenſure it, (eſpecially not knowing how to mend it) or perhaps what has happened, may again; and things we receive from our forefathers frequently paſs current without being looked into or examined, as if they muſt be right of courſe, and it was impoſſible they ſhould err. This is a ſort of deference poſterity is very apt to pay to age and experience that are gone before them, though they do not always merit it. In this manner the greateſt men have often wandered in darkneſs; and when a light has broke in, things have appeared ſo contrary to what they had before conceived, they have ſtood amazed upon looking back; and have almoſt bluſhed at ſeeing the dark road they had ſo long been travelling [7]. Before we conclude, we muſt mention one

Traite de la colonne, ch. 3.

[6] Speaking of the ſquare, Folard ſays, "Je conclus de la que le quarré vuide & le plein ne ſont pas meilleurs l'un que l'autre; & ſi nous n'avons rien de plus parfait, comme en effet nous n'avons pas autre choſe, ou'en ſommes nous?

Aizma, lib. 45.

[7] A remarkable inſtance of this happened in the year 1665. When the famous penſionary John De Witt came on board the Dutch fleet, he found it

one more material advantage belonging to the target: owing intirely to it's being drawn up in ſix diſtinct bodies or diviſions. It may be aſked what is the conſequence of all actions; it may be anſwered, one ſure conſequence, is confuſion more or leſs: for which reaſon it is the buſineſs of every commander in chief, in every ſort of diſpoſition, to expect this as a certainty; and to take all precautions to prevent this growing evil as much as he can. Confuſion among troops in action, being like fire in buildings, which unleſs timely put a ſtop to,

it ſhut up in the Texel; ſo that, though it was abſolutely neceſſary to put to ſea, to ſecure the ſafe paſſage of the outward bound Eaſt-India fleet, the ſeamen unanimouſly agreed the thing was impoſſible, as the wind then ſtood. The penſionary De Witt was alone of another opinion, and he made no difficulty of declaring it; though in this he oppoſed his own ſentiments, to the common judgement of thoſe who ought to have been beſt ſkilled in their own profeſſions.

There are at the mouth of the Texel, three paſſages between the ſands; and theſe are the Lands-diep, the Slenk, and the Spaniards-gat. It was the received doctrine of the ſeamen, that there were but ten points of the compaſs, from which if the wind blew, ſhips could go out; and that twenty-two were againſt them; the penſionary De Witt, as he was a great mathematician, ſoon diſcovered the falſity of this notion, and that there were in reality no leſs than twenty-eight points in their favour; and but four that could hinder them from going out; viz. W.—N. W. by W.—N. W.—N. W. by N. The pilots however, perceiving that he reckoned upon all the paſſages, declared poſitively, that in the Spaniards-gat there was not above ten or twelve feet water; and therefore it was impoſſible to carry out large ſhips by that paſſage. Their aſſertion did not ſatisfy the penſionary; he went through it in a long-boat in perſon at low water; and without truſting the lead out of his hand, found it at leaſt twenty feet deep every where, and free from thoſe incumbrances which the pilots had hitherto talked of. The penſionary therefore engaged that himſelf and M. Van Haaren would carry out the two greateſt ſhips in the fleet through the Spaniards-gat, with the wind at S. S. W. which he performed on the 16th of Auguſt 1665, and the greateſt part of the fleet followed him without the leaſt accident; ſince which, that paſſage has been called, and very deſervedly, Witts-diep. This has been always eſteemed one of the moſt remarkable actions of his life; and has in ſome meaſure contributed to render his memory immortal.

Memoirs et hiſtoire de C. & J. De Witt, p. 374. It is alſo taken notice of in the 2d vol. of the lives of the admirals.

De Witt was alſo the inventer of chain-ſhot.

is ſure to get ſtrength [8]: and the more contiguous buildings are, the more apt is the fire to increaſe: was every houſe ſeparate, it ſtops of courſe with the loſs of one houſe. The confuſion in the target is the ſame: when it happens in any of theſe diviſions, it can't run through the whole from one to another, as it might if they were one contiguous body, being cut off by intervening ſpaces; therefore goes no farther than a diviſion, ſuppoſing the worſt, that it does not recover itſelf by the means of the diviſions remaining in good order; in this particular they help one another greatly. The Romans were ſo ſenſible of this confuſion in battles, that they divided their legion into ten ſeparate cohorts; each cohort into five diſtinct centuries; and to each century they allotted a ſtandard, upon which were letters ſpecifying the cohort and century: that in ever ſo great a confuſion the ſoldiers, by ſeeing and reading theſe inſcriptions, could repair to their proper places. Beſides this, the centurions, that they might be the more eaſily known, and to prevent miſtakes, had inſcriptions wrote on the creſts of their helmets; that both the ſtandards and centurions themſelves might be better guides to their reſpective centuries. And though the target is divided in ſeveral diviſions, and conſequently reaps by it the advantages the legion did; it can, when well conducted, as well as the legion, act like one intire body: like a man active in all his limbs, and knows how to uſe them ſingly or all together: for it has ſolidity, agility, variety, and without confuſion, liberty; ſecurity on it's flanks, dependency, independency; and above all, quantity of

Veg. li. 2. ca. 13.

[8] Malum quo non velocius ullum;
Mobilitate viget, virefque acquirit eundo:
Virg. Æneid. li. 4.

fire;

fire; is occaſionally active, fearleſly and ſafely paſſive: eſſential properties inherited by no ſingle figure: the hollow ſquare and orb, can lay claim to independency only; if the orb ſix deep, has pretenſions to any more, it can be but to one; which is, (like an ox, an elephant, or a dull unwieldy Ajax [9]) ſolidity. To make the target act conſonantly with harmony and uniformity, is to place ſuch officers at the head of theſe ſeparate bodies, who not only have a knowledge of their own ſeparate commands, but have a right underſtanding of the whole. In actions military, faults are wont to propagate themſelves: one begets another: there being a ſort of connection and dependency of one corps with another, which requires a conſiſtency in their actions; like the wheels of a clock, where one out of order ſtops the whole machine. To compare once more great things with ſmall. Prince Eugene of Savoy had a quick diſcernment in finding out the talents of his officers; and was uſed to employ them in what was beſt adapted to their peculiar talents. Nor were thoſe who were particularly attached to him preferred to others, if he knew they had leſs merit.

Folard, tom. 3. parellele du P. Eugene & le duc de Vendome.

It was obſerved of marſhal Turenne, when he drew up his troops for a battle, that he ranked his ſoldiers of different nations, according to the knowledge he had of their genius's, and regulated the poſts of their officers, rather by their capacity than precedency [1]. The great Scipio Africanus

Ramſay's character of Turenne.

Polyb. li. 10. ca. 2.

[9] Αἶαν ἀμαρτοεπὲς βουγάϊε.
Ajax blatero, ingens et hebes.

Clark's Homer iliad. 13.

[1] Beſides knowing the particular talents of his own officers; it was a ſtanding maxim of prince Eugene, that a general ſhould know the genius of thoſe who command againſt him, even before he enters the field: upon this principle, though otherways a man of few words, he knew ſo well how to ſound every priſoner of war who came in his way, that by the help of an excellent memory he underſtood the good and bad qualities of all the generals of his time:

Hiſt. of prince Eugene.

Africanus was intirely of the ſame ſentiments. He thought nothing more neceſſary to bring his enterprizes to a happy iſſue, than the ſkill and adroitneſs of particular officers. Great actions certainly require great abilities. There can't be a more convincing proof of this, than in the examples of Alexander and his generals. It is ſaid of the latter, after the death of Alexander, that one would have thought they were ſo many kings, they were endued with ſo many great qualities, that commanded ſo much reſpect. They had ſuch beauty, majeſty, and comelineſs

time: even the grand vizirs whom he had never ſeen, were better known to him than to the ſultan who employed them. And as he could not but know, ſo neither did he fail to take advantage of the marquis de Bulonde's foible. He wrote a letter to the marquis de Rovere, governor of Coni, at the time of the ſiege in 1691, to inform him that he was coming to his relief; and hoped the next day to attack the beſiegers in their lines; deſiring him as ſoon as he was engaged, to make a general ſally with his garriſon. This letter he gave to a peaſant, whom he ordered to deliver with all expedition. The fellow was ſeized, as the prince expected, and the letter found in his pocket, and carried to Bulonde: who, though he had before received advice from Catinat the French general, that prince Eugene was on the march; but that the marquis of Sylveſtre would come up with a reinforcement to the beſiegers, before he could poſſibly arrive; was yet ſo terrified at the prince's letter, that he ordered the ſiege to be raiſed precipitately, and left behind his artillery, ammunition, and baggage. The garriſon took poſſeſſion of this booty, and ſlew all the wounded that Bulonde had left in his camp.

Ramſay's Hiſt. of Turenne, li. 14.

Turenne ſeemed to have had as quick a talent at finding out not only the particular qualities of his own officers, but of thoſe who commanded againſt him, as prince Eugene. For at the ſiege of Arras, in the year 1654, the Spaniſh quarter commanded by the count de Fuenſaldagne, was to the north, on the ſide of the road to Lens: the prince of Conde at the head of the French, and the duke of Wirtemburg with his troops, were poſted to the ſouth: the quarter where the archduke was lodged with the German and Flemiſh forces reached to the eaſt, from Courtrai road to the Scarp: Dom Fernand de Solis with the Italians, and prince Francois de Lorrain with his troops, extended themſelves on the weſt, from Perne to the ſouth. Whilſt Turenne, to view theſe lines, was ſkirting along pretty near the quarter of Dom Fernand de Solis, the cannon of the Spaniards killed ſeveral of his ſoldiers: ſome of the officers apprehending a yet greater miſchief, could

lineſs in their perſons; ſuch greatneſs of ſtrength and wiſdom; that they who did not know them, would have thought they were men choſen, not from one nation, but from the whole world. Who then, ſays Juſtin, will wonder that the world ſhould be conquered, when there Lib. 13.

could not forbear murmuring, and even repreſenting to the viſcount, that by going ſo near he expoſed the whole body of the troops that were with him to an unavoidable defeat, in caſe the enemy ſhould ſally out of their lines to attack it. The viſcount confeſſed he would not have ventured to do on the prince of Conde's ſide, what he did on the ſide of the Spaniards quarters: but that he was ſo well acquainted with their exceſſive caution, as to be very ſure that Dom Fernand would not undertake any thing, till he had firſt ſent for orders to the count de Fuenſaldagne, the Spaniſh generaliſſimo; that the count would go himſelf to ſpeak of the matter to the archduke; that the archduke would not fail to invite the prince of Conde to a council: and that while all theſe were conſulting one another, he ſhould have time enough to reconnoitre the lines and retire. Every thing happened juſt as he had foreſeen; and the Spaniards came to no concluſion 'till it was too late. And upon viewing the lines, though they were very ſtrong; the viſcount determined to attack them on the 24th of Auguſt, the eve of Saint Louis. It was reſolved the chief attack ſhould be at Dom Fernand de Solis's quarter, and that part of Fuenſaldagne's which was neareſt to it; theſe places being the weakeſt, and the fartheſt from the prince of Conde: and to have at the ſame time three falſe attacks. The diſpoſitions being made, publick prayers were offered at the head of each battalion and each ſquadron. At ſunſet, the army began to croſs the Scarp, and arrived at the place at the time appointed. Turenne's infantry paſſed the lines with not ſo much difficulty as was expected: La Ferte's attack was not ſo fortunate; but by the help of Turenne's troops, afterwards entered the lines. The enemy upon D'Hocquincourt's arrival, towards the morning, who came not ſo ſoon as Turenne, being forced in every quarter; at break of day, Conde alone croſſed through the archduke's quarters, and adviſed him to think of a retreat. He marched with what cavalry he could get together to ſtop the fury of the French, and fell firſt upon thoſe who were buſy in plundering; then beat La Ferte, who inconſiderately came down from an eminence: but he dared not puſh him, becauſe he perceived a body of troops upon an eminence, which the marſhal had quitted; and he retired to a neighbouring hill, with an intention as ſoon as his infantry ſhould join him, to go and attack thoſe troops he ſaw upon the eminence; Turenne had there aſſembled all the troops he could, and cauſed ſome cannon to be brought: the fire of this artillery ſtopt the battalions which Conde would have marched againſt him, and ſo diſcouraged them, that the prince was obliged to deſiſt; and the more be- Mem. of the duke of York.

there were ſuch men to conquer it? [2] This choice of officers ſhews plainly that the ſentiments of Philip and Alexander were (as is already ſaid) that great actions required great and ſuitable abilities: as the finer and more difficult the work is; the nicer and more ſharp muſt be the inſtruments [3].

Life of Conde.

cauſe ſome troops that had entered Arras, ſallied out. Conde and Turenne, without being told, gueſſed each of them where the other was. By the prudent conduct ſhewn in not puſhing La Ferte too far; the viſcount judged that Conde commanded the troops that had beaten him; and the prince did not doubt but it was Turenne who had poſted himſelf upon the eminence before mentioned.

[2] As a little idea has been given of the Roman armies when they were in high perfection; and alſo of the chief officers of the Macedonian army; we will now ſhew what ſort of men theſe great officers commanded: by which we may form a judgement of the ſort of armies that founded the two greateſt empires that ever exiſted. Alexander ſet out for his Perſian expedition, or conqueſt of the eaſt, with thirty-two thouſand foot, and four thouſand five hundred horſe. It is related, if we had ſeen the beginning of his camp, we ſhould have ſaid, we had ſeen the ſenate of ſome ancient republick. "Hac tam parva manu univerſum terrarum orbem, utrum ſit admirabilius vicerit, an adgredi auſus fuerit, incertum eſt; cum ad tam periculoſum bellum exercitum legerit, non juvenes robuſtos, nec primo flore ætatis, ſed veteranos pleroſque etiam emeritæ militiæ, qui cum patre patruiſque militaverant, elegit: ut non tam milites, quam magiſtros militiæ electos putares. Ordines quoque nemo niſi ſexagenarius duxit: ut ſi principia caſtrorum cerneres, ſenatum te alicujus priſcæ reipublicæ videre diceres. Itaque nemo in prælio fugam, ſed victoriam cogitavit: nec in pedibus cuiquam ſpes, ſed in lacertis fuit.

Juſtin. lib. 11.

[3] That great miniſter cardinal de Richelieu remarked very judiciouſly, that every one conceived things according to their capacities: the greateſt actions ſeemed eaſy to men of deep underſtandings and ſtout hearts; to thoſe who had not theſe qualities, every thing appeared difficult.

Folard, tom. 3.

Cardinal de Retz was a good deal of this way of thinking, for he obſerved, all great things that remain unexecuted, appear always impracticable to thoſe who are incapable of any thing great: and that what has made ſome men the moſt remarkable, is their having obſerved before others the critical minute which made the undertaking of them poſſible. He obſerves again, that all projects of an extraordinary kind, are never thought poſſible by thoſe who are capable of only ordinary ones, but when they ſee them executed. This, he ſays, Longinus, that famous chancellor to queen Zenobia, has obſerved before in his Sublime.

Memoirs of card. de Retz, li. 3. an. 1654.

But

But to return to the target; whoſe chief qualities having been fully related, there is no neceſſity to be tedious in ſhewing how it is reduced, the danger then being over. However, when it is required; the flanks and a platoon of the right wing muſt ſtand their ground, whilſt the five other platoons of the wings march into the body, and then into their firſt places: the parts of the body required, moving to give them room: the platoon in the body ſeparating alſo to fill up their firſt places. The target now being in a triangle, is farther reduced to a ſtraight line; by the ſide faces of the triangle joining the flanks and compleating the battalion. There is no neceſſity to mention the reduction of the laſt method of forming the target, being quicker and eaſier than this. The reduction ſhall finiſh this volume, with the compariſon of Iphicrates the Athenian; to give our readers the right and true ſenſe of the target. For according to his diviſion, the light-armed were the hands; the cavalry, the feet; the infantry, the breaſt; and the general, the head: in this light is the target to be underſtood. The wings being the arms or hands; the flanks, the feet; the body, the breaſt; the general or commander, the head; and the platoon in the center, may be ſaid to be the heart. Wherefore, whoever prefers a ſquare, orb, or any ſingle figure of theſe ſizes, formed for the ſame purpoſes, againſt a prepared enemy, to the target; might as well prefer a maimed, weak, and mutilated man, without either heart, hands, or feet; to a man active and daring, ſtrong and perfect [4].

Plu. life of Pelopidas.

[4] When Artaxerxes reſolved upon a war with the king of Ægypt, he ſolicited the Athenians to licenſe Iphicrates to come into his ſervice; deſiring he might command his auxiliaries, which conſiſted of a body of twelve thouſand men. Theſe forces he ſo inſtructed and trained up; that as the

Cor. Nepos, life of Iphicrates.

Fabiani were diſtinguiſhed among the Roman ſoldiers; the Iphicratenſes were in no leſs eſteem among the Grecians.

Plu. life of Galba. Iphicrates was of an opinion, that a ſoldier of fortune ought to be covetous and ſenſual; to put him upon bold adventures, to lay in a ſtock to gratify his luſts.

To harden him to do, what Lælius promiſed in his own perſon on the behalf of the reſt.

Lucan, li. 1.
Pectore ſi fratris gladium, juguloque parentis
Condere me jubeas; plenæque in viſcera partu
Conjugis, invitâ peragam tamen omnia dextrâ.

In another place;

Lucan.
Nulla fides pietaſque viris qui caſtra ſequuntur,
Venaleſque manus: ibi fas, ubi maxima merces.

Plu. life of Galba. But Plato obſerving nothing ſucceed well under a brave general, unleſs the army was alſo ſober and agreeable; judged, that to obey orderly, as well as to command, required a generous temper, with conſtant diſcipline and exerciſe; chiefly to allay their hot ſpirits and active humour, with gentleneſs and civility.

And with regard to the different opinions of Iphicrates and Plato, we can't but ſuppoſe that every chriſtian, whether a ſoldier or not, agrees intirely with Plato. This is a concern that has not eſcaped a late author on military affairs. For ſpeaking of the uſefulneſs of chaplains in an army: he ſays, when they are well choſen, well directed, and properly employed; they might be of notable benefit to an army. I would not, ſays he, be miſunderſtood, or thought ſo unfaſhionable, as gravely and dryly to recommend the ſervice of God to a world ſo conſtituted as the preſent; but the ſneerers will ſpare me, when they find that I here adviſe a conſtant and regular performance of divine ſervice in the field; not purely on a moral, but pretty much on a political account; and in uniform purſuance of one of my principal heads, the good œconomy of the army. That this is effectually promoted by the means here recommended, is not, with me, a point of empty ſpeculation, but a fact confirmed by experience. In ſhort, I will venture to affirm (becauſe I have ſeen it ſo) that by making your army better men, you make them better ſoldiers: and that a ſpirit of order, inſtilled into them in this particular point, ſoon diffuſes itſelf through the whole œconomy, and will be plainly ſeen in their perſons, their cloaths, arms, accoutrements; their conduct, diligence, and obedience; and even in their courage and reſolution againſt the enemy; of which, this is the firmeſt and moſt laſting foundation, let the abandoned, profligate debauchee, think what he pleaſes.

A courſe of ſtanding rules for an army in the field, by a lieut. general. ch. 3. ſec. 4. an. 1744.

Cyropedia, li. 3. So much ſays this author upon this head. And Xenophon, who was, as well as the above, a ſoldier and an author, ſays likewiſe, from experience; that they who in action are ſuperſtitiouſly given, ſtand ſo much the leſs in fear of men. Xenophon's meaning of the word ſuperſtitiouſly here, is not to be underſtood in our ſtrict ſenſe of the word; ſo much, as a true manly devotion. But as we are now upon this head; we will take it in our meaning

meaning of the word. Superſtition and ignorance always go together; therefore, there is no body ſo ſuſceptible of it, as common, low, ignorant people; ſuch, who for the generality compoſe the greater part of an army: though it appears ridiculous to men of underſtanding, it generally operates ſo violently, either for or againſt; either encouraging or intimidating; that when it happens in armies, as it generally does, more or leſs, (eſpecially in times of danger) it is not to be lightly and contemptibly looked upon; being capable of doing great miſchief or great good. Whoever has read the hiſtories of England or France, could never let the maid of Orleans eſcape their attention; and the influence that girl had upon the troops. However, we will relate ſome particular inſtances of the influence of ſuperſtition in armies.

St. Anthony of Padua is the patron of the kingdom of Portugal; and the Portugueze pay a great devotion to this tutelar ſaint, to whom they think they are indebted for ſeveral victories. They pretend, that when they ſhook off the Spaniſh yoke to ſubmit to the houſe of Braganza; they had infallible proofs that this ſaint favoured and protected them. Whereupon they demanded of their king, that this ſaint ſhould be declared perpetual generaliſſimo of their armies; and the king was forced to comply with their requeſt. He accordingly ſummoned his council, to which all the grandees of the kingdom were called; and the requeſt of the nation was laid before them. Some repreſented, that St. Anthony having never ſerved in their armies during his life; this poſt could not be conferred upon him after his death: and that it was ſufficient for him to be the patron and protector of Portugal, in order to be likewiſe the patron and protector of their armies. This reaſon did not ſatisfy the nation; they perſiſted in their requeſt. The king, to pleaſe both ſides, reſolved to make St. Anthony paſs through all the military degrees, that he might come at laſt to be generaliſſimo. For this purpoſe he made a promotion of general officers, wherein St. Anthony was declared brigadier of the armies of the king of Portugal; afterwards the ſaint was declared marſhal de camp; and then lieutenant general; after this, he was declared perpetual generaliſſimo of the Portugueze armies. An houſhold and officers were aſſigned him. And it was ordered that the buſto of this ſaint ſhould always be carried in the army next the general: that the order ſhould be always given in the name of St. Anthony. This has been practiſed by the Portugueze ever ſince. When therefore the enemy were upon the banks of the river Sabugal near Almeida, in 1704, ready to paſs it, a cannon ball carried off the buſto of the ſaint; ſtruck with amaze, the Portugueze, like troops who loſe a general in whom they repoſe all their confidence, took the alarm, and thought of nothing but making their eſcape. In vain did the king of Portugal endeavour to ſtop them; he was never able to remove their pannic, or to rally them; but being chagrined at this kind of defeat, he quitted the army, and returned to Liſbon.

Life of the duke of Berwick.

When Peter the 2d emperor of Ruſſia was upon his travels; a rebellion broke out in his kingdom. And when the rebels were about 40 miles from Moſcow, general Gordon ſent to them, to know if they would return to their

Bancks, li. and reign of Peter the great, emp. of all Ruſſia.

their duty. They perſiſted to come to Moſcow, and oppoſe thoſe that came againſt them. Upon this reſolute anſwer, the general fired ſome cannon over their heads, to awe and ſummon them to a ſurrender: but the rebels finding the ſhot do no execution, the prieſts immediately gave out it was a miracle; and that the ſhot could not hurt them: upon which the rebels gave a ſhout, and run upon Gordon's army, and there began a very ſharp engagement, which laſted near two hours. When the rebels, finding that the battle was in earneſt, and that they had between two and three thouſand men killed on the ſpot; they ſurrendered themſelves priſoners, very few making their eſcape.

There cannot well be more ſurpriſing inſtances of the effects of ſuperſtition than what we have mentioned; and what makes them more ſo, is, the two latter happening ſo few years ago, when one would have thought the veil of darkneſs was too much withdrawn to have ſuffered it to have had ſuch an influence upon the minds of men. In ancient ages it would not have been ſo aſtoniſhing; and there are many ſtrong inſtances of it, though none that we have met, exceed the above. And the wiſer people knew how to turn it oftentimes to advantage.

Xenophon's Cyropedia. The army of Cyrus at Tymbrea, in the preſence of Creſus's, took a clap of thunder that was heard for an ill omen: the impreſſion it made upon the troops eſcaped not the eye of Cyrus; but the cool temper he knew how to put on, on ſuch an occaſion, ſuggeſted to him an interpretation that animated the ſoldiers. "My friends, cried he, the heavens declare for us; let us march on; I underſtand the ſound of victory.

Great Jupiter! We follow you."

Thucydides, lib. 7. In the war the Athenians made in Sicily, upon their ſeveral defeats, it was propoſed to quit the iſland. And juſt as they were preparing to ſail, there happened to be an eclipſe of the moon, which was looked upon as very ominous, and was ſo ſuperſtitiouſly obſerved by the Athenian generals, that they reſolved to ſtay twenty-ſeven days longer, which was the term limited by the ſoothſayers. This delay afterwards proved fatal to them and their army.

Joſephus's wars of the Jews. The Jews ſo ſuperſtitiouſly kept their ſabbath, that in the ſpeech Agrippa made to them, to perſuade them from going to war with the Romans, he ſays, "And if you obſerve the cuſtom of the ſabbath day, and will not be prevailed on to do any thing thereon; you will eaſily be taken, as were your

1.7.3. Antiq. 14. 4. 3. forefathers by Pompey, who was the buſieſt in his ſiege on thoſe days the beſieged reſted.

Echard's Rom. hiſt. Numa, to gain the more credit and obedience to his conſtitutions among the Romans, pretended he had often and immediate converſe with the goddeſs Egeria; and would be often telling them, that ſtrange viſions and apparitions were ſeen, and prophetic voices heard: which ſtories had great and remarkable effects upon a people ſo ſuperſtitiouſly inclined.

Plu. life of Quin. Sertorius. When Quintus Sertorius was in Spain; Spanus a countryman gave him a milk-white young hind, which grew ſo tame and gentle that it followed him whereſoever he went; and could endure the noiſe and tumult of the camp.

camp. Sertorius, knowing well that barbarous people are naturally prone to ſuperſtition, by degrees gave out, it was inſpired by a deity; that it was given him by the goddeſs Diana; that it diſcovered to him hidden myſteries, and revealed to him what was to come to paſs hereafter: to which alſo he added theſe farther contrivances; if he had received at any time private intelligence, he pretended the hind informed him of it in his ſleep, and charged him to keep his forces in readineſs: or if he had notice of any victory by the commanders under him, he would hide the meſſengers, and bring forth the hind crowned with flowers, for joy of good news that was to come; and would encourage them to rejoice and ſacrifice to the gods, for the good account they ſhould ſoon receive of their proſperous ſucceſs: and by theſe inventions filling their heads with ſtrange imaginations, and the thoughts of miracles; he brought them to be more tractable and obedient in all things; for now they thought themſelves no longer led by a ſtranger, but rather conducted by a heroe, or one nearly related to the gods.

In the deſcription given of Tamerlane, it is ſaid, that he wore his hair long and curled, contrary to the manner of the Tartars, who ſhave their heads, having the ſame always covered; whereas he was generally bare-headed, commanding his ſon alſo, to be ſo by his tutors brought up; his hair was of a dark colour, ſomething like a violet, right beautiful to behold; which his mother coming from the race of Sampſon (as he gave it out) willed him to nouriſh, in token of his deſcent; the cauſe that made him to be more reſpected of his men of war; moſt part of them believing that in thoſe hairs were ſome rare virtue, or rather ſome fatal deſtiny. Knole's and ſir Paul Rycaut's hiſt. of the Turks, li. of Mahomet, 5.

Themiſtocles the Athenian uſed religion only as a cloak, though it was generally for the ſervices of the publick. This was the uſe he made of ſigns, prodigies, dreams, omens, and oracles, and other divine revelations; which he knew how to interpret, according to the ſpirit he was to raiſe in the minds of the people. Stanyan, Gre. hiſ.

And Epaminondas perceiving the Thebans as they marched out of the city terrified by omens and prodigies, which they interpreted to portend ill ſucceſs to them; to prevent the bad effects of their ſuperſtition, invented other counter omens, and auguries, which he took care to have explained in a favourable manner to the ſoldiers: and by way of encouragement, repeated a verſe out of Homer. "There was one ſure omen to thoſe who fought for their country" Stan.

Εις οἰωνὸς ἄριστος ἀμυνέσθαι περὶ πατρης.

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